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In simultaneously pursuing commercial and social goals, specialist microfinance organisations 
(MFOs) are leading examples of social enterprises working in development. Yet evidence of the 
feasibility of such ‘double bottom line’ management is limited. The thesis takes a comparative case 
study approach to investigating the dynamics of a social enterprise model of microfinance, with 
particular emphasis on its role in promoting employment related goals. Case study material consists 
primarily of the experience of two Central Asian MFOs that participated in an action research project 
‘Microfinance for Decent Work’ implemented by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Data 
was obtained through participant observation, staff interviews, client level surveys, and it also 
includes reflective practice arising from my participation in the ILO project as a consultant to both 
MFOs between 2008 and 2012. The findings are mixed. One of the MFOs was more strongly 
internally motivated to achieve social goals, and was more successful in implementing SPM 
initiatives. The other was motivated more by the goal to demonstrate social performance to external 
stakeholders, and was less responsive to the evidence generated. The thesis also illustrates both path 
dependence in the evolution of social performance management, and the limited capacity of external 
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Models of Social Enterprise?  
Microfinance Organisations as Promoters of Decent Work in Central Asia 
 
 




1.1. Microfinance and Performance Management  
 
Microfinance has often sparked the interest of people for being a “commercial” as well as a 
“development” intervention. Some views of performance-based management (PBM) of Microfinance 
Organisations (MFOs) focus primarily on creating sustainable commercial microfinance and see the 
development impact as a secondary objective (Robinson 2001; Von Pishke 1991; Seibel 1996; Rhyne 
2001). Others focus on generating social impacts for the microfinance clients and find achieving 
financial sustainability less important (see Hulme and Mosely 1996; Wood and Sharif 1997). The 
latter includes a more radical group of authors who argue microfinance is harmful for clients (e.g. 
Dichter 2005; Bateman and Chang 2009). A variety of authors examined both perspectives (Woller et 
al 1999; Dunford 2000; Mayoux 2000; Rhyne 2001; Robinson 2001; Nissanke 2002; van Maanen 
2004; Seibel et al. 2002; Kabeer 2008).  
 
In the last decade, a third perspective became popular, namely what may be labelled as “social 
enterprise”. This is the idea that it is feasible and desirable to pursue social and financial goals 
simultaneously (Dunford 2001; 2003; Yunus 2007). In microfinance this view is embodied in the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign that believes it is possible for MFOs to be financially sustainable and 
alleviate poverty (Daley Harris 2002; 2009; Simanowitz and Walter 2002:3-5&22). It is also 
embraced by the Social Performance Task Force that promotes social performance management 
(SPM) as a way to reach both client and MFO sustainability objectives (SPTF 2008:2012). SPM looks 
at the entire process by which impact is created and is a deliberate shift towards institutionalising 
social performance assessments and practices into the routine operations of MFOs (Copestake et al 
2005: 4; Hashemi 2007:3; Simanowitz and Walter 2002; Imp-Act 2004; 2005). Thus social enterprises 
differ from commercial organisations in that they manage social objectives for their clients, but they 
also differ from developmental organisations in that they are concerned with their own financial 
sustainability (see Navajas et al 2000:335; Dees and Anderson 2006 cited in Lehner 2012:39; 
Copestake 2007). However, despite the increasing popularity of this perspective there is limited 
evidence of the feasibility of such “double bottom line management”. 
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Although there is a reasonably standardized system of accounting to verify financial sustainability 
(e.g. Yaron 1992; Yaron et al. 1994; CGAP 1993), there is a substantial debate about how to measure 
social performance at the client level sufficiently reliably. Part of the debate involves whether to use 
quantitative (Duflo et al 2007: Karlan and Goldberg 2007), qualitative, or mixed methodologies to 
evaluate results  (Barnes et al. 2001; Nelson et al 2004). Another part concerns how to keep these 
performance appraisals cost-effective (Imp-Act 2004; Barnes et al. 2001:7; Duflo et al. 2007:30-41: 
Dunn 2008). A third discussion surrounds how the assessments themselves may lead to better 
performance management (Copestake and Simanowitz 2002; Karlan and Goldberg 2007).   
 
Social and financial performance management may generate synergies because client level 
assessments could stimulate organisational learning and inform ways to foster product innovation 
(Imp-Act 2004; 2005; Copestake et al 2005). Implementing SPM activities could even create a 
“business case” or “win-win” situation for clients and MFOs. However, in other cases, tensions arise 
in the allocation of resources and multi-tasking of goals (Schmidt and Tschach, 2001:22; Armendariz 
and Morduch, 2007: 266-267). Organisations that pursue double bottom line management may also be 
subject to the risk of mission drift (Christen 2001; Copestake 2007; Mersland and Strom 2007).  
 
From a broader perspective, the issue of institutionalizing social goals into organisational structures is 
part of a wider discussion in development management. On the one hand, “New development 
management” proposes PBM with development goals is desirable and effective (Binnendijk 2000; 
2001; Meier 2003; Brinkerhof 2008; Thomas and Mohan 2007; ILO 2008). However, the “Critical 
Development Management” school argues this is merely a way for Western development agencies to 
do social engineering (Cooke and Dar 2009:1-3). An open question is who drives the process of 
development management, donors or local agencies (Hulme 2007; Brinkerhof 2008; Cooke and Dar 
2009:1-3).   
 
The new institutional economics (NIE) and related fields also examine the dynamics of PBM in 
organisations (Kim 1993; Denzau and North 1994; North 1992; 2005; Boettke et al. 2008; Argyris and 
Schon 1996; Senge 2006). I focus on one part of this literature, namely Denzau and North’s (1994) 
notion of shared mental models (SMMs), which describes how institutional change cannot be 
separated from the way staff in organisations think and embed this thinking into organisational 
structures. In applying this theoretical concept, I will identify the above-mentioned perspectives of 
PBM in microfinance as “business first”, “development first”, and “social enterprise” SMMs (See 
Chapter II). Moreover, I also address the related problem of how to institutionalize a new way of 
thinking about SPM within MFOs.  




1.2. MFOs and Decent Work  
 
This thesis is about how far MFOs as a form of social enterprise incorporate social goals related to 
decent work for clients into their PBM. Since 1999, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has 
used the umbrella concept of decent work to support its political agenda, incorporating it into the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2005 (ILO 2007, March; 2008c; 2008e). It argued 
microfinance was making a strong contribution to decent work because it facilitates small investments 
in (self) employment and job creation, it can help the poor to manage risks through, savings, micro-
insurance and emergency loans (ILO 2005:1). At the same time, the Labour Organisation recognized 
there was limited evidence of impacts of microfinance. Studies found positive effects on work 
quantity, but showed very mixed results on the quality of the employment generated (e.g. Sebstad and 
Chen 1996; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Balkenhol 2007).  
 
The ILO Social Finance Programme suggested MFOs might be encouraged to intervene in certain 
decent work aspects such as job creation, child labour, formalisation, association of workers, risk 
management and social protection, over-indebtedness, working conditions and women’s 
empowerment (ILO 2007, Dec, see Chapter III). In 2008, it started a large “Microfinance for Decent 
Work action research project” to investigate whether microfinance companies can address some of 
these aspects (ILO 2007, Dec: ILO 2009, Feb). 22 MFOs in various parts of the world conducted a 
diagnostic survey that assessed decent work aspects among their borrowers. From 2009 to 2012, 16 
MFOs tested new ways of working by launching a pilot experiment and client level assessment in one 
specific decent work aspect (see Chapter III).  
 
I participated in the overall project and supported the selection of partner-organisations, the design of 
the assessments, and data analysis. At the same time, I decided to conduct a parallel academic research 
analysing how microfinance companies managed their pilot experiments. More specifically, I worked 
with two MFOs located in Central Asia. Bai Tushum in Kyrgyzstan had job creation for clients in its 
mission statement. The company launched a separate department for SME lending, with the objective 
to create more jobs among microfinance borrowers. We conducted a client level assessment using 
longitudinal data (see Chapter VI). IMON in Tajikistan pursued the objective of women’s 
entrepreneurship. The company launched a start-up loan and entrepreneurship training package for 
women with the aim of improving women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship. We conducted a 
quasi-experimental impact assessment using longitudinal data (see Chapter VII).    
 
This research draws from the ILO “Microfinance for Decent Work” project. It reports on the findings 
for the two MFOs and reflects critically on the effect of the pilot assessments on their practices of 
performance-based management. The thesis goes beyond social performance measurement and 
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assesses social performance management. It looks at how the MFOs managed the pilot experiment 
and used data outcomes for improvement of development practices. My participation raised one 
particular reflective question, namely could the ILO as an external agency (along with myself as an 
external consultant) have a sustained effect on the MFOs’ performance management. Or to what 
degree could the shared mental model (SMM) of the MFOs be influenced by the ILO and its decent 
work agenda? 
 
This thesis aims to bring back to the literature a better understanding of how you can assess 
development goals within a social enterprise in practice. How those goals are managed as part of 
double bottom line management. And subsequently, following the concept of SMMs proposed by  
Denzau and North (1994) what can be learned about the dynamics of PBM of social enterprises from 
their response to the ILO sponsored pilot assessment.  
 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
The central research question is: 
 
How do microfinance organisations incorporate social goals into their performance management, 
with particular reference to ILO’s “decent work” agenda in a Central Asian context? 
 
I assess this at three levels, namely social performance assessment, double bottom line management, 
and changes in PBM over time:  
 
Feasibility of Social Performance Assessment in Practice  
 
The entry point for addressing this question was an opportunity provided by the ILO to participate in 
an action research program. An initial subset of questions concern how the selected MFOs responded 
to this:  
1. What determined the willingness and capacity of the MFOs to carry out the decent work 
assessment at the outset of the pilot in 2009?  
2. What other initiatives were undertaken by the MFOs in PBM from 2009 to 2012?  
3. How did the MFOs manage their decent work pilot assessments?  






Feasibility of Double Bottom Line Management in Practice  
 
This experience enabled me to inquire into performance management practices of MFOs more 
generally, beyond the ILO pilot assessment. Subsidiary questions include:   
5. How did the MFOs act on the empirical findings to improve development practice?  
6. What capacity does this reveal in the organisations for SPM?  
7. What does this reveal about the sustainability of management of social goals. Is there a 
business case for managing employment related goals at client and MFO level?  
8. What tensions were observed in financial and social performance management?   
 
Influence of the ILO pilot on changes in PBM of MFOs.  
 
In addition to gaining insights into practices and culture of the MFOs, I hope to gain a better 
understanding of how the pilot changed over time and whether PBM could be influenced by external 
agencies. Subsidiary questions here include:   
9. To what extent did performance management practices of the MFOs change over the period 
2009 to 2012?  
10. To what extent can an external agency such as the ILO influence the performance 
management practices of the organisations?   
 
 
1.4. Research Scope and Limitations 
 
1.4.1. Method  
 
The thesis uses an interpretivist epistemology and action research methodology. It conducts a 
comparative analysis of two case study MFOs in Central Asia. The methodology uses the opportunity 
I had as a participant observer during the ILO project, to analyse PBM practices of the microfinance 
companies. The research questions follow an action learning cycle (see Kim 1993:5; Argyris and 
Schon 1996; Senge 2006; Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:567) and look at how the MFOs managed 
their pilot assessment, and how they responded to the empirical findings in terms of new activities, 
learning and reality checks. Finally, I am interested to observe how this learning feeds back into wider 
organisational systems.   
 
I use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data collected at the level of the client and the 
microfinance company. Social performance outcomes were measured through surveys that tracked 
employment outcomes of clients. To inquire deeper into performance management practices, I 
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conducted semi-structured interviews with field staff and senior managers in the two case study 
MFOs. I also interviewed senior managers from other leading MFOs in Central Asia to gain an 
understanding of the wider operating environment. Primary data were supplemented with secondary 
data such as rating and annual reports. Lastly, I made participant observations throughout the project. I 
am very grateful for the valuable feedback and support of respondents given throughout the research 
(see more in Chapter IV). 
  
Because of my direct involvement in the project, I will reflect on my agency as part of action research 
inquiry (Argyris and Schon 1996: ch2; Reason and Bradbuy 2008:3-4; Reason and McArdle 2007; 
Senge 2006:176-187). One strength of the approach is that I was able to work for a longer period with 
the companies by conducting multiple field visits. I collected a rich set of data, allowing me to 
observe processes within the MFOs relating to organizational culture. A limitation was that the decent 
work pilots were never fully under my control, although I was responsible for a significant part of the 
client assessment methodology. Second, I became part of the action, an insider, creating a danger that 
results and analysis would become biased. Section 4.5 will give a more detailed overview on how the 
methodology itself evolved.   
 
1.4.2. Scope   
 
This is a case study based thesis and I could only research a limited number of social enterprises in-
depth. The two organisations that I investigated are not representative of the industry as a whole. 
However both studies are interesting examples of leading MFOs in Central Asia. They pursued a 
double bottom line management and wanted to experiment with SPM initiatives. Central Asia is a 
particularly suitable region to look at the institutionalization of employment related objectives as few 
client level assessments were conducted in Kyrgyzstan (e.g. Ngo 2008) and Tajikistan (e.g. Burkle 
2009).  
 
In the microfinance literature, only a few studies take both the perspective of the client and the MFO 
into account when assessing performance (e.g. Karlan and Valdivia 2006). Few studies have explored 
how MFOs act on client level evaluations (e.g. Imp-Act 2004). No study engaged over a longer period 
to see how staff experienced the process of doing social performance assessment. A lot has been 
written about microfinance since its rapid expansion in the mid-1990s. While some authors argue 
microfinance contributes towards achieving the MDGs (Dunford 2006:22; Daley Harris 2009; 
Littlefield et al 2003:2; Simanowitz and Walter 2002), others feel it is no panacea for development 
(Armendariz and Murdoch 2007:4; Banerjee et al 2009). This thesis contributes to this debate by 




This research may be viewed as a relevant case study of new development management (e.g. 
Brinkerhof 2008) and social enterprise (Lehner 2012:54; Nichols and Young 2006). Both sets of 
literature emphasize a strong need for more longitudinal studies that show attention to local contexts 
(Brinkerhof 2008; Lehner 2012:13: Austin 2006:16).   
 
In this thesis, I define microfinance as financial services for poor and low-income clients1 and MFOs 
as the financial organisations that offer these products to them.2 I will use the abbreviation PBM for 
“performance based management” and SPM for “social performance management”.  
 
The study focuses on microfinance and employment. The ILO is of course active on many other 
fronts, but these are beyond the scope of this research. Second, although the research builds on data 
from the ILO project, it does not apply the same methodology. For example, discussions on impact 
assessment and econometric methodologies are kept deliberately brief as this thesis looks at the actual 





Chapter II describes concepts of PBM of MFOs and starts with a literature review of new 
development management (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 then discusses the concept of SMMs, after which 
I inductively identify three SMMs for PBM in microfinance, namely business first (Section 2.4), 
development first (Section 2.5) and social enterprise (Section 2.6).  
 
Chapter III is a contextual chapter that introduces the ILO’s decent work agenda and the Microfinance 
for Decent Work project. It starts by describing the history of the ILO and the concept of decent work 
(Section 3.2). How does decent work apply to microfinance? What would the SMMs depicted in 
Chapter II say about employment outcomes of microfinance? What role can the ILO play in 
promoting the shared mental model of social enterprise (Section 3.3)? After discussing these issues, I 
then describe the ILO project, its objectives and planning (Section 3.4). Section 3.5 presents the 
outcomes of the diagnostic phase.  
 
Chapter IV explains my own action research methodology as well as how it differs from that of the 
ILO project. It reviews the strengths and limitations of the method by comparing experimental 
research and action research (Section 4.2). It then sets out the conceptual framework (Section 4.3) and 
                                                 
1 http://www.microfinancegateway.org/, accessed April 2013 
2 In literature on microfinance they are often referred to as Microfinace Institution (MFI). However given that 
“institution” in NIE has a somewhat different meaning, I use the term microfinance organisation.  
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the methods of data collection (Section 4.4). Section 4.5, reflects on my own agency as an action 
researcher.   
 
Chapter V is a contextual chapter introducing the MFOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at the outset of 
the pilot assessment in 2009. It briefly sketches the macro-economic, social and political environment 
in the Central Asian states (Section 5.2). It then describes the case studies of Bai Tushum (Section 5.3) 
and IMON (Section 5.4).  Section 5.5 conducts a comparative analysis of the two MFOs before the 
implementation of the pilot.  
 
I then turn to the results for Bai Tushum in Kyrgyzstan in Chapter VI and IMON in Tajikistan in 
Chapter VII. For each case study, I describe the pilot assessment design (Sections 6.2 and 7.2), its 
implementation (Sections 6.3 and 7.3), the empirical findings (Sections 6.4 and 7.4), and follow-up 
actions (Sections 6.5 and 7.5), and what this revealed for the capacity of the MFO to do SPM (Section 
6.6 and 7.6). Chapter VIII offers a comparative analysis of both case studies at the end of the pilot 
assessment and discusses lessons learned from them in relation to the literature. This is set out in three 
Sections for social performance assessment (Section 8.2), for double bottom line management 
(Section 8.3) and for changes in performance management in relation to the ILO pilot (Section 8.4). 














Chapter II. Performance Management in Microfinance  
 
 
2.1. Introduction   
 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature on performance-based management (PBM) with a 
development goal, with specific reference to microfinance organisations (MFOs). Section 2.2 links 
PBM to the idea of new development management. Section 2.3 explores the concept of shared mental 
models (SMM), along with associated ideas in New Institutional Economics and Organisational 
Development Theory. The purpose of doing so is to develop a conceptual framework with which to 
distinguish traditions of PBM within MFOs and to analyse how these change over time. I then apply 
the concept of SMMs to literature on PBM of MFOs by inductively identifying three SMMs, namely 
“business first” (Section 2.4), “development first” (Section 2.5) and “social enterprise” (Section 2.6). 
Each model differs in its understanding of tensions and synergies between social and financial 
performance goals. Section 2.7 concludes.   
 
 
2.2. Performance Management and New Development Management 
 
PBM in the development sector has been known under different names. It emerged in the 1960s in the 
form of “public sector management”, and moved in the 1970s to “management by objectives” and 
more recently to “results-based management” as identified by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC). In the last decade, PBM became increasingly popular in the development sector as a response 
to the need for greater transparency and accountability in the use of public resources as well as a 
requirement of the development sector to align to the Millennium Development Goals (Meier 2003:1-
6). In addition, there was a shift towards recognizing that the private sector could play potential role in 
reaching development objectives through public-private partnerships, corporate social responsibility, 
and the growth of the so-called “social enterprise” sector (Brinkerhoff 2008).  
 
In a technocratic sense, performance or results-based management is “a broad set of management 
systems that aims at changing the way an agency conducts its business operations” (Binnendijk 
2001:4). In many cases, organisations have engaged in such systems, but do not call it PBM as such. It 
normally starts with setting up a strategic plan, with objectives and targets that are explicit and 
monitored to see whether an organisation is on track (Binnendijk 2001). In this context, performance 
assessment is “the process an organization follows to objectively measure how well its stated 
objectives are met”. It includes the design of indicators and completion of data collection, analysis and 
reporting (Binnendijk 2000:6). Performance management is broader and entails the actual usage of 
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data for management decision-making, “implying it becomes integrated into key management systems 
and processes of the organization” (Binnendijk 2000:7). 
  
Meier (2003:6) and Binnendijk (2000:6-7) describe two main drivers for doing PBM in the 
development sector, namely to generate organisational learning on how to reach development goals 
more effectively, and to improve accountability to external stakeholders through performance 
reporting. It often uses a result chain to distinguish inputs of resources and activities, outputs, 
outcomes and impacts. In doing so, it makes objectives explicit as they should be intended, 
measurable and feasible to accomplish (ILO 2008:1-3&24; Meier 2003). Such development planning 
is most effective in organisations with a culture oriented towards achieving results (Meier 2003).  
 
Another set of literature challenges such “technocratic” thinking in development management. 
Thomas and Mohan (2007) argue that although PBM within private agencies is already complex as it 
involves having to make decisions based on uncertainty and incomplete information; PBM by 
development agencies is even more complex because it aims to reach goals that are external to the 
agencies themselves and subject to value-based conflicts. Development management is not just the 
implementation of tools and interventions that seek to make programs more effective, it is also a 
normative concept that involves building social values and norms into the management of all 
operations of  the organisation (Thomas and Mohan 2007:9-10).  
 
Brinkerhoff (2008) points out that development management, in contrast to other types of PBM, tries 
to achieve political agendas and uses goals that carry a particular set of normative values. As such, it 
is not an ideologically neutral exercise and there is a need to think about how organisations 
institutionalize development values. An open question remains whether donors allow local visions to 
prevail, or impose their views and blueprints (Brinkerhoff 2008:989-991&994). Such external 
development interventions may only succeed if plans adapt to local contexts and are able to motivate 
local agents (Brinkerhof 2008:996). Hulme (2007) evaluates the MDGs from a development 
management perspective and notices that “at times the ideas of human development and results-based 
management are pursued but, when they challenge the interests of powerful groups or nations, they are 
removed from the agenda and their principles are compromised or assiduously avoided” (Hulme 
2007:1). Developed nations rarely sign up for explicit objectives, but they require developing 
countries to do so (Hulme 2007:18). Therefore, PBM can be imposed through donor- recipient’s 
power relationships.  
 
Sanderson (2001) argues PBM should not be externally imposed because it increases the risk that it 
will lead to bureaucracy and becomes a mechanical process in which the ability to manipulate targets 
improves rather than the capacity to enhance performance. PBM can only succeed if it is driven from 
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within the organisation, only then it might function as a catalyst for positive change (Sanderson 
2001:309). Thomas and Mohan (2007:12) fear a technocratic “problem solving” approach by outside 
consultants that have limited knowledge on how to improve development practices. Roth (2008) feels 
that when performance standards focus on measurable outputs, they overlook other important factors 
such as organizational processes, external factors and unintended effects. The development of broader 
metrics and feedback processes enhances organizational learning (Roth 2008:478-479). Nichols and 
Young (2006: xvii-viii) stress that performance assessment of development goals is often conducted 
mainly to attract new funding sources rather that in a genuine bid to improve the internal operations 
and systems of development agencies. They consider this a missed opportunity to “improve” 
development practice. 
 
The ‘critical development management’ school goes even further and argues that PBM is managerial 
because it imposes a certain management model that advocates hierarchy and power. PBM for 
development is for them a form of social engineering by Western development agencies. The very 
idea of development management is rejected and should be deconstructed,  it forms a way for donor 
agencies to control organisations in the South (Cooke and Dar 2009:1-3). By focusing on PBM within 
relatively autonomous MFOs, and by examining the potential of external agencies to influence but not 
to dictate how these work, this thesis sets out from a more reformist and less radical position towards 
the development industry.  
 
 
2.3. Shared Mental Models 
 
In this section, I broaden the discussion by drawing on ideas taken from the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) literature (Section 2.3.1). Particularly I describe the concepts of mental models 
(2.3.2) and how they can be shared (2.3.3). I link these to similar concepts from management to 
consider how shared mental models might change in organisations (2.3.4). I then describe methods to 
identify them in organisations (2.3.5). After this, I depict three SMMs of PBM in microfinance (2.3.6). 
 
2.3.1. New Institutional Economics  
 
New institutional economics (NIE) analyses economic systems by drawing not only from economic 
theory but also from history, sociology and organisational studies. It views economic performance and 
change as a humanly designed process that takes place at the micro, meso and macro level. NIE 
extends across a wide range of theories such as organisational theory, transaction costs theory, 
incentive economics, behavioural science and evolutionary economics (Wolfgang and Streit 1998:38; 
North 1992; Arthur 1994; Magnusson 1994; Denzau and North 1994; North 2005; Kasper and Streit 
1998; Williamson 1988; Boschma et al., 2002; Boettke, Coyne et al 2008). NIE overlaps with related 
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theories of organisational development (OD) and learning in that both describe processes by which 
firms deal with innovation, learning and change, in relation to their performance goals and structures 
(Cummings 2008: xv: Argyris and Schon 1996: xvii &181-182; Senge 2006; Huczynsk and Buchanan 
2007).  
 
NIE rejects the assumption of neoclassical economics that actors make rational choices and instead 
emphasizes the premise of bounded rationality because people often act based upon incomplete and 
unreliable information. Although economic actors strive to maximize performance, they reach at best 
sub-optimal outcomes because they are limited in information, knowledge, foresight, skill and time. 
Information is costly to collect, and our capacity to process it is limited (Boschma et al 2002: Ch3; 
North 1992:8; Denzau and North 1994:1-8; Williamson 1988). 
 
The second assumption of NIE is that agents are opportunistic, meaning they are subject to “a deep 
condition of self-interest seeking that contemplates guile” and includes shirking and cheating on 
contractual terms etc. Promises of economic actors to behave responsibly have limited credibility and 
this makes human relationships less predictable (Williamson, 1988:67-68). The assumptions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism underlie most incentive and transaction costs theory. However, 
they still have difficulties explaining why economic actors may have social motives (Ostherloh and 
Frey 2000; Frey and Jegen 2000), build social capital or trust (e.g. Dasgupta 1998; McAslan 
2002:139-142; Nooteboom 2000), or relate to a shared organisational identity (e.g. Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005), or ideology (Denzau and North 1994).      
  
North (2005) emphasizes a third assumption, namely a non-ergodic environment, in which economic 
change is a continuous process and there is a great deal of uncertainty about the environment. Under 
such conditions, the historical and socio-cultural context matter in economic systems and theory. He 
emphasizes that rather than using only abstract or rational logic, actors use pattern based reasoning; 
thinking is based on generalizing separate contextual events into historical and cultural patterns (North 
2005:21&25& Denzau and North 1994:13). Actors learn by induction through experience from 
previous choices and outcomes, trial and error and routine decision-making (Denzau and North 1994: 
11, Holland et al 1986). Under such circumstances, the actual performance outcomes may be very 
different from the intended target (North 1994:366). 
 
Under these three assumptions, “reality” is never fully known and by definition too complex for an 
individual person to fully comprehend. Nevertheless humans do develop and share an understanding 
of what “reality” looks like based on their experiences, alongside a normative model of what “reality 
should be like” (North 2005:2; Denzau and North 1994:4). These limited learning or belief systems 




While the literature on NIE is highly heterogeneous, and this deserves recognition, the concept of 
shared mental models (SMMs) is particularly useful for this thesis as one approach that may help 
explain how development management takes place within organisations. It emphasizes that ways of 
managing development cannot be separated from the way staff in the organisation think and 
institutionalize this thinking into the organisational structure. The concept is also central to the way 
this thesis understands organisational change, including change in performance management systems 
of MFOs. PBM systems can be viewed themselves as shared mental models identifying how a system 
organises itself so it has some basis for action under conditions of fundamental uncertainty in 
outcomes (Holland et al. 1996:3-5). 
 
 
2.3.2. Mental Models  
 
Under conditions of bounded rationality in a non-ergodic world, the actual world is complex and can 
at best be approximated by empirical data (Richards 2001: 259-261). Because information is costly 
and time consuming to process, economic actors deliberately simplify reality through their mental 
models and base their decisions on a certain level of ignorance. Denzau and North (1994:4) define 
mental models as value-laden “internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to 
interpret the environment”. Usually they are identified in relation to some desired performance goals 
(Denzau and North 1994:13; North 1994: 363). Mental models underpin all human-designed 
institutions, the formal rules and informal norms that shape organisations and their environment 
(North 2005: 59, 1990, Denzau and North 1994). The concept resonates strongly with the idea of a 
mindset, but one that is embedded in a socioeconomic and historical context and that evolves over 
time.  
 
“Mental models represent a person’s [limited] view of the world, including explicit and implicit 
understandings” (Kim 1993:4). They are more than a collection of experiences and memories, they 
include our personal management of new data and how we collect, filter, retain, discard and use 
information. They are learning and belief systems that do not only help us to understand the world we 
see, but also severely limit our understanding as some things we see do not make sense for our mental 
model and therefore are not accepted. They then limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting. 
Problems also arise when we take our mental models for granted as if they were a reality; we then 
undertake actions based on weak or untested assumptions. Indeed mental models contain implicit 
knowledge that is often not properly tested or made explicit (Kim 1993:4-5; Senge 2006: ch9: 164).   
 
In this context, explicit knowledge is formal in nature and can be easily shared and communicated. 
This as opposed to implicit or “tacit” knowledge, which is derived from experience and routines. 
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Implicit knowledge is often highly informal, specific to individuals, and difficult to transfer from one 
person to another or to apply into other contexts. It is more difficult to measure and incentivize 
because it is more process oriented. Implicit knowledge transfer requires regular interactions, 
coordination and sharing of experiences (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:128:129: Ostherloh and Frey 
2000; Frey and Jegen 2000). Nonetheless, implicit knowledge is important for companies because it is 
“encapsulated” or embedded in products and services, routine operations (Ostherloh and Frey 
2000:545) and organisational culture (Nooteboom 2000; Cameron 2008). It makes a company 
“unique” and therefore forms an important basis for its comparative advantage (Cameron 2008; 
Ostherloh and Frey 2000:544).  
  
  
2.3.3. Shared Mental Models  
 
Mental models are not just in the minds of individuals but arise in a social context. That is they are 
shared to some degree among individuals either consciously or sub-consciously. These “shared mental 
models” evolve over time and are embedded in an environment. For example, a performance 
management system within an organisation may be viewed as a shared mental model. When mental 
models are shared they form a source of stability in systems that improve collective action, 
communication and coordination among actors. They build shared understanding and interpretation 
that leads to faster decision-making (North 1992: 20; Denzau and North 1994: 4; Mathieu et al. 2000; 
Richards 2001:262). However, at the same time SMMs may be a source of collective bias, path 
dependency and institutional lock-in (North 1992:11-12; Holland et al 1996; Denzau and North 1994). 
In strongly closed mental models there may be less ability for individuals to change actions, 
outcomes, and strategies because the organisational and institutional framework constrain them from 
doing so. Moreover, actors who have different mental models are more prone to compete and come 
into conflict over resources, rules, norms and beliefs of what constitutes “good performance” (Denzau 
and North 1994:11-12).3  
                                                 
3 The concept of SMMs overlaps with other concepts of social sciences such as paradigms, schools of thought, 
discourse, ideologies and cultures. A general point is that multiple SMMs can co-evolve over time. This is for 
example where they differ from Kuhn’s (1970) notion of “paradigm” and “normal science”, which tends to be 
more dominant and revolutionary. It also differs somewhat from “schools of thought”, which are more 
temporary (Kuhn 1970:10&16-19; Denzau and North 1994:25). SMMs may use a (sub-conscious) discourse 
(Richards 2001; North 2005: 20), but is broader than “a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, 
stories, statements, and so on” (Burr 1995:31-32). Ideology can be a SMM as it is a knowledge structure 
summarizing normative political ideas (Richards 2001: 261-262). SMMs resonate with the idea of organisational 
memory but is more dynamic and includes how to obtain, discard and filter new information (Kim 1993:4). It 




As explained in Section 2.3.2 mental models are largely based on pattern-based reasoning, and 
embedded in a historical and cultural context. At institutional level, this is referred to as path 
dependency, “the way by which institutions and beliefs derived in the past influence present choices” 
(North 2005: 21; North 1994:364; Denzau and North: 22). The sustainability and survival of 
organisations depend on the prevailing institutional framework and this limits the scope for new 
actions (North 2005:64). Path dependency constraints changes in PBM and makes them incremental 
rather than radical. It can even lead to institutional lock-in, meaning a bias towards short-term 
incremental changes at the expense of more profitable long-term innovation because of the high risks, 
switching costs, and change in status quo associated with fundamental new ways of working. It 
threatens the innovative capacity and sustainability of companies, because they cannot diverge from 
an inferior path of development (Arthur 1994: 10-13; Magnusson 1994:34-35; Shapiro & Varian 
1999:11-12; Boschma et al. 2002:45-48). A closely related term is co-evolution implying that the 
socioeconomic, geographic and political environment matters because organisations are 
interdependent with their environment (Boschma et al 2002:42-47; Denzau and North 1994:20).  
 
More broadly, SMMs underpin all institutions in society - the explicit (formal) rules and implicit 
(informal) norms designed by humans, constraining human interaction and determining “the way the 
game is played” in economic systems. SMMs are internal manifestations of institutions and “while 
evident in the formal rules of society, [they are] most clearly articulated in the informal institutions” 
(North 2005:48-49; North 1992:10). For example, societal culture can be defined as an accumulation 
of formal rules, informal norms and individual mental models prevalent within a social group (North 
2005:6).  
 
Nooteboom (2000:92-93) distinguishes between micro and macro institutions. For example, individual 
firms are constrained by “macro-economic institutions” such as “societal culture” that are largely 
external, but they have “micro-institutions” such as “organisational culture” that are internal and 
within their control. Cameron’s (2008:431) emphasizes most staff in companies are unaware of their 
organisational culture, which “refers to the taken for granted values, underlying assumptions, 
expectations, and definitions that characterize organisations and their members.” Thus, one way of 
viewing organisational culture is as an accumulation of SMMs within an organisation.  
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                        
(Cameron 2008:431), but emphasizes these are embedded in a social and historical context. Mental models are 
less structured and can be shared among people who have not met each other. 
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2.3.4. Dynamics of SMMs of organisations  
 
How do these SMMs evolve under internal and external influences (North 2005:164-165)? Is it 
possible for companies to change their dominant SMM? NIE literature is very limited in addressing 
these questions (Haase et al 2007:1), but some work has been done on institutional change (Denzau 
and North 1994; North 2005; Boettke et al 2008; Nooteboom 2000:93) and organisational learning 
and development (Argyris and Schon 1996: Senge 2006; Kim 1993).  
 
Dynamics of SMMs in NIE  
 
Denzau and North (1994:7) hypothesize that changes in mental models are influenced by at least three 
factors. The first is complexity, how far away is new knowledge from the prevailing SMM in order for 
it to become accepted. The second is the motivation of actors to pursue their goal. The third is the 
quality and frequency of information, because feeding back “good information is essential to 
improving the mental models” (Denzau and North 1994:8-10). North (1992; 1994:366; 2005:59&63) 
further stresses it is much easier to change formal [explicit] rules than informal [implicit] norms and 
shared belief systems [i.e. read SMM], which is the key to explaining path dependency. Path 
dependency makes institutional changes incremental. Only careful exogenous support can bring about 
path-breaking institutional changes in SMMs (North 1992:12 &25; North 2005:164-165).  
 
Boettke, Coyne et al. (2008) argue that exogenous (or foreign) institutions are unlikely to bring about 
sustained development because they are too far afield of the “Metis”4, which may be described as the 
localised SMM underpinning “endogenous” (or local) institutions. Exogenous institutions can change 
economic systems, but it is likely that the local SMMs and institutions will adapt their interventions. 
Institutions are more likely to stick when they are supported by endogenous drivers for change, 
because they then are based on implicit and local knowledge, customs and values. Boettke et al., 
(2008) do not place a value judgement on whether endogenous drivers improve performance, but 
instead argue endogenously driven institutions are more likely to generate sustainable changes and 
innovation. 
 
Boschma et al., (2002: Ch4: 55-59) and Arthur (1994) argue individual firms have little control over 
the creation of path-breaking innovations. Most innovations are incremental, meaning they are small 
adaptations to existing products, routines, or modes of thinking. Few innovations entail completely 
new ways of working and thinking. Under the influence of path dependence, companies are normally 
not motivated to do radical innovations because they imply high switching costs, change the status 
                                                 
4 “Metis” emphasizes local or implicit knowledge through experiential and practice-based learning “it includes 




quo, and often reduce the economic value of existing production processes. Even if there is motivation 
to do R&D, it occurs with great uncertainty about outcomes. Innovations occur by chance, or through 
spill overs from other organisations. They depend on a broader macro-economic institutional 
framework, which is largely exogenous to individual organisations.  
 
Dynamics in SMMs and Organisational Learning   
 
The organisational learning and development literatures incorporate the idea that sustained path 
breaking “institutional change” is possible particularly for micro-institutions such as an organisational 
culture (Denzau and North 1994: 3-4; Kim 1993; Argyris and Schon 1996; Senge 2006; Noteboom 
2000; Argyris 2008).  
 
Kim (1993), Senge (2006) and Argyris and Schon (1996) view SMMs as the learning and change 
systems of organisations. Organisations are considered capable of learning because they offer an 
institutional system within which individuals, think, act and transfer knowledge, which in turn can 
result in group knowledge (Argyris and Schon 1996:7-8; 244: ch1&9). Kim (1993:1) views learning 
as “the process through which individual learning becomes embedded in an organization’s memory 
and structure” and this process takes place through SMMs.  
 
This thesis accepts the premise that organisations can learn, but similar to Kim (1993) recognizes that 
learning within a company should not be separated from the way members in the organisation think 
and embed this thinking into the organisational structure. 5 However, if organisations may learn, then 
what type of learning is considered productive?  
 
Argyris and Schon (1996: ix-xx & 3-4:21-22) express the need for productive double loop learning as 
opposed to defensive single loop learning. Single loop learning leads to temporary or incremental 
changes in the performance of organizational tasks, but it does not change the implicit values, norms 
and performance standards in the organisation. Single loop learning alone is not sustainable because it 
is unlikely to work under conditions of conflict, threat and embarrassment (Argyris and Schon: 1996, 
245-249). For example, members in a company may accept convenient truths but avoid acting on 
‘reality checks’ which challenge the dominant PBM systems. Actors do not change their theories-in- 
use, a term that overlaps strongly with that of a shared mental model (Argyris and Schon 1996; Senge 
2006).  
                                                 
5 The term organisational learning needs to be treated carefully because it is subject to anthropomorphism. Can 
companies literally know, remember, think or learn like an individual (Kim 1993; Argyris and Schon 1996: 




In contrast, double loop learning changes the shared mental model of an organisation because it 
changes implicit values and “building block assumptions” through which an organisation defines its 
PBM. It requires a transfer of implicit knowledge, in such a way that it “becomes embedded in the 
images of the organization held either in its members’ minds, maps, memories and programs” (p16). 
Double loop learning requires an inquiry into the organization’s capacity to do assessments (Argyris 
and Schon 1996:22:26-27). It may also lead to improvements of the organization’s capacity to learn, 
sometimes referred to as “learning how to learn”. To achieve double loop learning is far from easy 
since there is always an interaction between new and dominant modes of thinking. Although single 
loop learning is common, organisations that have only double loop learning are extremely rare and 
resemble the normative notion of “the learning organization” (Argyris and Schon 1996:282-284 and 
Senge’s 2006:13-15).   
 
Several writers on organisational learning are sceptical that organisations are capable to generate 
double loop learning that changes the SMM. For example, Kunda (1992 cited in Argyris and Schon 
1996:194) challenges Senge’s notion of the “learning organisation” by asserting that there is no such 
company in practice. Managers tend to base their decisions on their own ideologies and belief 
systems. March and Olsen (1989:322-323&335 cited in Argyris and Schon 1996:197) underline 
experiential knowledge generation may lead to “superstitious learning” and “erroneous inferences”, 
which are far from productive learning. Argyris and Schon (1996) describe defensive reasoning and 
routines, a frequently occurring form of single loop learning. Staff in a company avoid saying what 
they really think to avoid situations of conflict, embarrassment and threat. Even worse, defensive 
routines can be deeply ingrained into the company culture itself, leading to a lack of dialogue and 
critical reflection among staff, which in turn reduce innovation (Argyris 2008:54). Cameron 
(2008:437) recognizes that “changing organisational culture is very difficult, not only because culture 
is largely unrecognized but because once set, commonly shared interpretations, values and patterns are 
difficult to modify.” 
 
To summarize, organisational and institutional learning that changes the SMM incrementally or 
temporarily is labelled by various authors as “single loop, defensive learning” (Argyris and Schon 
2006:3-4:21-22), “limited or reactive learning” (Senge 2006:13-15), “operational learning” (Kim 
1993:3). Denzau and North (1994:13) describe this as “learning which preserves the categories and 
concepts [of mental models]”. These definitions overlap with notions used in NIE such as 
“incremental innovation” (Boschma et al 2002), “path dependent change” and “lock –in” (North 
1992:25; North 1994:364; North 2005:21; Arthur 1994: 10-13). The same authors refer to the more 
sustainable organisational change as “double loop learning”, “productive learning”, “generative 
learning”, “conceptual learning”, “radical innovation”, or “reversing path dependency”. Denzau and 
North (1994:13) described this as learning that “may strengthen the initial categories and [shared 
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mental] models or that may lead to its modification.” These types of changes require a change in 
institutional values, “belief systems” or “building block assumptions” on which the PBM is based. 
However, following the idea of path dependence, doing so implies high switching costs and requires a 
change in the status quo.  
 
I propose to label these first types as changes “within” the SMM [i.e. single loop learning], and the 
second type as changes that “broaden” or “modify” the SMM [i.e. double loop learning]. Within this 
synthesis, it should be clear that each author discusses the issue of change at different levels of 
abstraction (e.g. macro or micro-economic institutions) and historical time paths (e.g. decades or 
days). Following the reasoning of Nooteboom (2000, see p19), this thesis focuses on the SMMs and 
institutions that guide PBM at the level of the organisation, but I allow for the possibility that 
organisations themselves are also constrained by country and even global level institutions.  
   
What factors then drive changes “within the SMM” [single loop] as opposed to “modifying or 
broadening the SMMs” [double loop] and can managers influence this? Senge’s (2006) learning 
organisation starts from the premises that firms have a great degree of internal control and should 
stimulate the internal commitment of staff to generate the best performance outcomes. Staff who are 
intrinsically motivated are more likely to invest in their own capacity, competences and creativity. In 
addition, it is important for managers to set an open environment that allows for dialogue through 
critical reflection (Senge 2006:129-162; Argyris and Schon 1996:23-25).  
 
Some work has been done on intrinsic and extrinsic motivational system that can create productive 
organisational learning. Intrinsic motivation occurs when staff enjoy doing an activity, however 
extrinsic motivation is output-oriented and imposed by outside actors through monetary incentive 
schemes (Ostherloh and Frey 2000:539). Although classical economics informs us that stronger 
monetary incentive schemes will lead to better performance, Ostherloh and Frey (2002) and Frey and 
Jegen (2000)’s work, demonstrates that managers cannot stimulate productive organisational learning 
by using only monetary incentive schemes. Intrinsic motivational schemes can increase participation 
and coordination among staff. They work best in situations where efforts of people are not clearly 
linked to organisational outcomes. Monetary incentive schemes can even be in tension with intrinsic 
motivation, thereby reducing performance. For example, bonus systems may create a target driven 
culture, where the resources to achieve targets crowd out resources needed to generate creative 
thinking necessary to find new ways of working (Osterloh and Frey 2002:540-541). Staff may feel 
monetary incentives are merely used as a control mechanism (Frey and Jegen 2000:9). Monetary 
incentive schemes may result in multi-task problems where workers pursue the goals that are well-
rewarded, but underperform on tasks that are poorly rewarded. They then achieve the measurable 
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explicit targets, but ignore more implicit goals and processes (Osterloh and Frey 2000:540; Akerlof 
and Kranton 2005:11).  
  
Ostherloh and Frey (2000) argued intrinsic motivational schemes such as training activities and 
internal learning system are more useful for stimulating implicit knowledge transfer. Extrinsic 
motivational schemes such as monetary incentives is mainly useful for the transfer of explicit 
knowledge (Ostherloh and Frey 2000).  
 
As a summary of this review Table 1 gives an overview of the literature on SMMs. While most of 
these authors seem to concur that changing an organisation’s SMMs is far from easy (Argyris and 
Schon 1996), arguably most of the macro-economic institutional literature (North 2005: Boetke et al 
2008; Boschma et al 2002; Arthur 1994) is even more sceptical about the possibility for one 
organisation to create sustainable institutional change. Aside from this, there is a debate whether 
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2.3.5. Identifying SMMs 
 
SMMs is somewhat of a meta concept that can be applied at micro- and macro- level. The challenge is 
how to identify them as by their very nature they are highly implicit (e.g. Kim 1993, Denzau and 
North 1996; North 2004; Haase 2007:1). There is some evidence on how SMMs function, but this 
often draws from experiments on team-based learning conducted in controlled environments, rather 
than “real life” conditions of developing country contexts (Holland et al 1996; Richards 2001; 
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Mathieu 2000; Denzau and North 1994). NIE and OD use inductively identified methods to 
operationalize them.  
 
At a macro level SMMs are identified according to shared mind-sets, ideological belief systems, or 
worldviews (North 2005; Haase et al 2007). They encompass a set of normative ideas, values and  
goals, as well as shared interpretations of history and agenda’s for practical action (Denzau and North 
1994; North 1994;363). Copestake (2008) based on Denzau and North (1994) draws on this to identify 
SMMs in development studies, arguing that SMMs are more likely to persist if these normative, 
historical and practical aspects are mutually consistent. The normative dimension embodies an ethical 
view of what constitutes development, as it should be, for instance a vision of development embedded 
in a broader ideology. The historical dimension, reflects a particular way of understanding the world 
and interpreting how it changes. Third, the practical dimension is concerned with how development 
could be improved through practices and action. The practical component is always constrained; to 
accomplish all development goals at the same time is impossible. Resources are scarce, implying 
making tough choices about what sets of goals and activities to pursue (Copestake 2008:578). I will 
use this framework for the literature review in the remainder of this chapter (see Section 2.3.6).    
 
At a micro-level, action research methods have been proposed by management theorist to identify 
SMMs within organisations. As a starting point they look at shared perspectives and understandings of 
members in organisations such as values and informal norms, next to more explicit knowledge such as 
formal procedures, policies and reports (Dick 1993; Woodhouse 2007:160-161; Thomas and Mohan 
2007; Cameron 2008). To assess implicit values it is useful to understand “building block 
assumptions” (Holland et al 1996) or “belief systems” (North 2004; Kim 1993) underlying PBM. This 
may require some form of qualitative or mixed method assessment such as semi-structured interviews 
or dialogues to assess underlying processes (Woodhouse 2007). One method to test whether 
perspectives are shared is convergent interviewing (Dick 1993:18-19), overlapping pieces of data 
mentioned by several respondents are kept and information unique to one person is in principle 
discarded. Another related method is to triangulate a variety of data sources to assess diverging and 
shared perspectives (Dick 1993:17; Atkinson and Hammersley 1994:250-253; Woodhouse 2007:169-
170).  
 
Argyris and Schon (1996:92-94) identify SMMs by looking at differences between explicit 
understanding or what people “say they do” and their implicit understanding, the actual “theory-in-
use”. A simple method uses a table where in one column actors write what they communicated in a 
given situation and in another column, what they really thought at the time. By making implicit 
behaviour more explicit, actors can reflect on gaps between them. For example they can become more 
conscious of their pattern-based reasoning and generalisations (Argyris and Schon 1996:79; Senge 




Senge (2006) further advocates the need for organisations to reflect on tensions between what they 
preach as a vision and what they practice. A related method is the “tension-framework”, companies 
are rated on a set of tensions with the idea of becoming more conscious of trade-offs and synergies 
between PBM practices (Cameron and Quin et al 2005; Cameron 2008). For example, Cameron 
(2008: 430-432) and Cameron and Quin et al (2005: 15-19)’s competing value framework maps 
organizational culture according to two core management tensions, first, the degree to which it is 
‘inward looking’ with focus on internal learning systems and capabilities, or ‘outward looking’ with 
focus on the external competitive environment and opportunities. 6 Second, the degree that the 
organization operates with ‘dynamic, flexible and adaptable systems’, or with ‘static, standardized 
systems focusing on stability and control’.  
 
To identify SMMs of organisations may require some form of double loop learning experiment to 
change building block assumptions and values of PBM systems (Kim 1993; Argyris and Schon 1996: 
Senge 2006; Huczynski and Buchanan 2007). One widely used model is the action research feedback 
loop (see Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:567-568; Kim 1993:5; Lewin 1947 cited in Dick 1993). 
Figure 1 illustrates an example, experimentation starts with the process of problem diagnosis and 
analysis, followed by experimentation, data collection, data analysis and dissemination of results, 
which in turn feeds back into findings for new cycled learning. At minimum two such cycles are 
needed to generate double loop learning (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:567-568 &128; Argyris and 
Schon 1996).  
 
Figure 1 Feedback Loop  
 
                                                 
6 Inward looking organisations resonate with a focus on internal capabilities, integration of processes, cohesions 
and harmonization of internal systems and culture. All concern elements located within the boundaries of the 
organisation. At the other end of the spectrum, Outward looking companies resonate with a focus on competitive 















See e.g. Kim 1993:5, Huczynski and Buchanan (2007:567:568)  
 
The feedback loop assumes knowledge generation takes place in isolation of the wider organisation 
and its external environment. Several authors (e.g. Kim 1993:5 and Haase et al 2007) warn that 
although new knowledge could modify the SMM of the organisations, the opposite can also occur, the 
SMM of the organisation can discard the new knowledge. Therefore, in addition to looking at how 
cycled learning takes place several authors argue it is desirable to assess wider institutional and 
organisational systems (Argyris and Schon 1996; Senge 2006; Kim 1993; Dick 1993:53).  
 
Although there is some agreement, about what broad aspects to look at to assess “wider organisational 
systems”, there are no common qualitative or quantitative methods. For example, Cameron 
(2008:434) assesses performance standards, criteria of success, strategic emphasis, human resource 
management, leadership and bonding mechanisms. However, Senge (2006) and Argyris and Schon 
(1996) look amongst others at the processes of testing, cycled learning, performance assessment, staff 
motivation, behavioural systems. A more serious challenge is that the OD and NIE methods are not 
contextual for MFOs and their development management practices. One explanation for this variety of 
methods and indicators is that NIE, OD and action research literatures start from the premise that 
knowledge is to a large degree context-specific, implicit and inductive. By definition there is no one way 
of doing research and this makes it important that researchers keep an open mental model and reflect on 
their choices in methodology (Dick 1994:14-15; Argyris and Schon 1996: ch2, Reason and McArdle 
2007; Reason & Bradbury 2008). I will return to this issue in discussion of my own primary research 
in Chapter IV.  
 
 
2.3.6. Identifying Shared Mental Models in Microfinance  
 
Having elaborated these concepts, the remainder of this chapter applies the concept of SMM not to 
individual organisations, but to the secondary literature on PBM in microfinance. Echoing Copestake 
(2008) and Denzau and North (1994, see p26), SMMs are inductively identified according to 
interlinked positive, normative and practical dimensions.  
 
The remainder of the chapter aims to understand strategic planning of MFOs and microfinance as a 
global phenomenon since the early 1990s. I argue that this literature can be usefully organised in terms 
of three inductively identified SMMs in microfinance, which I call the business first, (Section 2.4) 
development first (Section 2.5) and social enterprise (Section 2.6). An overview of the models is 
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provided in Table 2. Each SMM has its own way of looking at the world in a normative, historical and 
practical dimension.7 
 
Table 2 Shared Mental Models in Microfinance  
Dimension Business first Development first Social enterprise  
Normative or 
ethical   
 
Sustainable financial development 
first: human development is 
secondary. 
Human development first, financial 
development is secondary 
Sustainable development through 
balanced and simultaneous 
pursuit of human and financial 
development.   
Interpretation of 
history 
Capitalism as an engine for 
growth delivered primarily by 
private enterprise.  
  
Public service as a response to 
deprivations arising from 
capitalism.  
Part of a tradition of managed 
capitalism “with a human face.”  
 
Practice  Sustainable and commercial 
microfinance. Primarily market-
led 
Raise productive capacities of 
people through a mix of services, 
including microfinance. State 
and/or NGO funding are needed.   
Synthesis of public and private 
sector strategies and skills: 
whether integrated within one 




- Washington consensus 
- Mainstream economics, neo-
liberalism.   
- “New York or Geneva 
consensus” 
- Basic needs and capability 
approach 
- Social development perspective. 
- “Post-Washington consensus”  
- Social enterprise  
- Corporate social responsibility 
- NIE, OD 
-New development management 
Source: see also Gravesteijn and Copestake 2010:5100, Microfinance and Social Performance.  
 
What I refer to as “business first” advocates commercial microfinance and broadly resonates with neo-
liberal “Washington consensus” (Stiglitz 1998a;1998b). In doing so, it draws from wider economic 
theories (e.g. Stiglitz Weisz 1981; Schumpeter 1950). It is broadly what other authors have identified 
as “sound business school approach”, “minimalist approach”, “financial system approach”, 
“sustainability camp”, “traditional business approach”, “institutionist paradigm”, “financial 
sustainability paradigm”, “sustainability first”, and “Ohio school of thought” (See Woller et al 1999; 
Dunford 2000; Mayoux 2000; Rhyne 2001; Robinson 2001; van Maanen 2004; Seibel et al. 2002; 
Kabeer 2008). What I refer to as “development first” SMM has been labelled by the same authors as 
“development school”, “integrationist approach”, “poverty lending approach”, “poverty camp”, and 
“traditional social service”, “welfarist paradigm”, “poverty alleviation paradigm”, “poverty first”.  It 
draws from a wider literature of a “New York consensus” that includes capability (e.g. Sen 1999; ILO 
2008c) and basic needs approaches (Maslow 1946; Standing 2008; ILO 2008b; Kabeer 2008:13-14).   
 
The third mental model is “social enterprise” and resonates with the idea of double bottom line 
performance management (Dunford 2000; Yunus 2007; Imp-Act 2005; Copestake et al 2005). It 
draws from theories of OD, NIE and new development management (see Section 2.2), as well as 
                                                 
7 The remainder sections are based on (Gravesteijn and Copestake 2010).  
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social enterprise and entrepreneurship (e.g. Dees et al 1998; Borzaga and Defourny 2001; Austin et al 
2006; Nichols 2006: xiv; Nichols and Young 2006; Yunus 2007; Lehner 2012), corporate social 
responsibility (GRI 2008) and sustainable development (WCED 1988:17). It may be viewed as part of 
a yet to be defined “Post-Washington consensus” (Stiglitz 1998a,1998b).  
 
The SMMs outlined here are of course themselves deliberate attempts to simplify a complex reality, 
however I argue this is still useful to help understand tensions that continue to characterize strategic 
thinking in the microfinance sector. They provide a plurality of views on PBM in microfinance. Of 
course views of authors may change as well, for example Hulme and Mosley’s (1996) is listed under 
the “development first” grouping, but did not neglect sustainability issues. A later publication of Arun 
and Hulme (2008) states the commercialized approach to microfinance was to some degree successful. 
   
Before discussing the differences between the SMMs, it will be good to stress their commonalities. 
All three have their own normative idea of what constitutes “good development” and what paths 
MFOs should walk in trying to achieve this. All stress the importance of capital for economic 
development and recognize that financial markets work far from perfect, although they disagree on the 
specific type of market failure (van Maanen 2004, Hulme and Mosley 1996, Copestake 1996). Thus, 
each mental model draws from its own set of theories and ideologies and are based on very little 
overall evidence. This may be explained by the heterogeneity of microfinance in local contexts, 
technical and practical difficulties to attribute social impacts and the danger of generalization of 
development outcomes. In addition, each mental model uses its own discourse; for example, advocates 
of commercial microfinance would use terms like “the entrepreneur”, “customers” and “market 
segments”. In contrast, advocates of developmental approaches use words such as “poor”, 
“beneficiaries” and “pro-poor targeting” (Seibel 1996:5 ch1). Following the SMM framework this 
may be viewed in the context of bounded rationality and fundamental uncertainty (see p16), implying 
people rely on very limited evidence and shared belief systems. 
 
   
2.4. Business First  
 
2.4.1. Historical and Positive Dimension  
 
The “business first SMM” emerged in the late 1980s and advocates a commercial approach to 
microfinance. It formed a critical response to the failure of several state led development finance 
agencies (Robinson 2001:126, Von Pischke 1991). Government sponsored development finance 
organisations offered credit under terms designed by the supplier and its donors rather than market 
demand. They conditioned loans to target the agricultural sector and poor people, but in order to reach 
31 
 
the quotas they actually disbursed to wealthy clients (Von Pischke 1991: Seibel 1996:51). They paid 
little attention to screening and monitoring of the client’s debt capacity (Von Pischke 1991: ch12-14). 
Political lending exacerbated problems with subsidized loans triggering rent seeking and corruption 
(Von Pischke 1991: 60-61&379).  
 
With products at subsidized interest rates the development banks suffered heavy losses. There was no 
incentive for product and process innovation. Savings mobilisation and equity were almost completely 
ignored as potential products (Von Pischke 1991: Ch5). Non-commercial development finance 
organisations that charged subsidized interest rates undermined formal and informal financial markets 
through unfair market competition (Schneider et al 1997:32). 
 
Seibel sets out a critical report for the traditional supply-led approach of the 1980s: The government 
led development finance organisations “have neither reached the rural and urban masses nor achieved 
growth. They bypassed national resource mobilisation, ignored non-formal finance, undermined the 
viability of financial institutions and jeopardized the evolution of a differentiated financial system 
“(Seibel 1996: IX). The World Bank as important donor of the microfinance industry supported these 
views by stating, “subsidized credit does not lead to superior firm-level performance and the provision 
of finance in weak investment climates is ineffective” (World Bank 2002:39 in Nissanke 2002:7). 
 
These documented development failures coordinated various authors who had a shared understanding 
of commercial market-led approaches to development finance. Several identified themselves as the 
Ohio School of Thought, an alignment in thinking of the Ohio State University’s agricultural 
development finance department and the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. The World 
Bank and CGAP – a World Bank affiliated think-tank formed in 1995 to promote sustainable 
microfinance- also supported these views. Several former (Wall Street) bankers and Pro-Credit 
Holding Group also advocated commercial microfinance. From a broader perspective “business first” 
is aligned with the “Washington consensus” (Stiglitz, 1998a; 1998b) and resonates with neo-liberal 
thinking. The authors often draw from a wider set of mainstream economic literature that includes 
neo-classical economics, transaction cost economics and finance studies. Authors who I would label 
as broadly supporting business first include Yaron (1992), Yaron et al (1994), Von Pishke (1991), 
Robinson (2001), Rhyne (2001) and Seibel et al. (1996), several of them are  associated with the Ohio 
school. “Best practice” MFOs that supported the perspective are Bank Rayat Indonesia (Robinson 
2001), Bancosol in Bolivia (Rhyne 2001) and Pro-credit (Von Pischke 1991).   
 
2.4.2. Normative Dimension  
 
“Business first” prioritizes financial sustainability and views social impact as a secondary goal. Only 
commercial microfinance makes massive scale poverty alleviation feasible. Financial sustainability is 
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a mean, not an end, to achieve poverty alleviation. The approach aims to overcome market failures by 
seeking sustainable innovative finance and serving niche markets. 
 
As stated by Yaron (1992) and Yaron et al (1994), sustainability implies that the microfinance 
company still survives after the inflow of subsidies dries up. It is important because clients need to 
know that an MFO will survive in the years to come and provides them stable access to financial 
services. Furthermore, there are not enough grants available to support the worldwide demand with 
subsidised financial services (Robinson 2001). Drawing from the wider literature, financial markets 
need to be sustainable because they are key support sectors in the rest of the economy (Merton and 
Bodie 1995: ch1). Although there is still discussion on how to measure sustainability (Yaron 1992; 
1994) and efficiency (Gibbons and Meehan 2000: 8), this research will mainly use the standardized 
indicators accepted by CGAP such as operational self-sufficiency (CGAP 2003).  
 
Development as described by Von Pischke (1991) is mainly achieved when innovation creates an 
outward shift to the frontier of the formal financial market by creating market niches. Market niches in 
turn attract other competitors which will reduce interest rates, and this in turn stimulates economic 
actors to innovate and reduce costs for end-borrowers. This view draws from Schumpeter’s (1950:83) 
notion of “creative destruction8” (Von Pischke 1991: 226).   
 
MFOs should be measuring success solely according to financial performance standards such as 
portfolio quality and growth, earnings, repayment and sustainability (Von Pischke 1991:313). They 
should serve market demand and not focus on agricultural or poverty targeting (Von Pischke 
1991:227). “Business first” promotes a global financial inclusion agenda (Rhyne 2001; Robinson 
2001; Helms 2006).  
 
As argued by Robinson (2001) commercial microfinance addresses market failures of information 
asymmetries of adverse selection and moral hazard as described by the credit-rationing model of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Microfinance uses group guarantees to substitute social for physical 
collateral and it offers clients larger loans when borrowers build good repayment records (Robinson 
2001:Ch5). Commercial microfinance breaks the monopolistic market power of informal local 
moneylenders since increased competition is forcing them to reduce interest rates charged to end-
borrowers (Von Pischke 1991: ch8; Robinson 2001: 30-33&ch6).  
 
Organisational sustainability is important to sustain the trust of clients in the microfinance system 
(Von Pischke 1991: Zeller and Meyer 2002: ch1: 7).  Sustainable organisations also have access to 
                                                 
8 Schumpeter (1950:83-84) views capitalism as a revolutionary process in which markets and business cycles 
are created and destroyed by new markets and business cycles through radical innovations. These processes 
are desirable to improve long-term economic performance.      
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cheaper commercial funding because they mobilise savings and tap into capital markets, which allows  
them to grow at a much faster pace. Such funding is needed because there are not enough subsidies in 
the world to provide global financial inclusion (Robinson 2001: ch. 1).  
 
This results in an important feature of “business first” microfinance, in order to reach as many 
customers as possible, it offers standardized minimalist financial services to create economies of scale 
(Seibel 1996: IX). Only if there is a “business case” will MFOs promote non-financial or social 
services such as business development training and financial education schemes (Schneider et al 1997: 
13-14), however normally costly extra services should be avoided.   
 
2.4.3. Practical Dimension  
 
SMMs may evolve through learning and reality checks. Later Sections will describe some of the 
criticisms on “business first” approaches, but it is good to point out that the models also slowly 
evolves. One mandate of commercial microfinance is financial inclusion for all; but how many people 
exactly are excluded from formal banking services. In 2004, CGAP guesstimated up to 600 million 
people were served with active savings and lending accounts, even though there is a potential demand 
of up to 3 billion people (Helms 2006:6; CGAP 2004:13-14). Honohan (2007: 8) estimated a much 
higher 1.46 billion people accessed financial services (Honohan, 2007). Under the simplistic 
assumption that every person in the world needs a bank account and a loan there is still a large 
untapped demand for microfinance.  
 
Other studies challenged the assumption that competition reduces interest rates (Gibbons and Meehan 
2000), or that MFOs charge lower interest rates compared to informal money lenders (Rosenberg 
2009). CGAP (2008:4) found that many private investors in microfinance seek a social return on their 
investments. Following the mental model framework, these studies provided “reality checks” for 
commercial microfinance. Nonetheless, building block assumptions with regard to financial inclusion, 
minimalist services and competition were rarely challenged in the overall outcomes. In the context of 













2.5. Development First 
 
We now turn to the development first mental model that partly arose as a critical reaction to 
commercial microfinance.  
 
2.5.1. Historical and Positive Dimension  
 
In 1996, Hulme and Mosley (1996) published “Finance Against Poverty” which documented several 
impact assessments that challenged some of the building block assumptions of “business first” 
microfinance. A stream of criticism on commercial microfinance followed (Wood and Sharif 1997; 
Weber 2001; Nissanke 2002; Dichter 2005; Fernando et al 2006; Bateman and Chang 2009). Unlike 
the “business first”, those authors who supported the development approach were not organised into a 
formal body.  
 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) showed that it is possible to reach the poor and be sustainable, but there are 
tensions at the levels of the client, the MFO and the donor. First, poorer clients have relatively less 
development impact than richer clients. Second, financial organisations that serve the economically 
active poor make more profits than those who serve the hard-core poor. Third, a poverty-focused 
strategy implies more risk and a lower return on investment. Their conclusion therefore was that 
liberalisation as stated by the business first model is in itself not enough, more is needed to achieve 
social development for clients (Hulme and Mosley 1996:204-206).  
 
Also what has been labelled as “business first” neglected wider social impacts, for example on income 
and employment of clients and their households, instead they were often assumed, or considered too 
difficult and costly to measure (Hulme and Mosley 1996:200; Wood and Sharif 1997:36). Wood and 
Sharif (1997: 375-378) argued one should not only look at the sustainability of the MFO, but also at 
the sustainability and economic security of the client.  
 
Various authors feared that the World Bank and donors imposed MFOs, especially NGOs, to become 
sustainable in too short a time span and that this would go at the expense of social goals (Wood and 
Sharif 1997:35; Nissanke 2002). To impose the goal of sustainable microfinance to MFOs was in 





Minimalist microfinance services also did not raise the productive capacity of clients sufficiently or 
even led clients to pursue similar work activities creating market saturation. Above all, a minimalist 
approach was not what the poor needed (Wood and Sharif 1997: 371-379). There is no one-size-fit-all 
approach and replication of models should be handled carefully. Hulme and Mosley (1996: 7) make 
up a clear report for the Ohio school of thought by stating; it “would convict it of idealising the 
informal financial sector, of ignoring externalities, and of failing to produce data concerning the social 
rate of return and the poverty impact of the institution” (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 7).   
 
2.5.2. Normative Dimension  
 
“Development first” emphasizes MFOs should fulfil an important social function. From a broader 
perspective, this model draws from the “New York consensus” based on the United Nations principles 
and NGO concerns of poverty alleviation. It draws from a wider literature of human capability (e.g. 
Sen 1999; ILO 2008c) and basic needs approaches (e.g. Maslow 1946; Standing 2008; ILO 2008e; 
Kabeer 2008:13-14), in which poverty is based on multiple deprivations and lack of capabilities. 
Several authors highlight minimalist microfinance services are insufficient to improve client level 
performance (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Wood and Sharif 1997; Nissanke 2002).  
 
From a broader political perspective, microfinance is viewed as a neo-liberal political tool that 
continues the Washington consensus (Weber 2001; Bateman and Chang 2009:24-27). The idea of 
trying to create capitalism with a “human face”, while not challenging the fundamentals of capitalism 
itself, may be dangerous and can severely undermine other routes to development. For example, it 
may extract precious resources from other development management such as genuine political 
struggle, advocacy and development of labour unions (Weber 2001:3). It also drains macro-economic 
development and social capital (Bateman and Chang 2009). Weber (2001) and Bateman and Chang 
(2009) argue microfinance undermines social protection of the state by supporting privatisation and 
financial sector liberalisation. At the same time it offers neo-liberals a convenient opportunity for 
window dressing by showing that their practices address social goals (Bateman and Chang 2009:24-
27).  
 
Dichter (2005) fears the propaganda of the microfinance movement to sustain its own hypes and 
beliefs, leading every development agency to engage in it. The Microcredit Summit in 1997 and the 
microcredit year of 2005 were important lobby activities to support this belief system. Some feminist 
writers have been weary of the potential of microfinance for development because it may disempower 
women into fundamentally exploitative working relationships (Mayoux 2000). Fernando et al (2006:7) 
mention microfinance facilitates the belief that empowerment of women can be done through 






2.5.3. Practical Dimension  
 
“Development first” emphasizes PBM of MFOs should become more socially oriented. First, MFOs 
should target poor clients (e.g. van Maanen 2004). Second, a much longer time span for financial 
sustainability is acceptable, for example, Hulme and Mosley (1996:178) suggest a period of at least 15 
to 25 years. Grants are justified as subsidized financial services may create spill-over effects to other 
parts of the economy (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 70). Third, in order to raise capabilities, alleviate 
poverty, and secure basic needs, MFOs may provide a wide range of non-financial or social services. 
These are mainly basic health, education, social safety net programs and business development 
services often referred to as microfinance plus (Wood and Sharif 1997: 57&372-373; Velasco et al 
2005). It is also good practice to promote localised savings and credit unions (Bateman and Chang 
2009), small-scale NGO programs and successful state-led finance programs (Nissanke 2002). Views 
that are more radical see a need for alternative institutions such as cash transfers (Bateman and Chang 
2009) or even argue to terminate microfinance programs (Weber 2001).   
 
When viewed from the perspective of the business first SMM the ideas of development first are short-
sightedly unsustainable. They fear that altruistic development ideas would pull microfinance back into 
inefficient state-led development lending. Unsustainable microfinance (plus) would be able to reach 
let’s say at best millions of people but it is unrealistic to think it could create world-wide outreach to 
billions of people in need of it (Robinson 2001). Only when there would be a business case for 
offering such social innovations should MFOs adapt such products. Although the growth of 
microfinance flourished and its popularity heightened, as evidenced for example by Muhammed 
Yunus’ Noble peace price in 2006, the debates about the means and ends of microfinance reached an 
impasse. This partly resulted in increased popularity for a third mental model, namely that of “social 
enterprise”.   
 
 
2.6. Social Enterprise  
 
2.6.1. Historical dimension  
 
The social enterprise SMM in microfinance emerged in the late 1990s, partly in response to reach a 
consensus between the development and commercial views as well as trying to transcend them into an 
even broader mental model. It attempted to map the differences between pursuing financial and social 
goals more clearly from a management perspective.  
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It draws implicitly from a wider literature of management studies that includes development 
management, institutional economics and organizational learning (see Section 2.2), social enterprise 
and entrepreneurship (Dees et al 1998; Borzaga and Defourny 2001; Austin et al 2006; Nichols 
2006:xiv; Yunus 2007; Lehner 2012)9 and corporate social responsibility (e.g. GRI 2008). As such it 
resonates with views on sustainable development (WCED 1988:17) and advocates double or triple 
bottom line management which focuses on “People, Planet, Profit”. From a broader perspective the 
SMM can be seen in context of the somewhat ill-defined “post-Washington consensus” (Stiglitz 
1998a: 15-16, 1998b: 33).10 The social enterprise SMM links microfinance outcomes to the PBM 
structure of the Millennium Development Goals and advocates public-private partnerships. Two 
campaigns that actively promoted social enterprise principles are the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
(Daley Harris 2002;2009) and the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF 2008:2012).  
 
Authors related to these campaigns were critical on some of the assumptions of commercial 
microfinance. Gibbons and Meehan (2000:8&20-21) argued MFOs are often monopolists that are 
active in markets with little competition and therefore they have little incentive to become efficient 
and innovative. Simanowitz and Walter (2002:42-47) state few poor people are real entrepreneurs 
with risk-taking behaviour and many cope with great vulnerability. Dunford (2000) feels MFOs 
should be more transparent in their PBM, commercial microfinance should not receive subsidy 
funding, while development models should aim to alleviate poverty and use the subsidies effectively.  
 
Several “best practice” MFOs were reported to reach both social goals of poverty outreach and 
financial sustainability such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Yunus 2007), SEF in South Africa, 
(Imp-Act 2004) and Crecer in Bolivia (Dunford 2001; Simanowitz and Walter 2002). CGAP (1995) 
showed that there is no negative correlation between financial sustainability, average loan size and 
number of clients. Recent studies using regression analysis on larger samples demonstrated that there 
is no negative relation between depth of outreach and operational self-sufficiency (Gravesteijn 2005; 
Cull et al. 2006; Mersland et al 2007). Dunford (2000), who was among the first to use the term social 
enterprise in microfinance, argued entrepreneurship training and microfinance services can be bundled 
at little additional cost.  
                                                 
9 “Social Enterprise” is a new and distinctive school of thought that lacks a clear theoretical underpinning and is 
inter-disciplinary (Austin et al 2006:1; Lehner 2012:54-55; Borzaga and Defourny 2001). They include 
organisations “that demonstrates some element of sociality, innovation, and market orientation”. The field 
focuses on those organisations that pursue double bottom line performance management (Nichols 2006:xvii; 
Yunus 2007). Lehner (2012:1) argues social entrepreneurship is itself is highly value-laden” and “socially 
constructed.  
 
10 The Post-Washington consensus was a plea to move beyond neo-liberalist approaches by focusing on broader 
development goals such as “sustainable development”, “pro-poor”, “pro-employment” and equitable growth. It 





Some of these views led to a belief that it is both feasible and desirable to pursue financial and social 
goals simultaneously as double bottom line management creates synergies between them (Yunus 
2007; Dunford 2000; 2002; 2003;2006; Woller et al. 1999; Daley Harris 2002; 2009; Imp-Act 2004).  
 
2.6.2. Normative Dimension  
 
Social enterprises are organisations that claim to pursue two sets of goals, namely goals set around the 
sustainability of the organisation or more narrowly defined as financial sustainability and social goals 
set around the sustainability of their clients. Thus, they differ from commercial organisations because 
they pursue social objectives, but they also differ from developmental institutions in that they are 
concerned with their own sustainability (Yunus 2007). Clearly, there is a spectrum here because an 
MFO can have either minimalistic or extensive social and financial goals (Navajas et al 2000:335; 
Dees and Anderson 2006 in Lehner 2012:39).  
 
Navajas et al (2000: 335) set out a systematic terminology of social performance and distinguish 
between extent, depth, scope and length of outreach. Extent of outreach is quantitative outreach and 
looks at the number of people served by the microfinance program. Depth looks at the socioeconomic 
background of the clients including their poverty level. Scope refers to the set of financial services 
offered such as savings, insurance, and also non-financial services such as health, education and 
business development services. Length is the institution’s financial sustainability (Navajas et al 2000).  
 
Zeller and Meyer elaborate there is a tension between financial sustainability, outreach (breadth and 
depth), and broader welfare impacts, creating opportunities for public-private partnerships (Zeller and 
Meyer 2002:5). An example is the NABARD Self Help Group linkage model in India, it emphasized a 
collaboration between commercial banks and the NGO sector with each type of organisation focusing 
on its own comparative advantage (Zeller 2001; Padhi 2004; Gravesteijn 2005). Other partnership 
models include upgrading clients from NGO programs by moving them from soft loans or cash 
transfers into more sustainable microcredit programs (Hashemi and Rosenberg 2006).   
 
However, the social enterprise model goes beyond acknowledging the feasibility of double bottom 
line management; rather it also reflects the strong normative belief that social and financial goals 
should be managed in tandem. The Microcredit Summit Campaign that tracks the contribution of 
microcredit to the Millennium Development Goals embodied this belief system. It was founded on the 
building block assumption that it is possible for MFOs to alleviate poverty and reach financial 




Noble peace prize winner Muhammad Yunus (2007:32), in his book, creating a world without 
poverty, goes even further by addressing the idealistic concept of “the social business”. “A Social 
business has a social goal, it pays no dividends, it sells products at prices that make it self-sustaining. 
Any profits that is made is being reinvested either into the company to help improve its social 
performance, finance expansion and do more good for the world” (Yunus 2007:XVI). Social business 
involves a variety of activities such as microfinance, production factories, agricultural cooperatives 
etc. The concept dates back as early as capitalism itself. For example, in the Mid-19th century social 
entrepreneurship was visible in the savings and credit cooperatives of Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen 
(e.g. described in Van Maanen 2004) and the family enterprise of Robert Owen. (e.g. described in 
Polanyi 1957: 257-258).  
 
Early work on SPM was done by the Imp-Act consortium (1998-2005), the book “Money with a 
Mission” argued “outreach and impact of MFOs on poverty is generally positive but highly variable, 
leaving scope for substantial improvement” (Copestake et al 2005: 205). Tensions and synergies 
between social and financial goals occurred mainly as a management issue. Emphasis was placed on 
the institutionalization of social performance assessments and its effect on organisational learning 
(Copestake et al 2005: 7: 179&207-208). The development of SPM system should consist of three 
components: first, one needs to prepare a strategic plan that includes a clear social mission and 
objectives in combination with an indication of the impact pathways. Second, routine monitoring and 
assessment of the strategy needs to take place. Third, SPM needs to be institutionalised, implying a 
need to create an organisational culture of impact (Imp-Act 2005: 11-41). Thus SPM as it “should be”, 
implies that data collected is used effectively for management decision-making, leading to 
organisational learning and innovation via feedback loops. This resonates with wider literature of new 
development management and NIE described in Section 2.2.  
 
What then constituted a good “social performance” is something that was negotiated by the Social 
Performance Task Force (SPTF 2008;2012), a loose consortium of various actors that aimed to reach 
consensus and negotiated the framework to measure social performance sector-wide.  In 2005, various 
organisations, including donors, investors, rating agencies and capacity builders, banks, and MFOs 
formed the Social Performance Task Force. It included over a 150 agencies (Hashemi 2007). After 
several years of negotiation they agreed on a common definition:   
[1] “ Social Performance is the effective translation of an [MFO]’s social goals into practice”… 
[2] ”in line with accepted social values these include sustainably serving increasing numbers of poor 
and excluded people, improving the quality and appropriateness of financial services, improving the 
economic and social conditions of clients, and ensuring social responsibility to clients, employees and 
the community they serve ” (Hashemi 2007:3).  
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Part [1] refers to translating the normative social mission into action, emphasizing the importance of 
“practicing what you preach” (Hashemi 2007:1, Imp-Act 2005).11 Part [2] relates to reasonably 
acceptable social values and norms and was mainly incorporated because of the preferences of donors 
and investors to conduct benchmarking on social indicators and report progress on the Millennium 
Development Goals.  
 
2.6.3. Practical Dimension  
 
SPM then looks at the entire organisational process by which impact is created and is a deliberate shift 
away from ad-hoc assessments towards ways of institutionalising social performance assessments 
within the routine operations of MFOs (Copestake et al 2005: 4; Imp-Act 2005; Hashemi 2007:3). 
Thus, social enterprises need to balance costs and usefulness of the assessments itself. Among others 
managers need to ask themselves what their optimal level of ignorance is; how much information is 
needed to take certain management decisions to improve MFO practices (Copestake 2002:14)?  
Besides having an explicit social mission and strategy it is necessary to have internal processes and 
systems in place to do routine monitoring of outputs, outcomes and impacts. “Outputs” are the 
activities of the microfinance agencies including offering loans, deposits, training services etc. 
“Outcomes” include monitoring of outreach at the start of the loan and tracking of changes in client 
lives over time. The latter may be divided into factual changes in client outcomes and “impacts” 
which is the possibility to establish the “counterfactual”, namely whether the changes in client lives 
can be attributed to the intervention of the MFO or whether it was caused by other factors (SPTF 
2008).   
 
There has been considerable debate as to whether impact measurement is a desirable step to improve 
development practice. Several advocates of SPM argued that impact assessment when done as an ad 
hoc activity is unlikely to lead to sustained improvements in development management (Simanowitz 
and Copestake 2005 in Copestake et al. 2005:212). Although it is important to know whether MFOs 
achieve impact, the question of impact evaluation is effectively last in line for the institutionalization 
of assessments. Rather it is more desirable to focus on social mission, strategy, outputs and monitoring 
of outreach because these are within the control of the MFO. 
 
Impact assessments are viewed as costly compared to other simpler assessments, for instance because 
it uses relatively large sample sizes. This has led authors to do mixed methods of quantitative and 
qualitative studies (see for instance, Barnes et al 2001:7; Marr 2001; Nelson et al 2004; Imp-Act 2004; 
Dunn 2008). Second, there are technical challenges in impact measurement, particularly in the 
selection of a good control group. Even if the evaluation has a strong internal validity with few 
                                                 
11 This resonates with ideas of Senge (2006); Argyris and Schon(1996)  who call attention to the importance of 
becoming aware of tensions between mission and organisational practices.  
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potential estimation biases, it is still questionable whether the results apply to other geographical 
contexts and periods in time (see Coleman 2001:133). Lastly, rigorous impact assessments require 
more capacity from an MFO in terms of experience and knowledge. Impact assessments are often 
heavily funded by donor agencies and implemented by external consultants with the aim to make 
objective evaluations. However, social audits and ratings can also externally review SPM practices 
and are much cheaper. Rather than using only impact evaluation, advocates of SPM prefer a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative assessments (Simanowitz and Walter 2002; Copestake et al. 2005; 
Simanowitz 2007).   
 
Recently, advocates of the Poverty Action Lab have argued that impact assessment can lead to 
sustained improvements in development management. Since 2003, the Poverty Action Lab has used  
randomized controlled sampling (RCT) methodology to measure impacts of pilot interventions for 
clients and MFOs (see for example, Ashraf and Karlan 2005; Karlan and Valdivia 2006;2009;2011 
March; Karlan and Goldberg 2007; Duflo et al 2007, Jan; Banerjee, Duflo et al 2009, May). These 
studies are able to control for selection bias because they randomize clients into treatment and control 
groups. Selection bias occurs when possible differences between control and treatment groups can be 
attributed to pre-existing differences of the two groups rather than the intervention (Duflo et al 
2007:5). To the degree that differences are caused by observable indicators they may be controlled for 
through econometric techniques, but this is often done insufficiently particularly in relation to un-
observed factors influencing causality. RCTs have become popular among donors and policy makers 
because they can quantify whether an intervention worked or not and this feeds back into policy 
decision making.  (Karlan and Goldberg 2007c:8).  
 
Karlan and Goldberg (2008) highlight there can be a win-win proposition for policy makers who can 
use the assessment as a public good with the aim to replicate successful interventions into other 
contexts and MFOs that use it to improve their own operations. Although some RCTs studies were 
costly, they argued the high costs were justified since up-scaling interventions without knowing 
impact outcomes is “risky for lenders”, because “inferences about the benefits of changes evaluated in 
such a manner can be misleading.” Knowing whether an intervention works can therefore be less 
costly in the long run as it avoids scaling up ineffective pilots (Karlan and Goldberg 2007:8). This 
implicitly assumes that management decisions related to up-scaling interventions are determined by 
the impact outcomes and not by other factors that influence managers such as political ideologies, 
values, and perceptions. 
 
In order to generate a business case for social performance the microfinance (plus) intervention should 
benefit the client and the MFO. In one of the first RCTs done in microfinance, Karlan and Valdivia 
(2006; 2009; 2011 March) show such win-win situation for integrated business development services, 
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an entrepreneurship training reduced customer exit by 4% indicating improved customer satisfaction. 
The study found positive effects of entrepreneurship training on business practices and self-
employment, but no effects on formalization of businesses, business start-up and women’s 
empowerment (Karlan and Valdivia 2009:15&24-25).  
 
It is argued social and financial performance goals are in synergy in the areas of market research and 
customer retention. The cost of screening a retained borrower tends to be lower than for new 
borrowers because the transaction costs decrease for follow-up loan cycles as records of repayment 
and other information are revealed. Likewise, high client exit results in substantial financial losses and 
indicate products are not meeting the needs of clients (Hulme et al 1999: 22, Churchill and Halpern 
2001; Copestake 2002; Pagura 2004; Microsave 2005).  
 
Other benefits of SPM may include improved brand reputation, staff motivation, innovation and 
organisational learning, and risk management (Copestake et al 2005:218; Imp-Act 2005: 8). The 
intuitive reasoning for these win-win situations often rests on the “building block” idea that products 
and services should be tailored to the needs of clients and that “the success of a microfinance provider 
is closely linked to the success of its clients” (Imp-Act 2004: 2). For example, four case studies 
showed the low costs of social performance monitoring resulted in significant economic benefits such 
as reduced dropout rates, improved product and services, increased mobilization of savings and new 
loans taken by clients. However the studies were not representative for the Imp-Act program or the 
microfinance sector (Imp-Act 2004: 7; Copestake 2005:198-203).   
 
But beyond these potential benefits, balanced PBM may create a multi-task problem at organisational 
level because financial goals are more observable and measurable when compared to social goals 
(Schmidt and Tschach, 2001:22; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2007: 266-267). Management 
needs to carefully balance multiple objectives even though the correlation between efforts and outputs 
is often much stronger for financial when compared to social performance. Furthermore the 
correlations between the client and company performance outcomes are often negative, e.g. the time 
spend on achieving financial goals goes at the expense of the time spend on achieving social 
performance. Therefore, with monetary incentive schemes a smart loan officer would pursue the 
observable financial goals first (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2007: ch10: 266-267). This 
resonates with the organisational learning literature of Osterloh and Frey (2002) and Frey and Jegen 
(2000), see p23, who identify multitask tensions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational schemes.  
 
At organisational level, double bottom line management can increase the risk of harmful mission drift 
in the context of transformation from NGOs to commercial banks (Christen 2001; Mersland and 
Strom 2007). Copestake (2007) highlights MFOs are path dependent, when an organization with a 
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social enterprise strategy would only achieve financial performance but not social performance, this 
could be seen as a temporary mission failure. However, when it does not allocate resources towards 
social goals, mission drift occurs that is unintended and can even happen subconsciously. Even worse, 
the drift may result into lock-in were the MFO may be unable to control the process of 
commercialisation (Copestake 2007). The case of Compartamos is seen as an example; for-profit 
investors demanded high returns on equity above 50% per annum. As a result, the company was 
charging exorbitantly high interest rates of 99% per annum, creating high costs for clients (Rosenberg 
2007). 
 
Based on the Imp-Act consortium study, Copestake et al. (2005: 160& 174) opens up the black box of 
social enterprise MFOs. He suggests that the capacity to engage in SPM depends on how well it fits 
into the wider organizational systems and local contexts. As shown in Figure 2, he starts with a 
description of mission, vision and goals of the organization. Furthermore, the organization is 
embedded in its economic, geographical and political operating environment and has relationships 
with external stakeholders particularly its investors and donors. It then describes the organisational 
capacity and culture, which includes human resource capacity, incentive systems, capacity to innovate 
and change management. These determinants influence social and financial performance and change 
the organization (Copestake et al 2005: 158). This system diagram overlaps with wider literature of 
organisational learning and NIE looking at PBM in organisational systems (see Section 2.3.5, p28; 
Kim 1993; Argyris and Schon 1996; Cameron 2008:434; Senge 2006; Thomas and Mohan 2007). 
 









Mission and Vison 
External Relations 
 Source: Adapted from Copestake et al 2005:160, Money with a Mission.  
 
Copestake (2005:176) subsequently argues the challenge for MFOs is to strike the right balance in a 
wide range of constructive tensions in double bottom line management. Managers need to make 
difficult choices based on limited and timely information relating to mission and vision, relationships, 
operating environment and organisational capacity and culture. This perspective takes the starting 
point that there is no “blue print”, or standard set of decisions to enhance social performance. Rather it 
views tensions between social and financial performance as “constructive” and argues it is important 
to become more conscious of them to be more effective in PBM (Copestake 2005:160). This 
framework overlaps with tension frameworks described earlier, (see p27, Section 2.3.5, Cameron 
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2008; Cameron and Quin 2005; Senge 2006), but is more specific in that it applies to the context of 
SPM in MFOs. But Copestake (2005) goes further in arguing that balanced performance management 
is the desirable “blue print” because managers need to stay away from extreme positions. Moreover, 
he makes no attempt to explain why so many tensions are identified, and not less as for example done 
by Cameron et al. (2008) and Cameron, Quin et al. (2005).    
 
Table 3 Social Performance Management Dilemma 
 Tensions  Extreme position Balanced  Opposite Extreme Tension 
Mission and 
Vision 
Mission  Dominant financial perspective- neglect 
of social mission 
Social mission constrained by 
financial realism 
Social mission is unsustainable due to 
lack of financial realism  
 Growth Strategy Growth orientation at the expense of 
staff motivation and quality of service, 
leading to high staff and client turnover 
Growth subject to minimum 
standards of service quality for 
staff and clients  
Limited scale of activity, possibly 





Investors and other 
funders 
Stable, open-ended, co-dependent  Diverse, long term and focused on 
enhancing  MFO autonomy  




Ambition to the 
external 
environment 
Attempts to work in environment that 
are too difficult relative to the MFO’s 
capacity, or to achieve too much too 
quickly 
Strategy strikes an appropriate 
balance between challenge and 
internal capacity  
Social performance limited by the 
reluctance to push into new markets. 
Excessive caution or conservatism in 
planning.  
 Relationship with 
other MFOs  
Fierce competition and mutual 
suspicion 
Flexible mix of collaboration and 
competition 
Complacent and insular closed 
networks 
 Public Relations  Aggressive self-promotion, rhetoric 
outstripping reality 
Public relations effort in line with 
actual and potential performance  
Lack of publicity limits development of 
external relations.  
Organisational 
Capacity and  
Culture 
Board Composition Dominant specialist microfinance 
perspective – insular view and danger 
of herd effects  
Tension between pursuit of best 
practice within microfinance and 
wider perspectives  
Dominant “generalist” perspective – 
failure to learn from best practice 
within microfinance 
 Human Resources Bias towards rewarding high 
qualifications and outside experience 
Blend between qualifications and 
experience; internally promoted 
and externally recruited staff.  
Bias towards rewarding practical field 
experience and loyalty.  
 Structure Rigid central control, completely 
subordinate field staff 
Continuous monitoring and 
review of scope for 
decentralization of decision-
making 
[No control with danger of]  Inadequate 
financial discipline. Low staff 
productivity and high risk of fraud.  
 Organisational 
communication* 
Rigid contracts and enforcement. Weak 
vertical and horizontal communication  
Culture of listening and 
consultation within a strong 
framework of work discipline  
Weak job specification. Staff overly 




Refusal or inability to contemplate 
changes to original model and 
management practices 
Culture of organizational learning 
tempered by careful change 
management 
Proliferation of new innovation and 
pilot projects often led by funding 
opportunities.  
 Product Design Rigid adherence to one or two standard 
products 
Cautious product diversification 
informed by careful research  
Highly diversified product range, with 
and without tie-ups and with flexible 
terms 
 Targeting Methods No targeting of any kinds limits social 
performance 
 
Flexible and low-cost (self-) 
targeting, especially area based, 
plus outcome monitoring  
Rigid pro-poor targeting, risks 
stigmatizing clients and can limit 
growth 
 R&D & Social 
performance 
assessment 
Part-time activity with ad hoc support 
from consultants.  
 
Specialist unit integrated with 
routine monitoring and strong 
feedback loop.  
Specialist staff isolated from 
operational staff working mostly for 
board and donors 
Adapted from Copestake (2005:176) 
* Copestake labels this organisational culture, but since organisational culture is broader (see sec 2.2.), I label 
this as “organisational communication.”   











2.7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter described ways of thinking about development management. It started with the premises 
that development management is framed by SMMs of actors and organisations, which led to a 
discussion of SMMs underpinning different types of PBM in microfinance. Three SMMs were 
inductively identified, namely business first, development first and social enterprise, each with a 
normative, historical and practical component and each drawing from a wider set of theories and 
ideologies.  
 
Social enterprise is the model that will be critically examined in this thesis, it rests on the belief that 
double bottom line management is feasible and desirable as synergies may be created in pursuing the 
financial and social goals simultaneously (Dunford 2006; Yunus 2007). SPM initiatives for MFOs are 
said to improve financial performance by fostering innovation and organisational learning and through 
better understanding of clients (Copestake et al 2005:218; Imp-Act 2004: 8). However, at the same 
time, there are management tensions (Copestake 2005:176), including multi-task problems in the 
allocation of resources (Armendariz and Murdoch 2007), and the risk of mission drift (Christen 2001; 
Copestake 2007; Mersland and Strom 2007). Despite its popular appeal as a vision of “capitalism with 
a human face”, there is little empirical evidence and good case studies on whether the social enterprise 
model is effective in practice. As was described by “business first” and “development first” there are 
strong views that you don’t mix goals, it is better for organisations to focus on either profit or socially 
oriented objectives and combining client and company objectives actually leads to confusion and a 
lack of efficiency which can undermine performance in both domains. So, there is a real empirical 
question here that I can try to answer through this research. At its core, this thesis will test the 
feasibility of social enterprises. How feasible is it in practice for MFOs to combine both goals or to 
what extent do they fail, reaching only one set of goals or neither.  
 
In order to enquire into this we have to dive deeper into the SMM of social enterprise by investigating 
case studies at the MFO-level itself, including its dynamics, management tensions and synergies. As 
described in Section 2.3.5 an open question is what exact metrics to look for when assessing the wider 
“organisational SMM”, “system” or “culture”. Many frameworks both overlap and diverge. The 
frameworks presented in Figure 2 and Table 3 overlap with other NIE and OD literature (p28) but 
were applied to “social enterprise” MFOs participating in the Imp-Act Consortium Research. They 
offer an entry point to assess double bottom line management in microfinance companies. I will return 
to this point in Chapter IV, after having introduced the wider ILO study, which formed the 





Chapter III. Decent Work and Microfinance  
 
 
3.1. Introduction   
 
This chapter describes decent work and its application to microfinance. Section 3.2 sketches the 
concept of decent work and how it is historically embedded in the ILO. Section 3.3 shows how it 
applies to microfinance according to the Labour Organisation. What would the SMMs identified in 
Chapter II state about the social impacts of microfinance on employment. What role does the ILO play 
in supporting these SMMs? Section 3.4 introduces the Microfinance for Decent Work project 
implemented by the Social Finance Programme over the period 2008 to 2012. I will outline its 
objectives, actors and planning, as well as my personal involvement in the project. Section 3.5 
describes the first phase of the action research and presents outcomes of the diagnostic survey 
conducted from Nov 2008 to February 2009. I will use the outcomes to challenge some of the 
perspectives of the SMMs identified in the previous chapter.   
 
The focus of this PhD will be on the application of employment in microfinance. The ILO is of course 
active on many other fronts including labour policy formulation, regulation of labour standards and 
rights at work, globalisation, social security through formal government agencies, labour statistics etc. 
Although this deserves recognition, it will not be the scope of this research. Within the broader 
concept of decent work, the thesis will focus on job creation and women’s empowerment and 
entrepreneurship because the case study MFOs chose to address these decent work aspects (see 
Chapter VI and Chapter VII).   
 
 
3.2. Decent Work and the ILO  
 
At its inception in 1919, the ILO formed a Polanyistic view of society (Standing 2008:355; Polanyi 
1957:26), aiming to protect labour from the hands of Wall street liberalistic excesses and following 
the principle that “labour is not a commodity”. Treating labour as a product to be traded in markets 
would undermine capitalism itself because it would not be socially acceptable and therefore make 
laissez faire capitalism politically unsustainable (Polanyi:1957). As such in the first 40 years of 
existence, the International Labour Organisation functioned mainly as an agency that developed 
labour standards and stood for national welfare capitalism through social dialogue as practiced in 
many Western European countries (Swepston 1999:36-38; Standing 2008:356, ILO 2008c:13; Deacon 




The principle of social dialogue lies at the heart of the ILO. It is the only UN institution that has a 
governance based on tripartism, a dialogue between employers, employees and the government 
(Swepton 1999:36-38; ILO 2008e). Tripartism is a model “in which standard employees would be 
treated decently and protected, in return for their accepting the employers’ ‘right to manage’ and their 
‘right’ to make and retain profits” (Standing 2008:356, and also ILO 2008e). The ILO had to represent 
and reach consensus between many competing views of labour market and welfare models. Such 
perspectives have been labelled by a variety of authors as formalised liberal welfare states, corporate 
welfare states, social democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990:26-29; Gradus, Hospers et al 
2000; Hall and Sokice 2002), productive welfare regimes liberal-informal regimes and informal 
security regimes (Wood and Gough et al. 2004; Wood 2007). With such a diversity of welfare models, 
in which labour unions, governments and employer organisations all play different roles, and have 
different levels of interests, power and values, it is difficult to reach agreements (Deacon et al 1997). 
The ILO supports the wider principle of social dialogue between competing views on labour markets 
and functions as a broker in the development of formal labour standards and policy.   
 
In the 1970s, the ILO broadened its agenda by incorporating the informal sector into its mandate as 
well as related concepts of gender equality and basic needs approaches (Standing 2008; ILO 2008e; 
ILO 2008c; Kabeer 2008:13-14). It recognized that informal routes to the development of labour 
markets were important because in most developing countries urbanization was increasing 
informality, and the percentage of working population associated in unions was generally smaller than 
15% and declining (Ghai 2002). It was difficult to estimate how large the informal sector was, because 
official labour statistics neglected a lot of the self-employment in microenterprises and non-paid 
workers, often women (Aliber 2002; Kabeer 2008:29-31; Samal 2008:ch1). Informal work activities 
tended to be small scale, unprotected by labour law and un-taxed, but beyond these shared 
characteristics they were highly heterogeneous.  
 
The ILO established the term “informal sector” together with the term “working poor”, emphasizing  
poor people are often not unemployed, but “underemployed”, working in small scale activities, with 
little government protection, regulation and remuneration (Rakowski 1994:15). It opened up a new 
mandate for the Labour Organisation to intervene in; the working poor consisted of millions of 
workers including many women and self-employed workers. The ILO’s approach acknowledged that 
the informal sector generated employment at a faster pace than the formal sector (ILO 1972:5 in 
Rakowski 1994). The informal sector offered income-generating activities during times of crises and a 
way for the working poor to “survive” (Rakowski 1994: ch3). The ILO promoted a social democratic 
reformist agenda, and implemented technical training and formalisation strategies for microenterprises 




Rakowski (1994) identifies four approaches to the informal sector, namely the above-mentioned 
approach of the ILO, a neo-Marxist approach, the neo-liberal legalist approach and microenterprise 
approach. The first two identified important roles for the state in formalization, the latter two argued 
to reduce state intervention. The neo-Marxist school used dependency theory relating to power and the 
casualization of labour to explain how the capitalist elite exploited the working poor in absence of 
strong governments (Rakowski 1994: ch3; Portes 1994: ch 7). This in stark contrast to the neo-liberal 
legalist approach that was based on the views of De Soto; informality was seen as a response of the 
working poor to the failure of the state. They “escaped” to the informal sector to reduce the costs of 
taxes, bureaucracy and corruption. The desired policy response was to reduce regulation (Rakowski 
1994: 39-40 based on De Soto 1988:29-31). The microenterprise perspective, embraced microfinance 
and business training as a route for small scale businesses to create self-help and empowerment. It 
became popular among aid agencies, who felt informal activities might be a cost-effective in creating 
social and economic development (Rakowski 1994:Ch3:31-34:45).  
 
The Washington consensus dominated development aid in the 1980s. It offered neo-liberal policy 
packages promoted by the US, IMF, WTO and World Bank enforcing liberalization, privatization and 
macro-economic stabilization (Stiglitz 1998a:9:1998b). Deacon et al (1997:47) and Swepston (1999: 
195-205) emphasized it strongly affected the ILO which was not anymore the main multilateral player 
in labour market policy and received competition from the neo-liberal models. For example, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the World Bank almost completely ignored the ILO in 
implementing labour market reforms in the new nation states (Deacon et al 1997:197-199). This 
forced the Labour Organisation to be more convincing in the debates on its relevance for development 
practice. It needed to go beyond moral views of human development (Deacon et al 1997). At the end 
of the 1990s, the ILO was again in need of a revival of its political development agenda also in 
context of a Post-Washington consensus such as public-private partnerships, social enterprise and 
corporate social responsibility, and the Millennium Development Goals (see Section 2.3.6, p29).  
 
Since 1999, the ILO has used the umbrella concept of decent work to support its political agenda, and 
it became incorporated into the MDGs in 2005 (ILO 2007; ILO 2008e:11; UNSD 2008). It defines 
decent work as “creating opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in 
conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity”. What may be labelled as the objective of 
decent work is to establish “productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an 
adequate income, with adequate social protection and with access to income-generating 
opportunities” (ILO Thesaurus Database; Anker et al. 2002:1-3; Ghai 2002: ILO 2005; UN 2006). In 
this context “decent” means “adequate” or “acceptable” work and it is specifically concerned with the 
most  vulnerable and poorest (Anker et al. 2002:3; ILO 2004: 289). Decent work strongly builds upon 
the core pillars of the ILO, employment creation and enterprise development, social protection, 
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standards and rights at work and governance and social dialogue (Ghai 2002; ILO2007). It draws from 
the seven core labour conventions that form the Fundamental Principles and Rights at work, including 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of forced labour, the abolition of the 
worst forms of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination regarding employment and 
occupation (Swepston 1999:37; Ghai 2002:2; ILO 2008b; ILOLEX database). The opposite of decent 
work are decent work deficits, which come in the form of unemployment and underemployment, poor 
quality and unproductive jobs, unsafe work and insecure income, rights that are denied and gender 
inequality (ILO Thesaurus database; ILO 2006).  
 
Decent work is an umbrella concept, a basket of topics related to quality of employment. It was 
created out of the need for policy coherence across the UN and other multilateral agencies, in the 
context of the Post-Washington consensus. Echoing Hulme’s work on the MDGs (2007), decent work 
is a convenient discourse for communicating the ILO’s normative political agenda of human rights to 
the outside world, but on the other hand, by not defining explicit objectives, the ILO also avoided 
having to be fully accountable for achieving “decent work for all by 2025”. Ghai (2002:2) argues that 
the term decent work has greater resonance with the public and is an attractive way to communicate 
traditional labour conventions. Standing (2008) applauds the use of the term “work” because it is 
broader than “labour” and includes unpaid informal labourers. However he finds the term decent 
intrinsically vague and fears it has limited operational usefulness (Standing 2008). Others have a need 
for a clear evaluative framework with indicators to measure decent work aspects (e.g. Anker et al. 
2002; ILO 2004 ch11: 289 on economic security; ILO 2008b, April on decent working hours; ILO 
2008d, April on child labour). This has proven to be difficult because decent work is continuously 
moulded by social dialogue and tripartism, which makes it impossible to reach a synthesis that 
satisfies all stakeholders. The paradox is that a universally accepted definition of decent work is not 
possible and even contradicts the idea of social dialogue.  
 
 
3.3. The ILO, Decent Work Aspects and Microfinance  
 
Having described the decent work agenda, I now discuss the role the ILO plays in the microfinance 
sector (Section 3.3.1), followed by a brief overview of literature on impacts of microfinance on 
entrepreneurship and job creation (Section 3.3.2). I then return to the role the ILO could play in the 







3.3.1. The ILO and Microfinance    
 
The ILO mainly intervenes in the labour market, while financial sector development is more the arena 
of the World Bank and IMF. However, because the financial markets affect the labour markets and 
microfinance can create employment, there is a role to play for the ILO in microfinance. With the 
incorporation of the informal sector into the mandate in the 1970s (see Section 3.2) and the increased 
popularity of microfinance interventions in the informal sector in the 1990s (see Section 2.4-2.6), 
microfinance became an area of interest (ILO 1998; ILO 2007, March). 
 
In 1999, the ILO started a Social Finance Programme as part of the employment department, its goals 
is to “use financial instruments to promote Decent Work”.12 “The Programme addresses three major 
goals: reducing vulnerability and increasing access to risk management tools, creating jobs through 
enterprise development, and making financial policies more employment-sensitive.”13 In 2005, the 
Governing Body adopted a policy on microfinance for decent work recognizing microfinance as an 
effective strategy to help advance decent work goals (ILO 2007, March:1). Microfinance is believed 
to contribute to decent work, “by providing opportunities for small investments in self-employment 
and job creation. And, through emergency loans, micro-savings and micro-insurance, it provides the 
means for people to manage risks” (ILO2005:1). Among key objectives of the program were to do 
action research on innovations related to market failures and monitor their costs and benefits (ILO 
2007, March:2). 
 
In 2008, the Social Finance Programme started the “Microfinance for Decent Work Project” as a way 
to promote the decent work agenda among MFOs. The project aimed to bring about changes in 
microfinance methodology to improve the decent work aspects. The working team identified decent 
work aspects or deficits that intersected with microfinance to be:  
- Productive employment for clients and job creation for their workers  
- Child labour 
- Formalisation of the work activity of the client 
- Association of workers 
- Risk management and social protection 
- Over-indebtedness and bonded labour  
- Working conditions 
- Women Empowerment 
 
                                                 
12 In this context, social finance promotes sustainable finance with an employment related social 
objective. 
13See ILO social finance programme: http://www.ilo.org/employment/Areasofwork/lang--
en/WCMS_DOC_EMP_ARE_SFN_EN , accessed Nov 2010 
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These aspects were inductively identified by Social Finance Programme based on the seven core 
conventions and a review of impact assessments and employment related innovations in microfinance 
(See Balkenhol 2007; ILO 2007, Dec; ILO 2009 for an extensive review). When I started working as a 
consultant for the project the eight items were already chosen. In my opinion, this list is both broad 
and relevant enough for MFOs.14 Before I will describe the ILO project in more detail (Section 3.4), I 
will first give a brief overview of existing literature on microfinance and employment effects.  
 
3.3.2. Microfinance, Employment and entrepreneurship  
 
Most reviews find microfinance has a positive effect on work quantity by increasing self-employment 
for the microfinance borrowers, but at the same time question the quality of employment generated 
(Sebstad and Chen 1996; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Armendariz and Morduch 2007:4; Balkenhol 
2007; Banerjee and Duflo 2009,Feb; Crepon et al 2011). Outcomes depend on how one defines 
employment, does one include wage, family, and daily workers (Balkenhol 2007). 
 
Another question is whether microfinance generates employment beyond the borrower. Studies done 
in the 1990s emphasized microfinance creates mainly family labour. Job creation was skewed towards 
a relatively small number of microfinance users (Sebstad and Chen 1996, Hulme and Mosley 
1996:102-104; Khander 2003). Hulme and Mosley 1996 (103-104) find microfinance mainly 
increased working time, there was little increase in productivity for most borrowers. Also external 
factors such as market and livelihood opportunities influenced employment outcomes and these were 
largely beyond the control of MFOs. Some studies recognized microcredit reduced vulnerability by 
diversifying income-generating activities (Sebstad and Chen 1996).  
 
Recent studies also show mixed results with Burkle (2009) finding positive effects on job creation in 
Tajikistan, while Banerjee and Duflo (2009, May) found small negative effects in South India. The 
ideal model in which financial services upgrade clients from having a family owned microenterprises 
to a job creating SME is not verified empirically (Emran et al 2006:3; Balkenhol 2007:10).  
 
Impacts can be highly heterogenic, for example, Imai and Arun (2008) used propensity score 
matching and found that access to microfinance in India decreased poverty for microfinance 
borrowers as measured by a multi-dimensional index that included employment quality and assets. 
While in urban areas access to finance was effective in reducing poverty, in rural areas access to loans 
for production activities were mainly effective. Effects also differed among poor and moderately poor 
borrowers.  
                                                 
14 Arguably, one aspect missing in the context of Central Asian microfinance was worker migration and 
remittances transfer. They were left out for practical purposes since not all decent work aspects could be 




It is believed that microfinance may empower women borrowers because it gives them opportunities 
to earn income. Women may then gain more respect, confidence and control over decision-making. 
However, microfinance may also be disempowering women, when they take the loan but other family 
members control it, or when loans or new business activities increase household conflicts (Fernando et 
al 2006:6-7). Early studies suffering from selection bias showed microfinance improves empowerment 
outcomes (Cheston 2002; Khandker 2003: Kabeer 2005). However, later studies using RCTs found 
access to microfinance increased self-employment, but there was no effect on business start-up and 
empowerment outcomes (Banerjee, Duflo et al 2007; Crepon et al 2011). Another group of authors 
argues microfinance has limited impact on women’s empowerment because it does not change 
society-wide gender norms and instead works within what is culturally acceptable (Johnson 2003; 
Mayoux 2000: Cheston 2002:29; Ngo 2008:42), or even enforces prevailing gender norms (Fernando 
et al 2006:6-7).    
 
Some authors researched the idea that entrepreneurship trainings in combination with microfinance 
may improve women’s entrepreneurship and empowerment. Kevane (1996:2-4) detects increased 
business expansion, earnings and capacity for women, but does not have a control group to see what 
would have happened in the absence of training interventions. Dunford (2001:9-11) finds no effects 
on women’s control over household decision-making. The first RCT was done by Karlan and Valdivia 
(2006;2009:15&24-25) who found positive effects of entrepreneurship training on business practices 
and self-employment for both men and women, but no effects were observed on formalization of 
businesses, business start-up and empowerment (see Section 2.6, p41) .  
 
Nevertheless studies are difficult to compare because they apply to different contexts and use different 
metrics (e.g. Balkenhol 2007). So to what extent do MFOs promote quality of work for clients and 
embrace a decent work agenda?  The argument advanced in this section echoes the work of 
Copestake’s (2008:578) on well-being and development, namely that understanding the role of 
microfinance in promoting decent work is better served by referencing “to the existence of multiple 
mental models than by attempting to proceed to an all embracing synthesis”. 
 
 
3.3.3. Microfinance and Decent Work from the perspectives of SMMs   
 
What role does the ILO play for MFOs and vice versa? Debates about decent work aspects such as 
child labour, over-indebtedness, women’s empowerment, job creation are often value laden. Different 
mental models depicted in chapter II, will observe the impact of microfinance on employment quality 
differently in the context of limited evidence and lack of generalizable results. The ILO may have a 




Business first  
 
From a “Business first” perspective MFOs are unlikely to embrace the decent work agenda for several 
reasons:  first, the decent work agenda should not go at the expense of increasing access to finance and 
building strong sustainable financial institutions. Decent work is problematically holistic; it is not the 
core business of financial companies to intervene in labour markets (see Section 2.4). Second, decent 
work interventions increase the operating costs of MFOs, but it is unclear how it is benefiting them 
and whether it can be sustained in the context of market competition. Third, the ILO and its “managed 
capitalism” does not resonate with the neo-liberal ideology, it constrains the freedom of enterprise and 
tends to favour regulation of labour markets over de-regulation of financial markets. For “business 
first” a simplistic agenda would be sufficient, for example looking at increases in incomes and 
employment opportunities for microfinance clients.  
 
However, for several supporters of commercial microfinance there is a paradox; despite that no 
evidence is provided or testing is done, they simply assume microfinance creates good quality 
employment as a normative belief. For example, Robinson (2001:37) states; “[minimalist] 
Microfinance matters, because it increases the options and the self-confidence of poor households by 
helping them to expand their enterprises and add others, to decrease risk, to smooth consumption, to 
obtain higher returns on investment,… [to] increase their productivity and incomes,… to escape or 
decrease exploitation by the locally powerful, and to conduct their business with dignity. The quality 
of their lives improves. Children are sent to school, and child labor decreases. And housing and 
health improve. In addition, the economically active poor who are able to expand their economic 
activities often create jobs for others; among those who gain employment in this way are some of the 
extremely poor” (Robinson 2001:37; see also Helms 2006:32-33 for a somewhat similar perspective). 
Von Pishke (1990:41) claims "Finance is social”, thereby ignoring any possible negative effects of 
microfinance on the quality of employment of the client. 
 
As described in the Section 3.2, (p46), the historical role of the ILO has been against neo-liberal 
business models. While the ILO is not an anti-capitalist or a neo-Marxist institution, it does view that 
labour market regulation is necessary for development. The labour organisation differs from the 
business first perspectives of the World Bank and CGAP (see Section 2.4, p31), in that has less trust 
in the functioning of laissez fair markets and sees stronger distributional consequences of market 
failures in the financial sector (ILO 2007, March:1-2). Nowadays, the ILO does embrace market-
adapted approaches to decent work. For example, in the mid-1990s it recognized that microfinance 
funds should apply market interest rates and microfinance providers should seek institutional 





Development first  
 
“Development first” is likely to embrace the decent work agenda because it starts from the premises 
that there is a need for microfinance plus, social services and public policy to improve the quality of 
employment and productive capacities of clients (see Section 2.5). Minimalist microcredit as 
advocated by the neo-liberalistic perspectives cannot create good quality employment. At best it 
creates work activities at the bottom of the barrel (Dichter 2005) and there is a danger that it can create 
decent work deficits such as disempowerment of women (Fernando et al 2006), over-indebtedness, or 
clientelism, a form of bonded labour (Wood 2004; 2007; Bateman and Chang 2009:9). Views that are 
more radical argue that only the power of the state and the labour unions create good quality 
employment and that microfinance may actually undermine the creation of such institutions (Weber 
2001; Bateman and Chang 2009). For example, Bateman and Chan (2009:11) suggest microfinance 
may sustain decent work deficits because it “helps to precipitate a decline in incomes, wages, profits, 
and working/life conditions in many localities in the developing and transition countries”. However, a 
paradox is that they provide no evidence in support of this strong statement.   
 
Early microfinance policies of the ILO were perhaps more of a development first nature, focusing on 
social aspects such as prevention of over-indebtedness, and subsidized targeting of vulnerable groups 
such as migrant, young or poor workers (ILO 1998:1-14). The ILO (1998) recognized it could play a  
role in cooperative development for self-help organisations, village banks, and savings and credit 




There may be a particular set of social enterprise MFOs sharing the ILO’s concern for decent work 
deficits in the labour market (see Section 2.6). Particularly, MFOs that have a mission related to 
employment may resonate with the decent work agenda. The ILO’s agenda could also be attractive if 
addressing employment aspects for clients improves customer satisfaction and retention, 
organisational image, product development, marketing or mitigates harmful mission drift.  
 
In April 2008, at the outset of the project the Social Performance Taskforce did not promote the 
decent work agenda. Most MFOs did not use the term “decent work” explicitly. Some of them 
addressed decent work aspects implicitly with mission statements relating to entrepreneurship, job 
creation, women’s empowerment, child labour and vulnerability. Other aspects such as working 
conditions and formalization may be part of specific interventions.  
 
At the same time, many microfinance networks and investors claimed to improve the quality and 
quantity of employment through microfinance. FINCA and Opportunity International had job creation 
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explicitly in their mission statement. World Vision and Plan International aimed to reduce child 
labour. Women’s World Banking and Grameen Foundation tried to addresses women’s 
empowerment. Among microfinance investors, Oikocredit aimed to promote empowerment of the 
poor and disadvantaged with focus on women, as well as attention to employment generation and 
cooperative development. Triodos believed microfinance “enables businesses to grow, generates 
income and jobs, thereby reducing poverty”.  Blue Orchard improved quality of life through 
microfinance enterprise activities, claiming experience shows that “even very modest loans generate 
huge business productivity gains and contribute to both job creation and better family living 
standards”. These donors and investors claimed to have a concern for the quality of employment of 
end-borrowers, especially in a normative context (source websites, accessed March 2009).15    
 
Although the commercial microfinance model may adopt at best a minimal decent work agenda, the 
development first model could embrace it. The question is whether MFOs can function as a social 
enterprise that promotes decent work aspects in a sustainable fashion. Historically the ILO has played 
the strongest role in the development first mental model and rejected business first thinking. The role 
it plays for the social enterprise model is ambiguous, as a mode of social enterprise microfinance may 
be criticised for disguising but not fundamentally challenging capitalist excess. On the other hand, 
MFOs also offer an additional agency through which the ILO could seek to execute its role, 
particularly in relation to informal activity where trade union activity is irrelevant and state regulation 
is weak.    
 
3.4. The Microfinance for Decent Work Project 
 
Section 3.1 to 3.3 showed the decent work agenda of ILO may be compatible with SPM agendas of 
several MFOs. Can they function as a social enterprise promoting decent work related aspects in a 
sustainable fashion?  In 2008, the ILO Social Finance Program started an action research looking into 
this aspect. I will now describe objectives, time line and phases of the ILO project.  I became actively 
involved in the project since April 2008.  
 
 
                                                 
15 Sources:  
Finca International: http://www.finca.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2603941/k.BBB2/Mission_and_Vision.htm  
Opportunity International: http://www.opportunity.org/Page.aspx?pid=779  
Women World Banking: http://www.swwb.org/mission-vision  
Grameen Foundation: http://www.grameenfoundation.org/who-we-are 
Oikocredit: http://www.oikocredit.org/en/who-we-are/mission-and-values  
Triodos http://www.triodos.com/com/international_funds/microfinance/spec_microfinance_funds/46181/ 
Blue Orchard: http://www.blueorchard.com/jahia/Jahia/pid/341,  
All accessed March 2009.  
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3.4.1. Objectives  
 
The main goal of the project was to “accompany a selected number of [MFOs] that want to address 
decent work deficits” (ILO 2007, Dec:27). This was to be done by piloting new ways of working16  in 
the areas of targeting, marketing, product design and diversification, delivery channels, bundling of 
financial and non-financial services and external partnerships. “In some instances there is likely to be 
a business case, in others not, but the benefits for society as a whole may warrant public policy 
support or incentives” (ILO 2007, Dec: 7 & 27). The project was considered to be an action research 
because it aimed to bring about a change in the methodologies of MFOs to improve decent work 
aspects for their clients (ILO 2007, Dec: 27). It used a diagnostic and experimental phase that could 
trigger learning for the MFOs. It started from the premise that an innovation in the microfinance 
methodology is required to improve decent work aspects. 
 
The research aimed to:   
   “generate knowledge about the effects of changes in the microfinance methodology on specific 
decent work outcomes”; 
 “demonstrate the business case and its limitation;   
 design incentives and generally build human and institutional capacity to create a permanent 
and sustainable basis for constant pro Decent Work innovations in MFOs;  
 inform and advise social partners” (ILO 2007, Dec:19).    
 
Also the project had an underlying political agenda to promote decent work in the microfinance 
sector, for example for those MFOs that resonated with decent work aspects. It intended to open a 
dialogue between labor market and financial market institutions and within the ILO itself.   
 
3.4.2. Activities and timeline  
 
 
The research was implemented in the following phases: 
 Selection of MFOs ; March-June 2008 
 Phase I: Diagnostic Survey of Decent Work Aspects ; June 2008- Feb 2009 (See Section 3.5) 
 Phase II: Decent Work Pilot Assessment;  May 2009- June 2012 (See Chapter V-Chapter VII) 
 
I will now describe each phase in more detail.    
 
 
                                                 
16 In this context, new ways of working meant creating products and services that were innovative for the MFOs 
(even though they may have been implemented elsewhere). 
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Selection of MFOs 
 
Applications were distributed selectively within the ILO and Oikocredit network to over 150 MFOs.  
We distributed the expression of interest forms to larger organisations that met certain predefined 
criteria such as a minimum of 10.000 borrowers, five years of operations, operational self-sufficiency 
and at least four branches. This was done because an overall aim was to select financial organisations 
that were large enough to be able to innovate with new ways of working.  
 
In May 2009, approximately 60 MFOs expressed interest in addressing decent work issues for clients. 
Out of this sample of applications we selected 22 MFOs for the diagnostic phase based on their 
established social mission relating to decent work goals, their interest in decent work aspects, their 
commitment to innovate and originality of their proposal. There were a limited number of participants 
per continent, with only two places in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Table 4 shows the MFOs 
completing the diagnostic phase and in bold the sub-sample implementing the pilot assessment. They 
were among the larger MFOs in their respective markets and had social  missions relating to 
employment or entrepreneurship goals.  
 
For example, both Central Asian companies were financially sustainable and had a social objectives 
relating to a decent work aspects, namely job creation for Bai Tushum and entrepreneurship of women 
for IMON. IMON’s mission was to “ promote economic development in Tajikistan, assist in 
increasing the quality of life and economic development in the country through providing sustainable 
access to finance for economically active people in Tajikistan”. The company was founded by the 
National Business Association of Women in Tajikistan and had the social objective to improve 
women entrepreneurship and empowerment. Bai Tushum’s mission was to contribute to “sustainable 
development of Kyrgyz economy, prosperity of society and improvement of living standards through 
provision of financial services to different sectors of agriculture, medium-size, and small businesses.”  
They pursued a social objective of employment creation for clients, particularly through its financing 
of small and medium sized businesses. Thus, for this thesis I accept these two companies to be case 
studies of social enterprise MFOs based on the criteria that they claimed to pursue a double bottom 
line of financial and social goals (see more in Sections 5.3-5.5).        
 
The region of Central Asia was interesting for the PhD because several MFOs had employment and 
business creation as part of their mission statement and therefore may resonate with a decent work 
agenda. MFOs in Central Asia were believed to resonate with employment goals of job creation and 
enterprise development because historically they were targeting higher market segments of small and 
medium enterprise with larger loan sizes. The markets were young and in an expansion phase with 
several of the MFOs having reached financial sustainability. Few social performance assessments 
were done in this region (Ngo 2008, June; Burkle 2009, Feb). The ILO project offered an opportunity 
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for the two case study companies, to experiment with SPM activities and improve employment 
outcomes for clients.  
 
Table 4 MFOs in ILO Project   
Africa  Asia Latin America ECA  
PRIDE Uganda  
 
AMK Cambodia  Confianza Peru Bai Tushum Kyrgyzstan  
NYESIGIO Mali  Vision Fund Cambodia  Bancovelo Honduras IMON Tajikistan  
 
RCPB Burkina Faso  NWTF Philippines  
 
FDL Nicaragua  
LAPO Nigeria  
 
ESAF India    
Tamweelcom Jordan BASIX India   
ABA Egypt  
 
NRSP Pakistan  
 
  
Al Amana Morocco TYM Vietnam  
 
  
Enda inter-arabe Tunisia 
 
XAC Bank Mongolia   
 BMT Indonesia 
 
  
* In bold are the 16 MFOs involved in the 2nd phase 
 
 
Phase I: Diagnostic Survey 
 
Phase one included a diagnostic survey for each MFO aiming to provide a snapshot of the decent 
work aspects of microfinance clients and their workers (see p50). Each MFO conducted the same 
survey of 53 questions for a random sample of 200 borrowers. The survey-results aimed to increase 
awareness of the MFO staff on decent work deficits, thereby feeding back into the design of the pilot 
assessment for phase II of the project. The Social Finance Programme including myself did the 
analysis. We presented key results to each MFO in a separate report. In February 2009 a workshop 
was organised in Geneva were all the MFOs participated and a synthesis report was presented (ILO 
2009, unpublished work). Section 3.5 will present some of the outcomes of the diagnostic survey. 
 
Phase II: Decent Work Pilot Assessment  
 
Phase two intended for 16 MFOs to come up with their own pilot to address a decent work aspect 
chosen by them, (see p50). They could engage in loop learning in a similar way as demonstrated in 
Figure 1 (see p27). It included doing problem diagnosis, pilot design, pilot implementation, data 
collection, and outcome reporting, this in turn may lead to follow-up actions and learning.  
Most MFOs wanted to conduct research in client risk management (8) followed by child labour (3), 
formalisation (2) and working conditions (2) The case studies in Central Asia were unique to the 
project because they intended to address job creation and women's empowerment and 
entrepreneurship. The pilots of Bai Tushum and IMON will be described in detail in Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII.  
  
To assess whether the pilot worked or not, each of the MFO conducted an impact assessment at client 
level to track decent work outcomes over time. Different quantitative studies were designed for each 
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organisation including different surveys, sampling, experimental methodology. However all the 
assessments aimed to use a treatment and comparison group design with a baseline survey and several 
follow-up surveys over a two-year period. This was required to maintain comparability in 
methodologies and be able to demonstrate impact measurement, but also because it was a formal 
requirement of the ILO and its donor agency to use the studies as a public good.17 In summary, the 
project intended to have MFOs engage in two rounds of experimentation in order to improve the 
awareness and practices of MFOs relating to decent work of their borrowers.  
 
3.4.3. Actors involved  
 
There were three types of actors for this thesis, namely the ILO, the two Central Asian MFOs and 
myself as a researcher and consultant. The ILO functioned as the umbrella organisation in the overall 
project, funding the cost of data collection, offering technical support and supervising the data 
analysis and outcome reporting. The MFOs designed and managed their pilot assessments and 
organized data collection. They set up a project team of senior managers.  
 
As an ILO consultant, I supported in the selection of MFOs and the design of the methodology for the 
pilot assessments. The task included designing and field-testing surveys, training staff in 
administering the survey, preparing data entry forms, advising on methodological design, conducting 
empirical analysis of outcomes, writing reports and other smaller tasks. At the same time, I also had a 
role as an academic researcher to analyse how the MFO managed the pilot assessment and to assess 
the interaction between the MFOs, the ILO and myself. Section 4.5 will give a more detailed overview 
on how these three actors interacted and how the methodology of my PhD co-evolved with the ILO 
project.   
 
 
3.5. Decent work outcomes observed through diagnostic phase  
 
Having described the project planning, this Section shows the findings of the diagnostic survey. I will 
first discuss the process of data collection (3.5.1) and then turn to the decent work outcomes (3.5.2.), 




                                                 




3.5.1. Process of data collection 
 
I was part of the team based in Geneva that developed the diagnostic survey in the first half of 2008 
during my 5 months detachment at the ILO and I helped implement the questionnaire in the two 
Central Asian MFOs.  
 
The first challenge encountered by the team was how to incorporate so many topics into one survey. 
We reduced the questionnaire from 87 to 53 questions with the final survey taking approximately 40 
minutes to conduct. A second challenge was to apply one tool in 20 different countries for 22 different 
organisations. Some questions did not work in specific contexts. For example, in Kyrgyzstan it was 
not polite to ask people about payment of taxes. In other cultures child labour or gender were sensitive 
topics. A third challenge was to develop a toolkit rather than a tool. Designing the questions was 
relatively easy, but implementing the questionnaire in the field required training, guidance (notes), 
data entry forms, survey testing etc. In almost all cases, senior loan officers or staff from marketing 
and social performance department conducted the interviews. Although MFO-staff had experience in 
dealing with clients, they were not always used to doing social interviews.  
 
Table 5 presents information on sample size and costs of conducting the survey. For Bai Tushum we 
took a random sample of all branches. For IMON we excluded the Southern branches because it was 
difficult to reach their clients during the winter. The sample was representative for the Northern and 
Central Branches only. Total gross costs of conducting the diagnostic survey were respectively 
US$ 5,363 for Bai Tushum and US$ 6,918 for IMON. Worldwide 4,748 clients were interviewed of 
which 63% female and 40% lived in the rural areas. The microfinance clients had an average loan size 
of US$1,197. When compared to the other MFOs, Bai Tushum and IMON were more rurally oriented, 
targeted fewer female clients and were positioned up-market offering larger loan sizes. 
 
 Table 5 Sample Overview and Costs 
 IMON Bai Tushum All 22 MFOs  
(ILO 2009) 
% Rural Clients 53% 56% 40% 
% Female Clients 55% 45% 63% 
Average Loan Size in US$ $2,226 $2,589 $1,197 
Gross Costs of survey 
implementation 
$6,918 $5,363 N/A 
 
Sample Selection 
4 Branches in the 
North 
All Branches Almost always all 
branches 
Clients Interviewed 200 200 4.748 





3.5.2. Decent Work Outcomes   
 
Table 6 shows some of the outcomes per decent work aspect for all 22 MFOs and specifically for 
IMON and Bai Tushum (see p63). I will reflect on the empirical outcomes by drawing from wider 
literature on microfinance and quality and employment (see Section 3.3.2).   
 
Approximately 90% of the microfinance clients were self-employed with some of them having several 
work activities. Each borrower employed on average 1.6 workers in addition to him- or herself. For 
the two Central Asian MFOs this average was skewed towards a small number of entrepreneurs, 
which is a finding similar to Sebstad and Chen (1996:9&iii) and Hulme and Mosley (1996: 103-104). 
The survey found a relatively high number of family workers among Bai Tushum (87%) and IMON 
borrowers (49%), most of them were unpaid.  The “household enterprise” seemed to be a reality for 
most of the microfinance borrowers, who employed few wageworkers (Sebstad, Neil et al 1995; 
Sebstad and Chen 1996; ILO 2009:3).   
 
Approximately 5% of the clients had children working in their enterprise. Often these children were 
from their own family (67%). Most respondents stated children did attend school. Finding working 
children among microfinance clients was not a surprise given earlier studies of Wydick (1999), 
Guarcello et al (2002), Hazarika and Sarangi (2008). 
 
The degree of formalization of entrepreneurship varied substantially. 96% of the clients had ID-Cards 
because this was often a requirement to receive a microfinance loan. However, less than half of them 
used income and expenditure books (42%), had registered their businesses (46%) and paid taxes 
(41%). For the two central Asian MFOs the degree of formalization was much higher when compared 
to other regions.  
 
Only 27% of the self-employed clients and 6% of their workers were associated in some sort of 
business association, labour union, or cooperative. In many cases clients were not aware of the 
existence of such institutions or did not see how it could benefit them. Almost all self-employed 
clients reported to negotiate wages upfront and pay salaries on time, but only 39% offered social 
benefits to their workers. Often this was done through informal mechanisms such as personal lending 
(17%) and offering money (13%), rather than through formal channels such as paid vacation (4%), 
pensions (2%), or maternity leave (1%) (ILO 2009:13). 
 
In terms of risk management, approximately 43% of the borrowers experienced a large unforeseen 
expense in the last 12 months. Frequently cited contingencies were health expenses, housing repairs 
and social events such as funerals and weddings. In most cases, clients used savings to cover large 
unforeseen expenses. Few clients had access to insurance products (ILO 2009:12). Results signalled 
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some borrowers may be prone to over-indebtedness as 16% of the clients had one late payment and 
14% experienced difficulties in repaying their loan.  
 
In terms of occupational safety and health at work, the survey found that 11% of the microfinance 
clients witnessed an injury in the last 12 months. In several cases, clients lost working days because of 
the injuries. 23% of the enterprises did not have sanitation near their workplace. 28% of the 
microfinance borrowers reported to have insufficient lighting, heating or ventilation at their 
workplace. For example, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan many clients reported a lack of heating 
systems.  
 
In terms of gender equality, women less often decided about the usage of loans by themselves when 




























Table 6 Decent Work Outcomes of Diagnostic Survey 
  IMON  
Tajikistan 




(ILO 2009)   
Job Creation and 
Productive Employment 
% self-employed clients  99% 78% 90% 
  Average no of workers for self-employed 
clients  
1.4  2.4  1.6  
 % of wage workers in total workers of 
clients 
39% 12%  
 % of family workers in total workers of 
clients 
49% 87%  
 % of daily laborers in total workers 6% 1%  
 % of total apprentices in total workers of 
clients 
7% 0%  
 % of family workers that were unpaid 79% 95%  
Child labour % of clients with working children  5% 6% 5% 
    Of which family members of the client 43% 81% 67% 
     Of which % of children that go to   school 
full time 
66% 59% 50% 
Formalisation  % clients with ID-Card   99% 100% 96% 
  % clients with income and expenditure 
books    
77% 47% 42% 
 % clients with business registration  65% 91% 46% 
  % of clients who pay taxes  73% 93% 41% 
Association  % of self-employed clients affiliated to 
association 
2% 41% 27% 
   % clients who state there is no association 64% 14% 70% 
  % of clients that have workers that are 
associated 
0% 5% 6% 
Risk Management and 
Social Protection  
% of clients with large unforeseen expenses 50% 53% 43% 
    Of which % of clients that covers 
unforeseen expenses with savings 
71% 42% 57% 
Over-indebtedness  % clients who state they have difficulties to 
repay their loan 
10% 14% 14% 
  % of clients who have one late payment for 
the loan (of 1 day or more) 
41% 17% 16% 
Working Conditions % of Clients that witnessed a working injury 
in the last 12 months 
7% 7% 11% 
    % of clients working that have insufficient 
light, heating and/or ventilation.  
66% 30% 28% 
    % of clients working that do not have 
sanitation at their workplace 
15% 24% 23% 
Gender Equality % men deciding themselves about usage of 
the loan   
94% 57%  
 % of women deciding themselves about the 
usage of the loan 
88% 39%  
 Sample Size   Number of clients interviewed  200 200 4.748 







3.5.3. Reflection on Empirical Outcomes 
 
 
Although the survey did not measure impacts of microfinance on decent work outcomes, it may be 
used to reflect on the normative dimensions of “business first” and “development first”. Several 
commercial microfinance advocates assume good employment quality among microfinance clients, 
however they offer little evidence and testing for it (e.g. Robinson 2001:37; Helms 2006;32-33, see 
p53). The diagnostic survey indicated employment in micro-financed enterprises often concerns 
unpaid family labour with few wage employees. In the context of gender equality, men were more 
likely to decide about the use of the loan by themselves compared to women. Several clients were 
experiencing unforeseen expenses, being subject to vulnerability and few of them had formal social 
protection or insurance. Several faced difficulties to repay their loans, indicating it is too simplistic to 
assume “finance is social” with no negative effects on borrowers (Von Pischke 1991:42).    
 
Development first embraces the decent work agenda in several ways. One group states microfinance 
plus products are needed to capacitate borrowers. The second more radical thinking states decent work 
cannot be accomplished through microfinance, only the power of the state, labour unions and 
associations can create good quality employment (Weber 2001; Bateman and Chang 2010). For the 
latter group the survey showed several reality checks. Few clients were member of labour unions and 
business associations because they were unaware of the existence of such institutions or did not see 
how the membership could benefit them. Few clients received formal social protection, questioning 
whether they had access to public policy institutions. The degree of formalization of the businesses 
varied with less than half of the clients paying taxes, keeping income records, or having registered 
their business.  
    
In the absence of formal state and labor institutions, and giving the reality checks placed with the 
“business first” and “development first” SMMs, the ILO may seek to execute its agenda of decent 
work through modes of social enterprise.  
 
 
3.6. Prospect of the Social Enterprise Model and Decent Work?    
 
 
Building on the SMM depicted in Chapter II, this chapter argued that historically the ILO’s role in 
microfinance has been to embrace the development first and oppose neo-liberal thinking, but the role 
it plays for social enterprise is ambiguous. On the one hand, MFOs that function as social enterprises 
may offer the ILO an additional agency to execute its role, particularly in relation to informal activity 
where trade unions are absent and state regulation is weak. On the other hand, as a model of social 
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enterprise, microfinance may be criticised for disguising and not fundamentally challenging capitalist 
excess.  
 
The decent work agenda may be interesting for social enterprise MFOs that pursue social objectives 
related to the decent work aspects. The ILO project offered several of them an opportunity to pilot 
new ways of working and conduct a social performance assessment, which in turn may yield 
improvements in double bottom line management.   
 
The ILO started the action research project to promote the decent work agenda within the 
microfinance sector, aiming to assess whether MFOs can improve decent work outcomes for clients 
and whether this is done in a sustainable fashion. Further, it wanted to see if it could improve the 
MFOs institutional capacity to address decent work aspects (ILO 2007, Dec:19). At the end of the 
project, the ILO has to state to what extent it is achieving its own normative agenda in practice. 
Relating this to the wider new development management and SMM literature described in Chapter II, 
could the ILO and myself have a sustained effect on the MFOs to do their PBM better? Or, to frame 
this into the context of institutionalising a new way of thinking into an organisation, to what degree 








Chapter IV. Methodology 
 
4.1. Introduction    
 
Chapter II explored concepts of PBM within the context of development practice including the 
literature of new development management. It then applied the concept of SMMs to PBM in 
microfinance by identifying three SMMs. The feasibility of pursuing double bottom line management 
within the social enterprise model was found to be supported by little empirical evidence and case 
studies, hence justifying the focus of this thesis: to bring back to the literature a better understanding 
of how development goals are institutionalized within MFOs operating as social enterprises. 
 
Chapter III explored how the concept of decent work interlinks with microfinance and how the ILO 
may relate to the three SMMs. I argued the role the ILO can play in the social enterprise SMM is 
ambiguous. Although the Labour Organisation supports microfinance for creating employment 
opportunities in the informal sector, it questions whether microfinance companies improve decent 
work outcomes for clients. The ILO project aimed to see to what degree MFOs promote decent work 
aspects for their clients. It did this by offering a selected number of them the opportunity to trial new 
ways of working through a pilot assessment.   
 
This chapter explains my “own action research” methodology, and elaborates how it differs from that 
of the ILO project. Section 4.2 reviews the strengths and limitations of action inquiry by comparing it 
with experimental research. Section 4.3 shows the conceptual framework at three levels, namely social 
performance assessment, double bottom line management and changes in performance management 
over time in relation the pilot. Section 4.4 shows the methodology of data collection at each of the 
levels. Section 4.5 examines my own mental model as an action researcher and critically reflects on 
first, second, and third person action research including my own agency, research ethics, development 
of the methodology, and the claims to validity. 
 
4.2. Choice of Participatory Action Research  
 
I will now describe action research methodology (4.2.1), its strengths and limitations (4.2.2) and 
implications for the methodology of this thesis (4.2.3).    
 
4.2.1. Action Research  
 
Action research, organizational learning and development are closely related fields. They combine 
theory and practice and draw from similar normative and methodological principles such as 
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participatory development, enquiry into human behaviour, and self-reflection of researchers on their 
agency (Reason and McArdle 2007:7). Action research can be viewed as a “model of organisational 
development that involves the feedback of findings [to participants] from interventions to help design 
and implement further improvements” (Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:567). It aims to generate 
applied knowledge that can improve organisational operations. It functions as a cooperative inquiry 
that involves consultant and members of the organisation in joint and cycled learning (Huczynski and 
Buchanan 2007:567-568). As described in Figure 1 (p27), studies often use cycled or system thinking.  
 
Action researchers emphasize the importance for scientists and practitioners to critically reflect on 
their own mental models and agency in relation to their research (see Section 2.3.5, p25-28, see 
Atkinson and Hammersely 1994:248; Argyris and Schon 1996; Reason and Torbert 2001; Reason and 
Bradbury 2008:3-4&7; Reason and McArdle 2007:1-4;7). Argyris and Schon (1996:xxiii & Ch2:45) 
argue for the importance of reflective methodologies for scientists who place themselves inside the 
situation they study and consequently must also study themselves. The relationship between 
practitioner and researcher is not simply one where the practitioner applies knowledge that the 
researcher provides, rather inquiry combines mental reasoning and action (Argyris and Schon 
1996:30-31). As described in in Section 2.3.5 (p26), Argyris and Schon (1996) and Senge (2006) 
developed methods to reflect on mental models of researchers. A related method emerged from 
ethnography, namely participant observation which are observations carried out “when the researcher 
is playing an established participant role in the scene studied” (Atkinson and Hammersely 1994:248).   
 
An action inquiry itself is not static and evolves over time (Reason and Torbert 2001; Reason and 
Bradbury 2008:3-4&7; Reason and McArdle 2007:1-4; 7). Reason and Torbert (2001) and Reason and 
McArdle (2007) make a distinction between first-, second and third-person inquiry. The first-person 
inquiry addresses the ability of the researcher to be aware of his own agency and to make choices 
transparent to stakeholders in the assessment. The second-person research includes cooperative 
inquiry through joint studies and dissemination of outcomes to other stakeholders. The third person 
action science seeks to create wider institutional change and feeds back lessons learned into the wider 
literature (Reason and McArdle 2007:7-18; Reason and Bradbury, 2008:xxv-xxvi,8&19). Attention 
needs to be given to all three levels. 
 
4.2.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Action Research  
 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of using an action inquiry. I will highlight some of 
these by comparing action research with positivist experimental research. Tensions arise in choice 
between multiple or single experiments, responsive or replicable experiments, qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, generating locally contextual or globally generalizable knowledge, 




Supporters of action inquiry emphasize that even though experimental science rigorously assesses 
single experiments, an action study is more responsive using multiple experiments that are allowed to 
evolve and adapt to practical contextual requirements (Dick 1993 and Argyris and Schon 1996:39-41). 
Choices in methodology need to be made concerning claims to internal and external validity. Drawing 
on Shadish et al (2002: 464-468), the “internal validity” may be described as the knowledge claims to 
causality that can be derived within a single experiment. The “external validity” is the extent to which 
pilot results can be generalized and replicated into other settings, across space and time. 
 
Admirers of experimental science view randomized controlled sampling as the best method to 
establish causality because it controls for selection bias and can objectively claim whether an 
intervention was successful (Duflo 2007; Goldberg and Karlan 2007; Shadish et al 2002). Karlan and 
Goldberg (2007:8, see p40) argued a high internal validity of impact assessment can lead to the 
scaling up of interventions into other institutions and within other contexts (Karlan and Goldberg 
2007). Although several action researchers agree that their approach does not meet up to positivist 
empirical standards, they say their data collection methods are part of a fundamentally different 
philosophy of science that should not be validated by empirical standards alone (Dick 1993: Reason 
and Bradbury 2008). Internal validity does not imply external validity because multiple experiments 
are needed (Dick 1993; Senge 2006:77). Dick (1993:32) confronts the theoretical idea that impact 
assessment methodology is in itself a single experiment in which no learning takes place during the 
implementation of the assessment. In addition, the ability of people to act does not just depend on 
statistical outcomes, but on values and belief systems (Reason 2008) or SMMs (see Section 2.3).   
 
Action research deliberately sacrifices some of its capacity to generalize to create more localized and 
contextual knowledge, but an experimental methodology seeks generalisable results even at the 
expense of local relevance. Kirk and Miller (1986 in Dick 1993:46) state qualitative data generated 
through action inquiry can have a stronger validity since the study takes place under real life 
conditions and not in a laboratory environment. Others note the importance of participation of 
practitioners in the inquiry as a way to make them more committed and motivated to action. This in 
turn improves data quality and the likelihood that stakeholders act on the findings of the research 
(Argyris and Schon 1996 ch2).   
 
Atkinson and Hammersley’s (1994:250-253) work on participant observation sees a need for 
researchers to become insiders because it allows them to assess implicit knowledge such as people’s 
behaviour and activities, rather than focus only on explicit knowledge. However, they also warn there 
is no guarantee that the informants speak “organizational truths”, so it is important to triangulate data 
(Atkinson and Hammersley 1994:250-253). Argyris and Schon (1996: ch2) agree and point out that 
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frequent participation can lead to the transfer of implicit knowledge or “theories-in-use”, because they 
are better observed by insiders than complete outsiders. Such implicit knowledge transfer is needed to 
create the second loop learning that can modify the SMMs of actors. Devine (2006; 2009) illustrates 
with two ethnographic case studies how pro-active participation in an NGO program in Bangladesh 
and a cooperative development program in India allowed him to identify underlying informal 
processes and institutional constrains that strongly affected the social performance of the 
organisations. Others also applaud action research as a way to improve the scientist’s own 
understanding (Atkinson’s and Hammersley 1994; Reason and Torbert 2001; Swantz 2008). For 
example, participating in studies may be ethically satisfactory for the investigator (Dick 1993:47; 
Reason and Bradbury 2008). However, as a consequence the researcher must critically examine his or 
her own human bias.  
 
The last difference rests in the assessment methods; while experimental methods such as RCTs use 
quantitative data with large sample sizes (e.g. Duflo et al 2007), a cycled learning approach can be 
qualitative or a mixture of quantitative and qualitative (e.g. Reason and Bradbury 2008).  
 
Table 7 Action Research vs. Experimental Research  
Action research Experimental Research (RCT)  
Multiple Experiments Single Experiment 
Flexible and Responsive approach Standardized approach 
Attention to external validity Highest form of internal validity 
Locally contextualized knowledge Globally generalizable knowledge 
Insider, participation and subjective 
reflection of actors 
Outsider, detachment of agency and 
objectivity 
Qualitative, often smaller sample 
sizes 
Quantitative, large sample sizes 
Implicit and Explicit Knowledge Focus on Explicit Knowledge 
 
 
4.2.3. Implications for the Methodology  
 
From a normative perspective, I chose to apply an action research methodology because the aim of my 
PhD thesis is to contribute both to academic research and development practice. I follow here the 
argument of Argyris and Schon (1996) that researchers interested in learning and innovation processes 
ought to take an academic interest in studying how practitioners make the inquiry and how the 
research contributes to learning processes.  
 
An action inquiry is also more suitable given that the performance assessment itself is an outcome of a 
negotiation between several stakeholders including myself, the ILO and the two MFOs (see Section 
3.4, p59). The ILO project formed an opportunity for me as a researcher to work with two MFOs over 
a long period gaining access to primary data at client and MFO level. It allowed the MFOs to engage 
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in cycled learning, see Section 3.4.2 (p58 ), which in turn allowed me to inquire deeper into MFO 
practices and examine to what degree the social enterprise MFOs could realistically incorporate social 
goals into their PBM (see Section 2.7). As will be discussed further in section 4.5, over time, I found 
myself taking a more detached perspective of my consultancy work to do positivist impact 
assessment, towards a more interpretivist thesis. This included reflecting more deeply into MFO 
practices, to what degree they could realistically incorporate social goals into their PBM and how far 
the ILO could influence this through the pilot project.  
 
This thesis goes beyond performance assessment by looking at the process by which data is used and 
the pilot is managed with aim to improve organisational performance.  More generally, evidence on 
the relationship between SPM and organisational learning and institutional change is lacking. Action 
research methodology is more suitable to explore such analysis because it can be more contextualized, 
using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data analysis. In particular, I am interested to observe 
how the MFOs manage cycled learning; whether they are responsive to the pilot assessment outcomes 
(see Figure 1, p27 in Section 2.2), and ultimately, how the results feed back into the dominant SMMs 
of the organisations to inform performance management (Kim 1993; Haase 2007; Denzau and North 
1994).  
 
4.3. Methodology   
 
The conceptual framework of the thesis can be represented as a set of Russian dolls moving from 
specific into general concepts: the inner and most specific doll concerns the practical feasibility of 
social performance assessment (level 1). The second doll is concerned with the practical feasibility of 
double bottom line management in MFOs (level 1+2). This includes the extent to which the social 
performance evaluation was put to use to improve development practice. The third doll is concerned 
with institutional changes in PBM in relation to the pilot assessment. This is viewed through the 
framework of institutional change to the SMMs of the MFOs (level 1+2+3). One relevant reflective 
question here is whether PBM of social enterprise MFOs can be changed by external agencies such as 
the ILO or whether changes are driven by internal factors. A set of Russian dolls provide a rough 
metaphor for how the three levels of research fit into each other. Social performance assessment (level 
1) is nested within the overall PBM practices of MFOs (level 1+2). However, these practices are not 
static, but subject to internal and external influences (level 1+2+3).  
Figure 3 below shows the three levels of the research questions. 
1. Feasibility of Social Performance Assessment in Practice 
2. Feasibility of Double Bottom Line Management for MFOs in Practice  
3. Influence of the ILO on changes in Performance Management of MFOs 
 
Figure 3 Three levels of Research Questions   
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The central research question can be stated as follows: 
 
How do microfinance organisations incorporate social goals into their performance management, 
with particular reference to ILO’s “decent work” agenda in a Central Asian context? 
 
Figure 4 elaborates on  
Figure 3 by setting out the main and subsidiary research questions already introduced in Section 1.3 
as well as the data collection methods. 
 
The thesis is an action research within the “ILO action research”, consisting of an inquiry at different 
levels; first, there is the decent work pilot assessment for the two Central Asian MFOs. This inquiry 
generated quantitative performance data at client level from a set of surveys conducted. I was involved 
in a cooperative inquiry and the methodology was partly negotiated between the ILO, the MFOs, and 
myself. Second, there is my own inquiry based on qualitative data collected at the level of the two 
MFOs. This assesses particularly the capacity of the MFOs to engage in social performance 
assessment and double bottom line management. This inquiry was completely under my control. I 
conducted 42 semi-structured interviews with staff and senior managers working in the two case study 
organisations. An additional 19 interviews were conducted with senior managers of other MFOs to 
help understand the local environment. Data also came from secondary sources and was supplemented 
by participant observations. Third, there is an inquiry into the first two inquiries, namely a critical 








4.4. Data Collection   
 
This Section discusses the methods employed for data collection at three levels of analysis.  
 
4.4.1. Feasibility of Social Performance Assessment - Level 1  
 
To enquire into the feasibility of social performance assessment, I rely on the quantitative survey as 
well as a qualitative audit on the data collection processes. I will keep this brief, as Chapters VI and 
VII provide more details.  
 
I designed the questionnaires based on a cooperative inquiry that involved the project teams of the 
microfinance companies and the ILO. Both MFOs set up a project team with senior staff managing the 
pilot studies. Different surveys were designed for each of them, including different methods of 
sampling and performance metrics. I have attached the surveys in the Appendix.   
3. Influence of the 
ILO pilot on 
changes in PBM 
2. Feasibility of 
double bottom line 
management for 
MFOs in practice 
 






9. To what extent did performance management 
practices of the MFOs change over the period 
2009 to 2012?  
(ch8) 
10. To what extent can an external agency such as 
the ILO influence the PBM practices of the MFOs? 
(Ch8) 
5. How did the MFOs act on the empirical findings 
to improve development practice?  
(Section 6.5&7.5) 
6. What capacity does this reveal in the 
organisations for SPM?  
(Section 6.6 &7.6) 
7. What does this reveal about the sustainability of 
SPM? (Ch8)  
8. What tensions were observed in financial and 
social performance management?  (Ch8) 
1. What determined the willingness and capacity of 
the MFOs to carry out the decent work 
assessment at the outset of the pilot in 2009? 
(Ch5)  
2. What other initiatives were undertaken in 
performance management 2009 to 2012?  
(Section 6.2&7.2)  
3. How did the MFOs manage their decent work 
pilot assessments? (Section 6.3&7.3)  
4. What did they find out as empirical outcomes? 
(Section 6.4&7.4)  
 
 
Action Research Methodology 
Qualitative assessment of 
organisational and institutional 
change through shared mental 
models for 2 case study MFOs 
through participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews 
with staff. 
Qualitative assessment of Social 
Performance Management for 2 
case study MFOs through 
participant observation and semi-
structured interviews with staff, 
reports. 
Quantitative Social Performance 
assessment of the 2 MFOs 
through ILO surveys at client level  
and audit of data collection 




Following the pilot proposal, I discussed with the project team the main topics to be included in the 
survey. At several workshops I asked the project team members to identify key performance 
indicators. I then designed a list of up to 60 questions based on the diagnostic survey and a variety of 
microfinance literature (Johnson 2003:265; Pagura 2004; Nelson et al 2004; Microsave 2005; Mel et 
al 2009; Banerjee and Duflo 2009; Karlan and Valdivia 2009). The project teams narrowed down the 
questionnaire to a maximum of 35 questions and an estimated survey time of 30 minutes. We did 
several rounds of testing to adapt the survey to the local context. Senior staff administered the 
questionnaires and received training from the marketing department, the ILO staff member and 
myself. We agreed interviews should be conducted at the client’s workplace or home. For practical 
reasons loan officers could survey their own clients.  
 
Both MFOs conducted a baseline survey and two follow-up surveys. We intended to do an impact 
assessment to measure the effect of the pilot on employment outcomes. The assessment included a 
treatment and comparison group using the difference-in-difference methodology. Bai Tushum 
interviewed 1440 borrowers looking amongst others at job creation in client enterprises. IMON 
surveyed 905 women, looking primarily at women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship. After each 
survey round, I checked data quality and interviewed MFO staff to see how they experienced the data 
collection process. Once the data corrections were made, I analysed the survey data and submitted key 
variable reports to the project teams, showing key performance outcomes.  
 
Rather than showing all empirical outcomes, which is beyond the scope of this research, Sections 6.4 
and 7.4 focus on key indicators used by the MFOs as a basis for action or learning. Sometimes I show 
outcomes to illustrate inaction of the MFOs. A full overview of the outcomes will be published by the 
ILO and is available upon request (ILO 2013a, ILO 2013b, forthcoming).   
 
4.4.2. Feasibility of Double bottom line Performance Management- Level 1+2 
 
To assess the feasibility of SPM in practice, I mainly rely on semi-structured interviews with staff as 
part of my own inquiry. To supplement this data, I made participant observations during a variety of 
events such as workshops, trainings, meetings, email-correspondence, and informal conversations. In 
addition, I used a set of secondary data sources such as annual reports, social rating reports and data 
from Mix Market and Oikocredit. The analysis was done at the outset of the pilot assessment in 2009 
(Chapter V), during the implementation (Dec 2009-June 2012), and at the end in 2012 (Chapter VI-
Chapter VIII).  
 
I will first examine the capacity of the MFOs to engage in SPM in 2009 (see Chapter V) by using the 
system diagram of Copestake et al (2005:160) presented in Figure 2, (p43). It offers a framework that 
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was applied to social enterprise MFOs during the Imp-Act action research and is using somewhat 
overlapping set of indicators as other frameworks identified in Section 2.3.5, (p28). The capacity of an 
MFO to do SPM depends on how well it fits into wider organizational systems and local contexts, 
specifically mission and vision, ownership and external relationships, operating environment, 
organisational capacity and culture.  
 
I then inquire into the management of the pilot assessments of Bai Tushum (Chapter VI) and IMON 
(Chapter VII), by looking at how the MFOs managed cycled learning over the period 2009-2012 
(Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:567: Kim 1993:5, see Figure 1, p27 in Section 2.2). This includes 
looking at pilot design, pilot implementation, assessment strategy, data collection, data analysis, 
empirical findings, and learning and actions in relation to the results. Social performance assessment 
is considered institutionalised when it forms a routine and integrated activity, part of the core 
operations of the MFO. The key aspect concerns how data is collected, shared and used as a basis for 
action (Copestake et al 2005:179; see also Section 2.6.3, p39). 
 
In addition, as part of double bottom line management I am interested to see how the MFOs manage 
tensions and synergies between social and financial performance goals. To assess synergies I look at 
the benefits of the pilot assessments for the MFO in terms of cost-effectiveness, customer satisfaction 
and scaling up of the intervention. To assess PBM tensions, I draw from the tension framework of 
Copestake (2005:175-176), presented in Table 3 (p44). I identify a set of constructive management 
tensions in financial and social performance based on the findings of the two case studies. Chapter 
VIII then compares findings of the studies for each of the research questions and describes lessons 
learned from them. 
 
 
4.4.3. Influences of the ILO Pilot on Performance Management - Level 1+2+3  
 
To assess changes in PBM in relation to the ILO pilot, I rely on the same sources of data as described 
previously. What I want to outline here in more detail, is how I apply SMMs as a framework. Instead 
of assessing holistically how members in the organisations “think”, my intention is more modest. I 
want to see whether the pilot triggered new ways of working within the MFOs in relation to SPM, and 
whether these were sustained or temporary.  
 
The thesis uses an interpretivist as opposed to a positivist epistemology (see Section 4.2). Both MFOs 
are highly complex, and as an observer, I cannot capture the full realities of all stakeholders of the 
organisation, but I can contribute to an understanding of those realities. I do this is by drawing from 
Denzau and North (1994)’s concept of SMMs, to see how the pilot assessment informed the dominant 
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SMM of the organisation. The SMM framework is useful in thinking about the issue of 
institutionalizing new ways of thinking into an organisational structure and culture.  
 
Building on Section 2.3.4 (see p22), it may be viewed there are two broad types of learning that can 
occur in SPM. The first is “within mental model learning” [i.e. single loop learning], this means 
learning takes place in an incremental way, but does not change the dominant PBM (Argyris and 
Schon 2006:3-4:21-22; Senge 2006:13-15; Kim 1993:3; Boschma et al 2002; Denzau and North 
1994:13; North 1992; 12). The second type was described as “broadening” or “modifying” of the 
dominant SMM [i.e. double loop learning]; new data leads to more fundamental and sustained 
institutional change for the organisations including new ways of working. This requires a change in 
perceptions of stakeholders with regard to “building block assumptions” and institutional values and 
beliefs relating to social performance. I will assess organisational and institutional change in relation 
to the project teams’ expected performance at the outset of the project in 2009.  
 
The case studies may also feed back into a wider discussion of what drives institutional change in 
PBM of organisations, internal or external factors (see Section 2.3, p25; Boschma et al 2002; North 
1992, 1994; Denzau and North 1994, Boettke et al. 2008). Moreover, this feeds back into wider 
discussion in new development management (see Section 2.2, p14, Hulme 2007a&b; Brinkerhoff 
2008; Sanderson 2001; Thomas and Mohan 2007; Nichols and Young 2006), by examining the extent 
to which an external development agency such as the ILO can influence the performance management 
of the MFOs.  
 
A challenge in applying SMMs as a framework is how to identify them because by their very nature 
they are highly implicit (e.g. Kim 1993, see Section 2.3.5). It would be ambitious to claim it is 
possible to understand the implicit assumptions of all the stakeholders involved in this research. As 
described in Section 4.2, in order to assess implicit values and norms it is desirable for the researcher 
to have regular interaction with research participants because it allows for implicit knowledge transfer 
(Atkinson and Hammersley 1994:250-253). For this study, I use a qualitative approach, conducting 
several semi-structured interviews and dialogues with practitioners. They may bring some implicit 
understandings to the surface. By following the two organisations over a period of four years (2008-
2012), I was able to have regular interaction with staff. I became closely involved with the 
organisations allowing me to receive good quality data and understanding.  
 
Building on Section 2.3.5, in order to identify the SMMs of performance management of the MFOs, I 
will look at the “building blocks assumptions” (Holland et al 1996) or shared “belief systems” (Kim 
1993; North 2004) with regard to social performance outcomes of the company. Particularly they 
concern shared implicit values, perspectives and norms held by staff and management, in addition to 
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explicit rules and knowledge such as reports, information on the website etc. I used semi-structured 
interviews to identify shared perspectives of staff (Dick 1993; Woodhouse 2007:160-161; Thomas and 
Mohan 2007; Cameron 2008). I started with open questions and used additional probing questions to 
ask for further clarification. Semi-structured interviews allow questions to be modified to data 
generated in earlier interviews, which in turn allow researchers to drill deeper into more implicit 
organisational knowledge and understanding (Woodhouse 2007; Dick 1993).  
 
Data from the interviews were analysed in three ways, first the interview contained similar open 
questions asked to each respondent. These questions were analysed in an excel sheet. Second, topics 
that seemed relevant for respondents would be coded after the interviews using NVIVO or colour 
coding. The method taken for data analysis is based on convergent interviewing of Dick (1993:18-19) 
and triangulation (Dick 1993:17; Atkinson and Hammersley 1994:250-253). Convergent interviewing 
uses Venn Diagrams to identify overlapping pieces of information and perspectives mentioned by 
several respondents. If two or more persons share a perspective, the information is kept, but 
information that is unique to only one person is in principle discarded. Later interviews can then 
inquire deeper into the “shared perspectives” by finding diverging or converging views. For example, it 
was useful to test whether the perspectives of senior managers were aligned with the views of field level 
staff. Responses are presented in footnotes to group common views. Furthermore, in this method the 
data collected in later cycles are superior to data collected earlier in the process (Dick 1993:18-19; 40-
42).  
 
After analysis of primary data, an extra round of analysis followed using secondary data to further 
triangulate the qualitative findings. This included using social rating reports, annual reports, websites, 
Mix Market and Oikocredit data.  
 
In addition, after each round of interviewing, my key findings were discussed with management or the 
marketing department as a way to further triangulate data. Both microfinance companies were sent 
several outcomes reports and I shared Chapters VI and VII with senior management.  
 
For this methodology to work, it is important that I have an open mental model as a researcher and 
inquire into my own agency (see Section 4.2). I will apply self-reflection methods of Argyris and 
Schon (1996) and Senge (2006) in Section 4.5. Based on Reason and McArdle (2007:13-18) and 
Reason & Bradbury (2008) I apply the distinction between first, second and third person action 





4.4.4. Semi-structured Interviews   
 
The semi-structured interviews with staff were done at several points in time. All interviewed staff 
engaged in the pilot implementation and assessment. In the remaining chapters, I will use 
abbreviations of SLO to indicate “senior loan officers”, “M” for middle managers and coordinators 
and “SM” for senior managers.  
 
I modified the interview questions over time. I started with questions on motivation, development 
values and awareness of the pilot design. Later interviews focused on pilot implementation, data 
collection, data dissemination and learning. Open questions guiding the interviews included:   
 What motivated you to come and work for the MFO?  
 What is the mission statement of the organisation? What is women's empowerment/ job 
creation for clients? 
 What is the microfinance for decent work pilot?  
 Were the survey questions clear and easily understood? Were clients able and willing to 
answer the questions? Did you manage to interview all clients? 
 Were you given sufficient time to conduct the interviews? Were you given remuneration for 
doing the interviews?  
 Did you find it useful to conduct interviews/ implement the pilot? 
 Name three things you liked about doing the interview. Name three things you did not like 
about doing the interviews.    
 Name three things you like about the decent work pilot product. Name three things you do not 
like about the decent work pilot product.  
 Did you use any of the information that came out of the interviews for your daily work? If so, 
what?  
 Are results from the baseline survey shared with you? When? And what information?  
 What surprised you about the findings?   
 
I conducted the interviews in the branches and often in the presence of a staff member of the MFO 
who translated responses from Russian into English. Sometimes, I edited responses to improve the 
translation, as much as possible I tried to keep the wording of the interviewees, trying to ensure it 
represents their perspective.  
 
Bai Tushum Interviews  
 
For Bai Tushum 20 social in-depth interviews were conducted with a non-random sample of 12 staff 
members. They included senior loan officers, underwriters and branch managers. Several of them 
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were interviewed multiple times (see Table 8). Collectively, these interviewers conducted 22% of the 
client surveys (788 out of 3659). They engaged in different activities related to conducting client 
interviews (8) and coordinating the pilot assessment (3). 9 out of 11 staff received interview training at 
baseline survey from the ILO and myself. Additional in-house trainings were organised before each 
survey by the project team. They worked for the head office (4), Bishkek (4), Naryn (2), Batken (1) , 
Karakol (1) and Talas provinces (1). Because the interviews took place at the head office, the sample 
does not represent all branches. There is an overrepresentation for the Bishkek branch and an 
underrepresentation from the Osh and Jalalabad provinces. Separate semi-structured interviews were 
done on three occasions with the CEO (Oct 2009, July 2011, Oct 2011) and multiple interviews with 
staff of the marketing department.  
 
Table 8 Semi-structured Interviews with Bai Tushum Staff 
ID Branch (Highest) Job 
Function 
Year Role in the Pilot 
M 1 Head 
office 
Manager Marketing  May 2009 Coordinator & 
project team leader 






SLO 3 Bishkek  Senior Loan expert May 2009 Interviewer 
SLO 4 Naryn 
Branch 
Senior Loan expert 
later Branch Manager 
May 2009 Interviewer 
SLO 5ab Bishkek, 
Dordoi 





SLO 6 Naryn Senior Loan expert 
 
Jan 2011 Interviewer 
LO 7 Talas Loan expert Jan 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 8 Karakol 
Branch 
Senior Loan expert 
 
Jan 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 9 Bishkek Senior Loan expert Jan 2011 Interviewer 








M 11ab Head 
office 
Marketing Manager Jan 2011 
Aug 2011 
Coordinator 
SM 12abc Head 
office 




* SM is Senior Manager, M is Middle Manager, SLO is Senior Loan Officer.  
 
IMON interviews  
 
For IMON, 22 social in-depth interviews were conducted with a non-random sample of 17 staff 
members (see Table 9). Collectively they completed 25% of the interviews (426 interviews at first 
follow-up survey out of 1695). Staff interviewed conducted a variety of activities related to the pilot 
product such as doing client interviews (11), implementing the entrepreneurship trainings (5), and 
coordinating the assessment (4). Half of them received interview training at baseline survey from the 
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ILO, the other half received in-house training from IMON. Staff worked in the headquarters in 
Khudjand (8), Northern branch of Istaravchan (3), and the areas surrounding the capital Dushanbe, 
(Dushanbe 1, Rudaki 2 and Ghisar 3). In terms of gender norms these regions represent a mixture of 
relatively modern (Dushanbe, Khudjand) and highly conservative norms (Rudaki, Istaravchan). No 
interviews were conducted with staff from the Southern branches bordering Afghanistan. Interviews 
were conducted with 6 male and 8 female staff. Separate interviews and dialogues took place with the 
CEO (1) and the regional manager (2) and a senior manager of the NABWT (1) (see Table 10).  
 
Table 9 Semi-structured Interviews with IMON Staff  
ID Branch (Highest) Job Function Year Role in the Pilot 








M 2 Khudjand PR manager Sep 2009 Interviewer 
SLO 3 Rudaki Loan expert July 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 4 Rudaki Loan expert July 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 5 Dushanbe  Loan expert July 2011 interviewer 
SLO 6 Ghisar Loan expert July 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 7 Ghisar Loan expert July 2011 Interviewer 
M 8ab Ghisar Sub-office Manager Sep 2009 
July 2011 
Interviewer 
M 9 Khudjand  Business Development 
manager 
July 2011 Coordinator  & 
Trainer 
M 10 Khudjand  HR coordinator July 2011 Trainer 
SM 11 Khudjand  HR manager July 2011 Trainer 
M 12 Istaravchan Specialist Operations July 2011 Interviewer 
SLO 13 Istaravchan Loan expert July 2011 Interviewer and 
Trainer 
M 14 Istaravchan loan manager department 
assistant. 
July 2011 Interviewer and 
Trainer 
SM 15 Khudjand Marketing Manager 
NABWT 
July 2011 Coordinator/ 
Project Leader 






SM17ab Khudjand CEO Oct 2009 
July 2011 
 
* SM is Senior Manager, M is Middle Manager, SLO is Senior Loan Officer.  
 
 
Interviews with MFO’s Managers  
 
To get a better understanding of the wider operating environment in which Bai Tushum and IMON 
were active, a total of 19 interviews were conducted with 10 senior managers of other leading Central 
Asian MFOs, in 2009 and in 2011 (see Table 10). The semi-structured interviews provided data on 
initiatives undertaken in SPM by other MFOs in the sector. They also helped to understand the 
socioeconomic and political context and institutional norms of the Central Asian microfinance sector. 
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Topics discussed in 2009 included SPM, initiatives in decent work and the financial crises. A second 
round of interviewing took place in 2011 and assessed what SPM initiatives were implemented since 
2009. 
 
Table 10 Interviews with MFO’s Managers 
 Organisation Country Type of Organisation Senior Manager Interviewed 
Finca Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan MFO Finance Manager Oct 2009 
July 2011 
Kompanion Kyrgyzstan MFO Chair person of the board 





Kyrgyzstan MFO CEO Oct 2009 
July 2011 
ABN Kyrgyzstan Credit Union. Chairman  Oct 2009 
July 2011 




Tajikistan MFO CEO/Board Member 
Business Development Manager 
Oct 2009 
July 2011 










Tajikistan MFO CEO Oct 2009 
July 2011 
Oxus Tajikistan MFO CEO July 2011 
 
 
4.4.5. Time line of Activities  
 
Figure 5 shows a time line of activities for fieldwork conducted in Central Asia. A total of 10 months 
of field work was conducted in Central Asia with regular visits to the MFOs. IMON was visited 4 
times (Nov 2008; Aug -Sep 2009; July 2011) and Bai Tushum 6 times (Nov 2008; April-Sep 2009; 
Jan 2010; May 2010; Jan 2011; July 2011). In addition, reporting, emailing, Skype calls and informal 
meetings took place.  
 
From April 2008 to August 2008, I worked at the ILO in Geneva to support the design of the 
diagnostic tool and selection of the MFOs. In Nov 2008, I visited the two MFOs in Central Asia to 
support in the implementation of the diagnostic tool, followed by a workshop at the ILO in February 
2009 where the MFOs participated.  
 
From April 2009 to September 2009, I supported Bai Tushum and IMON in implementing the 
baseline survey and methodological design for the assessment. During five months, Bai Tushum was 
visited several times and IMON was visited twice in Tajikistan and once at a conference in 
Kyrgyzstan. I had several personal meetings with Bai Tushum staff during the period 2010 to 2011. 
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This also because it is more convenient for me to travel to Kyrgyzstan as my family in-law resides in 
Bishkek. Skype calls took place during this period with the marketing department of IMON. In July 
2011, I made field trips to IMON and Bai Tushum to assess the process of implementation and 
organisational learning. In June 2012 there was a closing workshop in Jordan held at the SPTF 
conference where I met with project managers of the two MFOs.  
 













          
          








                
  
        
 
  






          
 
   
 
     
          
                    
          
       
4.5. Reflection on Action Research  
 
Having described the methodology of data collection at each of the three levels, this Section will 
reflect on first, second, and third person action research drawing from Reason and Mc-Ardle (2007) 
and Reason and Bradbury (2008). For this thesis, I consider first person action research as the inquiry 
into my own agency, second person action research as my participation in the joint ILO project, and 
third person action research as reflection on how the PhD feeds back into wider literature.  
 
Self-reflection was done through a logbook, travel reports and correspondences made with participants 
from July 2007 to July 2013. I use the methodology for self-reflection based on Argyris and Schon 
(1996:79) and Senge (2006) described in Section 2.3.5, (p26). It uses a simple table illustrated below 
that describes in one column what I explicitly communicated and did at the time, and in the second 
column my implicit thinking that I wrote down in my logbook. The reflection is an ex-post assessment 
of the mismatch between what I was thinking and what I communicated with the aim to become more 
conscious of some of the tensions between my role as a PhD researcher and my role as a consultant 
working on the ILO project. 
April: ILO  5 
monhts 
Nov: Visit to 
BT & IMON 
- 2 weeks 
 
May: Visits to 
BT & IMON 
- 5 months 
 
Feb;  ILO 
Workshop 3 days 
 
June; ILO/ SPTF 
Workshop -1 day 
 
Jan: Visit to 
BT & call with 
IMON 
 




to BT & 
IMON 
 




Table 11 Self-reflection on Mismatch Explicit and Implicit Understanding  
 What I said during that time 
 
Explicit understanding 
What I’m thinking/ 
thoughts and feelings 
unsaid (drawing from 
logbook) 
Implicit understanding 
Ex post Reflection 
/ need for further inquiry.  




interests   
Mid 2007  
After University, I wanted to 
conduct a part-time PhD 
research after gaining 
working experience, building 
on my Master thesis. 
Although I was indeed very 
happy to start the PhD 
research, my job in 
Oikocredit as analyst was 
not challenging enough. 
I do not regret this action, although, 
the PhD did bring over 5 years of 
challenges.   
 
 
*full table is available upon request  
 
4.5.1. First Person Action Research     
 
As part of first person action research, I focus on my role as a practitioner in microfinance and 
doctoral researcher. In particular my own personal objectives and learning interests, my own learning 
in relation to these objectives and my beliefs in microfinance as a “social enterprise”, as well as a 
further reflection on how the methodology evolved over time.    
 
Personal Objectives and Interests 
  
After graduating from University, my personal ambition was to do a PhD research that could build on 
my master thesis on trade-offs between outreach and sustainability in microfinance. During this study, 
I became fascinated by the interaction and relationship between human development and financial 
sustainability. After having worked for two years in microfinance for Rabobank Foundation and 
Oikocredit, I wanted to conduct further academic research. I was motivated to do this study because I 
like the process of learning and at the same time felt I was not challenged enough working as an 
analyst for Oikocredit.  
 
Mid 2007, I had discussed with my employer to conduct a research on SPM in relation to financial 
performance. In August 2007, I attended a training session on microfinance and decent work 
organized by the ILO and they offered me an opportunity to participate in the project. I found decent 
work aspects an interesting topic that was a relatively unexplored area for research. But also 
participation in the ILO project provided necessary funding resources to conduct the PhD and brought 
opportunity to work for a multi-lateral agency. By being part of this wider project, I was under the 
assumption that I could contribute to development practice. My participation was useful for the ILO 
since they needed a consultant who could support in survey design and data analysis for several years 




Personal Learning  
 
When I was reviewing my logbook, I found it embarrassing to see what little awareness I had about 
certain topics when starting the study. The PhD has created a lot of personal learning and significant 
“reality checks”, but they were not always easy and sometimes very painful. While I had explored a 
significant amount of literature in microfinance until 2008, I also began to discover that there was a 
self-selection bias in this literature, in that few of it actually challenged microfinance itself. Also as a 
practitioner working for a microfinance investment fund Oikocredit, I never needed to challenge the 
idea of microfinance as a development intervention. At a certain stage, this created a personal bias or 
belief that microfinance (plus) is a potential way forward rather than backward for microfinance 
clients. It is important when conducting an inquiry to distance from such weak inferences.  
 
Although I initially wanted to improve my knowledge in microfinance, the main knowledge areas that 
I found interesting to explore were employment related topics such as job creation, gender, 
vulnerability and child labour. I also become more interested in wider literature related to 
organisational learning, action research, performance and impact assessment, development 
management and philosophy. I revived and improved my knowledge about institutional learning, 
evolutionary economics and development science. Thus, while I was trying to challenge myself in my 
work in microfinance, I actually found it more beneficial to challenge myself in areas outside of 
microfinance.  
 
I realized that in the past I mainly conducted research for myself, rather than disseminating the 
findings to external audiences. In several cases, I ended up providing each stakeholder their own 
specific document. I had to make considerable steps towards writing publications and external reports. 
Some of the critical feedback I received was that the reports were too technical and not concise. One 
tension I found myself to be in is how to balance transparency and openness to other actors and at the 
same time be concise in the message. I am also still struggling with a poor writing style.  
A significant limitation in the research process was the language barrier. In four years, I did not 
manage to learn enough Russian to communicate with MFO-staff in the local language. Within both 
MFOs there were senior staff specifically CEOs and marketing department who spoke English 
moderately well. Interviews with loan officers had to be conducted with a translator. 
 
Tensions in Combining the PhD Research with work 
 
As a participant observer, I needed to balance my own engagement with the MFO staff with the need 
to remain detached in order to claim objectivity. I found it relatively easy to detach myself from 
“research outcomes”, but it was challenging to detach myself from “study processes”. There is a 
danger in action research that one is trying to control the situation too much, even though the 
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organisation should remain owner of the project. Micro-management should be avoided. Other times I 
felt I was not engaging enough, for example, when there were delays in data submission. 
 
One of the most challenging tensions was to multi-task activities between my study, work and family 
life. At the start, I hoped that the time spent on the ILO project would overlap with time spent on my 
thesis. However, in reality handling the two case studies implied a lot of extra work. Second, there 
was a mismatch in planning especially when short-term assignments for work had priority over 
longer-term PhD assignments. Third, it was not always possible to plan and achieve deadlines as there 
were several actors involved in this research including, two MFOs , the ILO and  Oikocredit. For 
example, when data was submitted later by the MFOs, it became difficult to cope with other work 
assignments. However, there was no greater multi-task challenge than combining a family life with a 
PhD life. When my son was born, it proved extremely challenging to devote time to research. The 
PhD thesis was not anymore the top priority in life.  
 
Figure 6 illustrates that over time the methodology of the PhD itself evolved. It experienced tensions 
between what I wanted to research at an abstract level (level 3), and what I could practically do at the 
level of microfinance organisations (Level 1 and 2). Even though the study started with the intention 
to investigate SPM (2007), this was only feasible if I could do some sort of client level assessment 
that aimed to improve development practice. By participating in the ILO project, I had a great 
opportunity to move from the topic of social performance assessment into the area of social 
performance management.  
 
However, as will be described further under second person action research, in some cases I did not 
know exactly what I was getting into. Participation meant having to accept some loss of control on the 
methodology used for client level assessment. From a positivist perspective it can be argued that for a 
PhD thesis, it is optimal to have full control over the research methodology. However, in my case the 
client level assessment was negotiated by various actors and also constrained by what was practically 
feasible. This required the PhD thesis to become an action research in the ILO action research. I still 
support my choice to participate in the ILO project, because it allowed me to gain access to a richer 
set of qualitative data at the level of the organisations as well as improve my understanding of how 
client level assessment were managed. The implication was that this thesis moved from a positivist 
methodology of impact assessment into an interpretivist methodology of studying the social 












4.5.2. 2nd Person Action research     
 
As part of second person action research, I will look at my own relationship with the staff from the 
MFOs and the ILO as part of research ethics and negotiation over the methodology. The next Section 
will also describe how the methodology evolved.  
 
Negotiation and Evolution of the Methodology  
 
The methodologies applied for the social performance assessments are an outcome of what was 
desirable for the ILO, the MFOs and myself, and what was practically possible for the MFOs given 
their capacity. The ILO Social Finance Program and myself as researcher initially wanted to assess 
impact of the microfinance pilots on decent work outcomes. This would need to be done by including 
a control group in the design and ideally use randomized controlled trials. However for both MFOs 
there was quite a lot of discussion on how to practically assess “impacts” with a control group and 
randomized trial (more on this in Chapters VI and VII).  I was confronted in a number of cases with a 
dilemma to follow what is methodologically desirable for my “PhD” on social performance 
management and what was desirable for the ILO pilot project.  
 
To avoid this tension it was important upfront to be clear that the methodology of my “PhD” should 
and need not be similar to the methodology of the “ILO project”. As a consultant, I was mainly 
involved in survey design, sampling, staff training, data analysis, feedback of results. However, I had 
little influence over the design of the decent work pilot itself. This was mainly discussed between the 
project teams of the two MFOs and the ILO. I was confronted to think about what the most interesting 
story for a PhD would be. Is this an academic research about the survey outcomes or is it about the 
process by which the organisations (struggle to) manage to collect and use data for social performance 
management? I made the explicit choice for the second. While the ILO was mainly interested in data 
Level  1 feasibility of social performance 
assessment in practice  
Level  1+2 feasibility of double bottom line 
management in practice  
Level  1+2+3 influence of the ILO pilot on 
performance management of MFOs  
2007        ILO 2008            Bath 2008               CA 2009             Dec 2009       
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outcomes, for my thesis it was more interesting to make participant observation of social performance 
management and audit of the process of data collection and usage. 
 
The ILO project may be viewed as an action research because it aimed to bring about changes 
development practices of the MFOs (see Section 3.4.1, p56). It aimed to do this through cycled 
learning using a diagnostic and experimental phase (see Section 3.4.2). However contrary to action 
research characteristics described in Section 4.2, the methodology was mainly quantitative raising a 
question to what degree an agenda of impact assessment matches the agenda and capacity of the 
MFOs? As will be further described in Chapter VI and Chapter VII, the ILO and myself as a 
researcher needed to balance our own positivist ideas of finding rigorous “proof” for decent work 
theories with the MFO’s capacity to conduct social performance assessment and management in a 
complex environment. 
 
One strength of the methodological approach is that through my participation in the ILO action 
project, I gained access to the two organisations over a longer period. The ILO project intended to 
trigger SPM initiatives in the MFOs. At the same time it formed an opportunity for the MFOs to 
demonstrate their capacity for social performance management through having some of their resource 
constraints reduced.  Second, participating in the ILO project allowed me to look at technical and 
practical problems related to the question of how to assess social performance. Third, my participation 
allowed me to investigate in-depth the implicit organisational structures and culture of the 
organisations, which would be hard to observe as an outsider. Assessing implicit organisational 
culture and learning is done better with regular personal contact and trust from people within the 
organisations. On the other hand, a weakness is that I could become potentially biased as a participant 
observer and that I couldn’t always control the client level assessment methodology.  
 
Relationship with Sponsors 
 
I am grateful to both sponsors for supporting this PhD thesis. They offered not just financial support, 
but also the opportunity to engage in a joint action research that aimed to improve development 
practice.    
 
Interestingly, I observed a different culture between Oikocredit – as a social ethical investor - and the 
ILO, as multilateral and political agency. I found Oikocredit to be much more demanding and 
intervening at the outset of the PhD research, when compared to the ILO that had a longer term and 
more research oriented perspective. At the outset, Oikocredit requested clear planning and budgeting, 
publications on a shorter notice and influence in study design and choice of partners. They initially 
intended to use the project to demonstrate to their members MFO’s capacity to “do social good”, and 
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requested me to come up with “popularized publications”. The ILO’s planning was more flexible, but 
not necessarily better organized. For example, in 2008 planning was delayed by several months due to 
a reorganization. At the same time, there was also limited communication between Oikocredit and the 
ILO and most of it I had to facilitate. At times, I felt like a broker between Social Finance Programme 
and Oikocredit that needed to please both parties and found this a frustrating process. It was not up to 
me to make management decisions on behalf of both organisations.    
 
Research Ethics in Relationship with MFOs 
 
I am grateful for the open relationship that I had with the staff of both microfinance companies. At the 
outset, I introduced myself to them both as an ILO consultant and as a PhD researcher. I informed 
them that I would use the pilot assessment in order to examine the social performance outcomes and 
practices of the companies. Although I became an insider in the MFO, I never considered myself a 
member of the project team. 
 
Although I feel I have not deceived anybody during the research process, there were constructive 
tensions in it. One potential conflict of interest occurred during the selection of MFOs by the ILO 
Social Finance Program in 2008. My wife who was also working for Oikocredit, supported in the 
dissemination of the ILO applications to the Central Asian MFOs. Thus, I already knew several of the 
participants in the research and was eager to do research in Central Asia. It was important to be open 
about this at the start of the selection, also to avoid any possible conflicts. In the end, the manager of 
the ILO’s Social Finance Programme made the final decision on the selection of MFOs.  
 
A second potential conflict in ethics is that my thesis deviated from the cooperative inquiry done with 
the MFOs. My action research findings may conflict with the views of fellow participants. MFO staff 
may or may not appreciate it, when I am critically reflecting on their operations. To mitigate this 
tension, at the outset I informed the MFO managers that I was doing a research on SPM processes in 
their company and that I used data generated from the ILO project and staff interviews for my PhD 
research. After each round of interviewing, I shared the feedback of staff with the senior managers in 
the companies. Often a project team member was present when I conducted the staff interviews. In 
addition, I did formal outcome reporting and communicated data checks to the project teams. Each 
MFO received key variable reports for the baseline and first follow-up survey, and a final report was 
circulated at the end of the research (ILO 2013a; 2013b forthcoming).  
 
However, although outcomes were shared proactively, at the same time, it proved impossible to give a 
full informed consent of how my thesis developed over time. This made it important also to share 
chapters VI and VII at the end of the thesis. I find it important to keep the MFOs in the loop before 
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publishing results into external journals. As of September 2013, the CEO of IMON responded 
positively to chapter by e-mail and was open to use it for any publication. The CEO of BT did not 
responded formally, but agreed informally to the use of the chapter for this thesis. In addition, I 
informed her on several occasions during the research period of key findings of the inquiry (e.g. CEO 
meeting Oct 2011, June 2013).  
 
In doing the analysis, I found it helpful to distinguish between the direct communications of MFO 
staff and my own personal reflection on it. This aimed to bring forward as much as possible their 
perspectives. At first, I felt particularly uncomfortable analysing personal items such as e-mails or 
informal conversations. This mainly because when I was writing these e-mails, I did not realize they 
could form such a useful source of data. Analysing this data systematically in NVIVO brought a richer 
understanding.   
 
For the client level surveys care was taken to maintain research ethics. MFO staff were offered a 
training in interview ethics as part of their training in surveying techniques. Each client was asked an 
informed consent before participating in the questionnaire. The introduction also mentioned the 
duration of the survey and that data was held confidential and collected for research purposes only. In 
addition, both MFOs offered for gifts to clients before starting the interview.  
 
During survey testing, I observed a tension between length of the interview and the quality of the data 
given by respondents. For example, several clients working in urban markets started to rush through 
the questions at the end of the interview. As a result, we decided to reduce the surveying time for the 
baseline to 30 minutes and a maximum of 35 questions per client. Follow-up surveys were even 
shorter.  
 
4.5.3. 3rd Person Action research     
 
As part of third person action research, I will focus on internal and external validity and describe how 
the thesis can feed back lessons learned to the wider literature. Validity implies there should be 
sufficient evidence to support claims and ensure they are not based on inconsistencies and gaps in 
reasoning or methodology (Argyris 2008:53). Drawing on Shadish et al (2002: 464-468) case studies 
by definition cannot claim external statistical validity for other contexts. I do not make the claim that 
the two organisations that I studied in detail were representative of the industry as a whole.  
 
The aims of the thesis are more modest, namely to provide two case studies that bring understanding 
into SPM processes. Lessons learned from them may apply to some degree to other microfinance 
practices. Since the microfinance companies are market leaders in their respective countries, it is 
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likely that the research findings may be more applicable to medium and large MFOs. In addition, it 
may be relevant for Central Asian MFOs as well as MFOs participating in the ILO project. By 
researching microfinance companies in neighbouring Central Asian countries, the study can explore 
commonalities and differences between the two organisations. 
 
I aim to feed back lessons learned into the broader literature of SPM in microfinance. As described in 
Section 1.4.2, the study is unique because few studies take both client and MFO perspectives into 
account when assessing performance management (e.g. Karlan and Valdivia’s 2006). Few studies 
have explored how MFOs act on client level assessments (e.g. Imp-Act 2004). This study combines 
the views of managers and front line staff and takes an in-depth look into MFOs over a longer period. 
The thesis also provides an empirical case study relevant for wider literature of the new development 
management (e.g. Brinkerhof 2008) and social enterprise (Lehner 2012:54; Nichols and Young 2006 





The methodology of this thesis is based on the opportunity I had as a researcher to participate in a 
number of pilot projects initiated by the ILO. It gave me an entry point in the two MFOs and an 
opportunity through the pilots to observe, not only - whether the pilot worked -, but also how 
empirical findings fed back into the double bottom line management of the MFOs.  
 
As described the study itself evolved as it became an action research within the broader ILO action 
research. My data is not just the data that the organisations generated at the client level and the MFO 
level, but it is also my own participant observant operations of how the MFOs responded to the pilot 
assessments. It raised on particular reflective question, namely could the ILO as an external agency 
and myself as an external consultant have a sustained effect on the MFOs’ performance management. 
Or to place this in the context of embedding a new way of thinking into an organisation, to what 
degree can the dominant SMM of the MFOs be influenced by the ILO and its decent work agenda.    
 
Chapter V discusses microfinance in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and examines the capacity of the two 
MFOs to engage in social performance management at the outset of the pilot. Chapter VI and Chapter 
VII describe respectively the case study of Bai Tushum in Kyrgyzstan and IMON in Tajikistan. 
Chapter VIII compares the empirical results and outcomes for organisational learning for the two 
MFOs. It then turns to a broader discussion of the practicality of the social enterprise model.      
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This chapter describes the capacity of the two Central Asian MFOs to conduct SPM at the outset of 
the pilot in 2009. Section 5.2 introduces the state of the microfinance sector in the two countries. I 
then describe Bai Tushum (Section 5.3) and IMON (Section 5.4), using the framework of Copestake 
et al (2005:160) discussed in Chapter II (see p43). It emphasizes that the capacity to engage in SPM 
depends on how well it fits into wider organizational systems and local contexts. Section 5.5 presents  
a comparative analysis of the MFOs at the outset of the pilot.  
 
5.2. Central Asia  
 
This Section introduces the macro-economic environment of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Section 
5.2.1), and the microfinance sectors in the two countries (Section 5.2.2).  
 
5 .2 .1 .  Macroeconom ic  Contex t   
 
With the implosion of the Soviet Union (1990-1991), the new independent states started violently with 
an outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan and ethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan divided territorial borders, but until today, these borders remain cross-cultural with many 
people from different ethnic background (Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik) living within the borders of other 
countries (Shozimov et al 2011a; 2011b 278). As generalized by Shozimov et al (2011b: Ch12:279-
288) the Kyrgyz culture is historically more nomadic, the Tajik more agrarian and the Uzbek a 
mixture of the two. While many Tajik identify themselves with Islam, pan-Iranism and Afghan 
culture, Kyrgyz people often identify themselves more in terms of their nationality and family is one 
of the strongest institutions. In Kyrgyzstan the main language is Russian, followed by Kyrgyz which 
evolved out of Turkish language. Tajik language is much closer to Persian. The “Central Asian 
region” is far from homogenous and characterized by strong cultural differences and many conflicts 
between neighbouring countries over access to land, electricity and water as well as ethnic conflicts 
within the countries (Shozimov et al 2011a; 2011b 278-288).          
  
The Tajik civil war followed immediately after the collapse of the Sovjet Union in 1991 and lasted 
until 1997. Approximately 50,000 people died, many more were left homeless or migrated (Shozimov 
et al 2011a: 188; Beshimov et al 2011:215). The Northern front received support from Uzbekistan and 
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Russia, while the Southern front received support from Muhajahideen fighters in Afghanistan. After 
the war, Rakhmonov came into power and since 1998 there has been a fragile peace under his 
authoritarian rule. The political system remains unstable with a high potential for conflict, particularly 
in the South were Taliban are located (Beshimov et al 2011:216-217).  
 
The Kyrgyz political system was also fragile and traditionally has been governed by several family 
regimes. Under the rule of Akayev, from 1991 to 2005, Kyrgyzstan followed a more liberal political 
regime than other Central Asian states. There was a stronger international civil society than in other 
countries, relatively more ethnic tolerance and free press, but also a high level of corruption 
(Beshimov et al 2011:210). Kyrgyzstan adopted several recommendations of the “Washington 
Consensus” of the IMF and World Bank in the first days of independence. When the regime changed 
to the Bakiyev family in 2005, the country continued this course becoming a member of the WTO in 
2008 (Zokirov and Umarov 2011:233). Therefore, the private sector in Kyrgyzstan is relatively 
liberalised compared to Tajikistan, where Rakhmonov did not want to privatise the economic system.  
 
The Kyrgyz political system is however far from stable, as shown during the recent political crisis. On 
April 7 2010, riots broke out in Bishkek and Talas and the opposition overthrew the Bakiyev 
government. One month later violent clashes occurred between the sympathizers of the Bakiyev 
regime and the interim government creating mass disorder in Southern cities of Osh, Batken, 
Jalalabad. It was followed by interethnic conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June. Authorities 
estimated that more than 2000 people died and “Hundreds of thousands of people, mainly ethnic 
Uzbeks fled their homes in the wake of the conflict” (Central Asian Times Dec 2010:2-318; see also 
ADB, IMF, World Bank 2010 July:9). As an MFO manager argued the crisis was not just about 
ethnicity rather, “the driving factor behind the crisis was crime” (CEO FMCC Oct 2011). There was 
an increase of inflation, reduction in employment in particular tourism and agriculture. Trade flows 
distorted because of closure of the borders with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. One of the largest banks, 
AUB, went bankrupt after a run on deposits (ADB, IMF, World Bank, 2010 July: 19).  
 
Table 12 explores several macro- and socioeconomic indicators. In 2009, both states were amongst the 
most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International. Corruption is embedded 
in all levels of society in Central Asia, including the government, militia and judicial system, 
education system and corporations. Some of the major sources of corruption include drug trafficking 
from the Afghan war and large-scale money laundering  (Beshimov et al 2011:226; Bobokulov 
2011:379).  
 
                                                 
18 www.timesofcentralasia.com, accessed Nov 2011  
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The World Bank classifies both states as low-income countries. Income poverty is especially 
widespread in the Southern and rural parts of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As one MFO manager 
expressed “In Kyrgyzstan poverty looks a bit different, [it is] less obvious and hidden from public 
sight” (Manager Kompanion July 2011). Poor people may own assets such as a house or land, but 
often they were obtained during the post-Soviet privatisation. Many houses are in a weak condition as 
people lack the income to maintain them (participant observation). Life expectancy in both countries 
is low. Healthcare is publicly available but not always of good quality. Most people are able to read 
and write and completed secondary or tertiary education (see Table 12). However, highly skilled 
professions such as doctors, accountants, and teachers tend to earn low wages (Participant 
observation). Mountains cover more than 75% of the territory of both countries and most people live 
in the river valleys, which tend to be highly populated. The majority of the population live in rural 
areas. Agriculture employs 60% of the workforce in Tajikistan and 52% in Kyrgyzstan (Zokirov and 
Umarov 2011:241).  
 
Tajikistan and to lesser degree Kyrgyzstan score low on the list of countries to do business (World 
Bank and IFC, 2011:21) As one Tajik MFO manager highlighted “entrepreneurship is ‘the missing 
gene’…”There is no entrepreneurial history, a good environment for setting up a business..”  (CEO 
1MFB, Oct 2009).  
 
Both economies strongly depend on remittances inflow from migrant workers in Russia and 
Kazakhstan (see Table 12). As one manager in IMON indicated, remittances may well contribute 
more to household incomes than microfinance: “the total remittances in the country are 1,5 Billion 
US$, while the combined microfinance portfolios of all [Tajik] MFOs are only a fraction of this 
amount” (M16a 2009, Oct). The latest household census estimated that 14% of the Kyrgyz and 37% 
of the Tajik households have one or members working abroad. These migrant workers were 
predominantly male and from rural areas. They often left the country at a young age because of low 
wages and a lack of employment opportunities. In some provinces in Tajikistan, more than 70% of the 
working-age males work abroad. Often men leave immediately after getting married, while the wife 
stays behind and resides with the family-in-law. The social cost is high, as many families have no 
male household head for years and divorce rates are among the highest in the world (ILO 2010:5: 
Bobokolov 2011:381; Zokirov and Umarov 2011:246).  
 
What role does the ILO play in both countries? As discussed in Chapter III, (p48) in the period after 
independence (1989-2012), the ILO was almost completely ignored by the World Bank in labour 
market reforms in the former Soviet Union countries (Deacon et al 1997:197-199). It remained a 
relatively small multilateral player in Central Asia with one representative in each country and general 
support of its regional office in Moscow. Key areas for intervention in Kyrgyzstan were employment 
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creation, working conditions and reduction of decent work deficits in the informal economy (ILO 
2006). In Tajikistan, intervention areas included promoting employment opportunities for men and 
women, returning migrant workers, increasing the capacity of associations and improving the working 
conditions and social protection for workers (ILO 2011, Feb). The pilot assessments of IMON aiming 
to promote women’s entrepreneurship and Bai Tushum aiming to promote job creation fitted well 
under the decent work country programs of the ILO.  
 
Table 12 Macro-economic Indicators 
   Kyrgyzstan Year Tajikistan Year 
Geography  Population size  in Millions* 5.3 2009 7.5 2009 
Income Poverty  GNI Per Capita * 
(Atlas Method in US$) 
860 2009 650 2009 
  % Population below National Poverty 
Line* 
32% 2009 47% 2009 
 % Population below $1.25 a day at 
PPP* 
6% 2009 7% 2009 
 % Population below $2 a day at PPP* 22% 2009 28% 2009 
Social  Human Development Index  0.59 2009 0.57 2009 
  Human Development Index Ranking  109 2009 112 2009 
   % Literacy Rate* 99% 2009 100% 2010 
  Life expectancy in years* 69 2009 67 2009 
Macro-Economic  Inflation consumer price index  6.8% 2009 6.5% 2009 
  Corruption Index ** 1.9 2009 2.0 2009 
 % of firms identifying corruption as a 
major constraint*** 
59% 2009 38% 2008 
 % of firms experiencing at least one 
bribe payment request*** 
43% 2009 38% 2008 
 Remittances as % of GDP * 24% 2009 49% 2009 
 % population above 15 taking loan 
from a financial institution in the past 
year**** 
11% 2011 5% 2011 
 % population above 15 that saved at a 
financial institution in the past year (% 
age 15+)**** 
1% 2011 0% 2011 
* Sources, IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, UNSTAT for social indicators, **Transparency 
International, *** World Bank enterprise surveys **** Worldbank financial inclusion database 19  
 
 
5 .2 .2 .  Microfinance in Central A s ia and the idea of  social perform ance   
 
Microfinance made its introduction in the two Central Asian countries after the civil war in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 as part of disaster relief programs of international NGOs. As described by one 
MFO manager, many programs started with a focus on social goals such as poverty reduction and 
                                                 
19 http://data.worldbank.org/country/kyrgyz-republic , accessed Oct 2011 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results , accessed Oct 2011 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TJK.html, accessed Oct 2011 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Research#0--eastern-europe-central-asia-- . accessed July 2012.  




employment creation. They used a combination of cash transfers and credit as part of wider 
development programs. From 2001-2005 the development programs expanded into large microfinance 
programs, (CEO Oxus, June 2011) , and from 2006 to 2008 microfinance organisations mainly 
focused on financial sustainability (CEO Oxus Oct 2009; CEO HUMO Oct 2009; Microfinanza 2010.)   
 
The two markets were relatively young and predominantly credit based. Only a small percentage of 
the population in both countries had taken loans, namely 11% in Kyrgyzstan and 5% in Tajikistan (see 
Table 12 above). The six largest MFOs in Kyrgyzstan had a combined portfolio of US$ 144 million, 
compared to US$ 67 Million in Tajikistan (Mix Market data of 2009). The Kyrgyz microfinance 
market was partly larger because it opened up to outside investors in 2005, which was three years 
earlier than the Tajik microfinance sector. In 2009, most MFOs had not yet developed saving and 
insurance products because the regulatory environment made it unattractive to do so (First 
Microfinance Bank 2009; FMCC 2011). There was no strong savings culture among clients and the 
MFO staff (as cited by managers from FMFB 2009; HUMO 2011; Arvand 2009; Finca Kyrgyzstan 
2009; BT, M11ab 2011).20 For example, less than 1% of the adult population saved money in a 
financial institution. Two MFOs (1MFB and ABN) offered savings; others had plans to start offering 
deposit products in the next years (i.e. Bai Tushum, Arvand, Finca Kyrgyzstan, IMON).  
 
Table 13 shows an overview of social mission statements of the MFOs and their founding 
organisations. All MFOs remained connected with the international NGOs that founded them as part 
of their development programs. ACDI VOCA started Bai Tushum and Frontiers in Kyrgyzstan and 
ARVAND in Tajikistan. Mercy Corps set up Kompanion (Kyrgyzstan) and IMON International 
(Tajikistan). Other financial institutions were set up by the Aga Khan foundation, Care International, 
ACTED and Finca International.  
 
MFOs claimed to have social objectives of contributing to client business growth (12 out of 12) and 
employment creation (11 out of 12). Most MFOs in Tajikistan (except HUMO and Finca) had a social 
objective of promoting women’s empowerment. Several MFOs wanted to start-up new enterprises for 




                                                 
20 -  “In 1997 four banks collapsed due to risky credit operations. People lost their savings….. “ 
-  “Bishkek infrastructure for savings is not yet developed” and there is no proper mindset towards marketing of 
savings” - Finance Manager, Finca Kyrgyzstan, Oct 2009-  
- “People do not trust banks when it comes to savings” - 1st MFB, Tajikistan-  
- “there is a need for financial literacy programs to boost the culture of savings” and  
“The problem here is that even the employees do not save.” - CEO Arvand, Tajikistan Oct 2009  
“It is more difficult in Kyrgyzstan to develop savings, because of the social communistic period. Because of the 
default of many of the banks” - Chairman ABN credit Union July 2011 
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Table 13 Mision Statements   
 
a) Kyrgyz MFOs 
MFO Social Mission Statement Founding 
NGO 
Bai Tushum To be a reliable financial partner contributing to the economic development of the 
Kyrgyz Republic through the delivery of microfinance services in rural and urban 





To provide financial services to the world's lowest-income entrepreneurs so they can 
create jobs, build assets and improve their standard of living. 
Finca 
International 
Kompanion To be the leading community development financial institution in Kyrgyzstan. 
Kompanion supports the strengthening and growth of communities by offering 
development products and services to entrepreneurs and individuals. 
Mercy Corps 
Frontiers  To support and foster development of sustainable and transparent financial institutions 
through provision of best financial solutions, which strive to create employment and 





To reduce poverty, diminish the vulnerability of poor populations and alleviate 





To provide access to innovative financial services for rural people Members  
 
b) Tajik MFOs 
Source: Mix Market and Oikocredit as of December 2009  
 
SPM was introduced as a formal concept at a conference in Tajikistan organised by the national 
microfinance association AMFOT, in November 2008. I participated in one workshop on SPM held 
by the Micro Finance Centre and Oikocredit. During the first round of interviews in 2009, few MFO 
managers explicitly used the discourse ‘social performance management’. During the interviews, all 
managers mentioned that social goals were relevant to their organisations. For example as the 
chairman of one credit union mentioned, “it is only since 2008 that we heard about social 
performance, but we have been doing it since a long time ago” (Chairman, ABN Credit Union, Oct 
MFO 
 
Social Mission Statement Founder 
IMON To promote economic development in Tajikistan, assist in increasing the quality of 
life and economic development in the country through providing sustainable 





To reduce poverty, diminish the vulnerability of poor populations and alleviate 





To strengthen the economic base of the low-income households in Tajikistan through 
increased access to credit services for entrepreneurial activities in urban and 
surrounding areas.  
ACDI VOCA 
HUMO To assist the development of the microfinance industry in the country by rendering 
accessible, accredited lending services to micro and small businesses in Tajikistan 





To provide microfinance to vulnerable communities and small entrepreneurs in order to 
alleviate poverty, create sustainable livelihoods and contribute to the development of 
the country.  
ACTED 
Finca Tajikistan To provide financial services to the world's lowest-income entrepreneurs so they can 





2009).21  However, it was questionable to what degree microfinance agencies actually implemented 
these performance goals in practice. Particularly also because several MFO Managers mentioned to 
have focused predominantly on financial performance management since 2005.  
 
 
5.3. The Case of Bai Tushum 
 
Having introduced microfinance in Central Asia, I now describe the organisational determinants for 
Bai Tushum and highlight to what degree employment goals were incorporated into performance 
management at the outset of the pilot. I will start with the company’s history (5.3.1), followed by its 
social mission (5.3.2), ownership and external relations (5.3.3), operating environment, (5.3.3) and 
organisational capacity and culture (5.3.5), and finally what this entailed for the capacity to do SPM at 
the outset of the pilot (5.3.6). Section 5.4 will follow the same structure for the case study of IMON.  
 
5.3.1. History  
 
Bai Tushum which translates ‘great harvest’ in Kyrgyz, originated out of an agricultural development 
program of ACDI VOCA and CARITAS in 1997.22 The company started in 2000 out of a merger of 
several microfinance programs and it transformed into a commercial microcredit company in 2009. In 
2008, it applied for a deposit-taking license to transform into a commercial bank. With a rapid growth 
in terms of number of active borrowers, the company became one of the market leaders (see Figure 
7). In time, the portfolio shifted from horticulture into livestock and trade for small enterprises (CEO 
Bai Tushum Oct 2011). The MFO had a strong financial performance receiving a good A+ rating for 
from Microfinanza in 2005, followed by a reasonable BBB in 2008 (Bai Tushum 2006; Mix Market).  
                                                 
21 - We “first function as a bank, second as a social institution.”…“The two are not in friction, but are not 
comfortably coexisting either.”- CEO First Microfinance Bank 2009 
- “I have to proudly say Finca is based solely on a social mission.” - Finca Tajikistan Oct 2011 
- “The founders of the organisation request both financial and social performance. “ - CEO Arvand Oct 2009 
- “We are doing social performance in the sense that we state that consumption loans are socially unwanted. We 
are doing consumption loans in the sense of education.” - CEO FMCC July 2011 
- From 2001-2005 the development programs expanded into large MF programs“…“The period 2006 to 2008 
was less focused on social responsibility. We needed to look at sustainability”- CEO Oxus, June 2011.  In 2010 
the company conducted a social rating to inquire where its stands on its social performance management. 
 
22 www.baitushum.kg/en/about, accessed 9-11-2011 
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Figure 7 Growth of Bai Tushum  
 

















5.3.2. Mission and Vision  
 
In 2009, the mission of Bai Tushum was revised by featuring employment more prominently (see 
Table 13, p95). As highlighted by the CEO: “The mission has been changed to specify more who uses 
the loans, how we work and what we offer. Key words are job creation, SME and microfinance, rural 
areas and self-employment. Job creation was selected because the history of Bai Tushum consists of 
individual lending for seasonal and permanent jobs.” (CEO BT Oct 2009). For Bai Tushum the main 
client level objectives were employment, business growth and agricultural development.  Employment 
in this context meant, “to go beyond self-employment of clients. It should also look at permanent jobs 
or seasonal income; protection of jobs, paying taxes, informal economy“…“With job creation we 
mean mostly wage workers, but to a certain extent self-employment is also job-creation.” (CEO BT 
Oct 2009) The CEO’s perspective on job creation was close to the ILO standards in that she 
emphasised wage employment. As Bai Tushum offered larger loans to more formalized enterprises 
staff believed it contributed to SME finance and job creation more strongly than other MFOs. For 
example, “Bai Tushum estimated that for every US$ 250 in loans one job position was created” (CEO 
Bai Tushum Feb 2009).  
 
The business plan for 2008 to 2012 mainly related to factors such as the expansion of the portfolio, 
offering more products and services, and reducing interest rates. There were no explicit objectives 
related to job creation or SME finance (M-Cril 2009:4). The MFO planned to grow at around 24% per 
annum in the loan portfolio and 14% per annum in the number of borrowers over the period 2009 to 
2013 (M-Cril 2009:4). However, “in September 2009 the loan portfolio decreased. For the whole year, 
the planned growth was 58%, but the actual growth was 19%” (Oct 2009 CEO Bai Tushum). The 































5.3.3. Ownership and External relationships  
 
 
In 2009, Bai Tushum’s shareholders included the foundation Bai Tushum (72%) which was based on 
funds of ACDI VOCA, Triple Jump (15%) and staff (13%) (Source Oikocredit EPT 2010, Section 
II.1). Managers had a significant ownership in the company. Although Bai Tushum received some 
technical support from ACDI VOCA, it had become financially independent from its founder. The 
company was searching for new investors in order to complete its transformation into a bank. It 
received loans from all major microfinance investment vehicles as well as international development 
finance organisations such as the EBRD and the IFC.   
 
5.3.4. Operating Environment  
 
 
The company’s management tended to place a strong emphasis on the external environment as it 
expected a strong increase in competition and pressure from regulators. There was the perception that 
“Today the competition is getting tougher, and the micro finance market attracts not only micro-
financing organisations, but also the banks of Kyrgyzstan… their strategies are targeted at our 
clients,” (Bai Tushum Pilot Proposal 2009:5). The CEO feared commercial microfinance could be 
harmful for clients, but the only way to mitigate this in an environment of strong competition was 
through external regulation.  “Today people consider microfinance a profitable business. Most think 
only in terms of profits. One new small privately owned MFO in Kyrgyzstan started to lend daily 
loans and refinancing debts. There is no control on such non-correct MFOs. Some [people] raised this 
issue with the Central Bank, and tried to make sure that they increase the minimum capital 
requirements. Otherwise [these MFOs] will grow as mushrooms” (CEO Bai Tushum Oct 2009). 
Management experienced “a problem from competitors who lend to their clients, despite knowledge 
of high existing debt levels” (M-Cyril 2009, June: 9). At the same time as articulated in the rating 
report “The most immediate priority for the board is to ensure financial sustainability over the next 
three years, during which severe competition is expected from banks [moving into microfinance]. 
[Furthering] outreach and lowering the cost of funds are the top priorities” (M-Cril 2009, June). So the 
response to the increased competition seemed to deepen the commercial approach.  
 
Bai Tushum is one of the four MFOs that worked nationwide (Kompanion, Finca, Mobulak). Figure 8 
shows the location of the branches and sub-offices that functioned as the loan delivery and collection 
points.  The company was mainly targeting SMEs and rural areas, because financial inclusion was 
limited for these market segments. Most loans were designated for agricultural and trade activities and 




Figure 8 Geographical Presence of Bai Tushum 
 
Source: Bai Tushum (2009) 
 
Bai Tushum was the third largest MFO in the country in terms of the number of active borrowers and 
the loan portfolio (see Table 14). Operational sustainability and portfolio quality were strong for all 
MFOs. The company had relatively high average loan sizes partly because it offered individual loans, 
while competitors focused more on group lending.  
 



























Bai Tushum 38,1 27,526 130% 2.7% 5% 11.2 294 1,014 
FINCA 
Kyrgyzstan 
53,0 108,102 129% 0.6% 7% 7.8 846 352 
Kompanion 30,2 99,385 114% 0.6% 4% 9 835 224 
Mol Bulak 10,9 27,644 110% 0.7% 3% 5.6 329 N/A 
1st MCC 8,9 11,987 105% 2.0% 1% 5.7 164 526 
ABN Credit 
Union 
2,6 1,143 207% 2% 16% N/A N/A 1,138 
Source Mix Market and Oikocredit Database data as of December 2009, www.mixmarket.org, access Nov 2011 
 
 
The Kyrgyz microfinance sector was in tension with government officials with regard to political 
interests in the sector. Starting 2005, president Bakiyev privatised banks into the ownership of his 
family. In 2008, a large MFO network was rejected market entry; rumours said it was because it 
refused to pay a bribe. In February 2010, the Bakiyev government tried to launch a microfinance fund 
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with the AUB Bank. However, several microfinance practitioners felt it was a vehicle for money 
laundering and an attempt to undermine the market by offering subsidized interest rates. After the 
political crisis, it turned out that the regime had private stakes in the AUB bank (ADB et al 2010). 
Upon several occasions, politicians and politically organised groups wanted to set an interest rate cap 
with the aim to reduce over-indebtedness, and with an agenda to gain votes for the upcoming elections 
(Central Asian times 2011).23 The political crises in June 2010, discussed earlier (Section 5.2, p91) 
was an external factor that influenced the sustainability of clients as well as the MFO (see more in 
Section 6.3). The events indicated to me that politicians wanted to build up stakes in the growing 
microfinance sector, MFOs in turn often avoided the dialogue with government institutions. 
 
Bai Tushum’s management was highly concerned about the potential pressure from regulators stating 
that “currently there are political attacks from parliamentarians who are asking whether microfinance 
is being conducted in the right and correct way” (CEO Bai Tushum Oct 2009).  
 
 
5.3.5. Organisational capacity and culture  
 
 
The main motivation for staff to work for Bai Tushum was personal skill development and career 
making24, and good working conditions including salary25. They seemed to work not out of 
philanthropy or wider social goals but more because it was good for their career path. For example, 
one loan officer pointed out Bai Tushum is a “well developing competitive company” and it provides 
“advantages for the career path” (SLO6, Jan 2011). Staff interviewed had a background in economics, 
finance and business administration. Many of them had worked for other MFOs or banks. Indeed, as 
indicated in the rating report (M-Cril 2009, June: 7) the staff hiring process deliberately recruited 
qualified and experienced staff from the Kyrgyz financial sector.  
 
                                                 
23 Times of Central Asia, Victor Winner, (2011, July 21) “Kyrgyzstan’s microfinance sector continues to grow”  
 
24 - “this was a foreign and international company.” - SLO2a, May 2009 
-“I was just promoted from Senior Loan officer to Sub-office Manager.” She had higher education in economics 
and over 5 years of experience.” - SLO4, May 2009  
-“I was Interested in microfinance and lending.  [The] “professionalism of working here” and [that it is a] “most 
developing company.” - SLO5, Oct 2010  
- “In the past I worked for [a] bank in remote regions. I came to Bai Tushum for the ‘career path’ and wanted to 
be manager.” - SLO7, Jan 2011 
-She has been working for 8 years and came from the banking sector. “Bai Tushum is a company which 
develops personal skills. BT is the place for high skilled specialist.”- SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
25 -“BT offered higher salary.” - SLO7, Jan 2011 
-“I was working for Finca for seven years and heard from colleagues that Bai Tushum is a good company with 
good working conditions for Karakol”[including salaries]. - SLO8, Jan 2011  
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In 2008, a record number of 105 new staff members were hired and as of December 2009, there were 
294 staff members working for Bai Tushum. Staff retention was 78%, indicating employees were 
loyal to the company (Mix Market 2009; Bai Tushum proposal July 2009:10). There seemed to be a 
strong work ethics. For example, I found staff in Bai Tushum to work more often overtime than 
IMON. Staff did not complain much about working extra.  
 
Compared to other Kyrgyz financial companies, salaries and bonuses in Bai Tushum were relatively 
high and competitive. Incentive systems such as staff and branch-based bonuses were mainly geared 
towards financial performance such as disbursements and portfolio quality. The average salary in Bai 
Tushum was 11.2 times GNI per capita of Kyrgyzstan, compared to 7.7 for other Kyrgyz MFOs, as of 
2009 (see Table 14, p99). In addition, several staff held shares in the company. When disbursement 
and portfolio targets were reached, bonuses could vary from 1/3rd of regular salary for administrative 
staff up to two times the regular salary for loan officers. In addition, as part of career development, 
staff were promoted regularly by management into new job functions (M-Cril 2009, June: 7).   
 
There was recognition that “SPM is a gap in the training program. As loan officers with experience 
have all graduated towards the higher positions. Staff in the field needs to be trained on SPM” (CEO 
Bai Tushum Oct 2009). Other soft incentives systems included team-building activities such as semi-
annual staff retreats, collective lunches, birthday celebrations, sports and the companies support to 
charity events.  
 
The board composition predominantly consisted of Kyrgyz people with a strong background in 
banking and accountancy. For example, the CEO had a strong background in accountancy and 
finance. In 2009, social performance was not featured on the agenda of board meetings. For example, 
there was no reporting on social indicators to the board (M-Cril 2009, June:1).   
 
In 2008, Bai Tushum set up a marketing department with two staff members who had the 
responsibilities for marketing, PR and social performance. The marketing manager previously worked 
for a commercial bank and was experienced in market research and staff training, but she lacked 
experience in client level assessment. The main social performance assessments conducted by the 
department were the diagnostic tool and a customer satisfaction survey.  
 
According to procedures, loan officers needed to collect client level data for monitoring at least at the 
start and end of the loan contract. The management information system tracked basic indicators such 
as the percentage female and rural borrowers, type of work activity by sector, income and assets.  
Bai Tushum monitored only two indicators related to job creation, namely seasonal and permanent 




Delving deeper into the dataset revealed weaknesses in data processing; first there were significant 
data gaps, for example employment indicators were not collected for several loan products. Several 
indicators such as assets and employment were not stored in a client database and only available for 
the branch or sub-office levels. Second, data was unaudited and this most likely reduced its quality. 
For example, as shown in Table 15, a first analysis conducted by the new marketing department 
showed that most clients exited the microfinance program because they did not need credit or were in 
default on their debt. However, as will be shown in Chapter VI, the outcomes for the ILO survey 
showed a different picture. Weak data may have led to incorrect decision-making, and this in turn may 
have led to weak product improvements. Third, some of the client level data such as asset and income 
data were captured to measure the loan collateral and repayment capacity rather than to monitor the 
client’s welfare. No reports were readily available that tracked client level outcomes or changes in 
outreach of the portfolio. Also it took quite some effort to extract the dataset from the information 
system.  
 
Overall, my first impression was that the institutionalisation of client level data in the management 
information system was very weak (participant observations made while analysing data in the 
management information system, Aug 2009). My participant observations were triangulated by other 
sources such as the social rating report that highlighted weaknesses in client level monitoring. Data on 
employment was sometimes based on the client’s business plan rather than the actual size of the 
enterprise (M-Cril 2009, June:8). As mentioned in the rating report, “after loan disbursement, the 
clients are not visited by the Credit Specialists except in the event of default” (M-Cril 2009, June:11). 
The CEO of Bai Tushum admitted client level monitoring was considered a weakness of the company 
(CEO BT, Oct 2009). 
 
Table 15 Reasons for Client Exit 
 % 
Did not need a loan, resting 
clients 
61% 
Late payment   19% 
High interest rates  4% 
Borrowed from another bank 2% 
Terms and conditions of loan 1% 
Other 14% 
Total 100% 
Bai Tushum analysis of customer exit (Aug 2009) see M-Cril (2009:16)  
 
The company offered a set of six loan products with flexible product features including loan amount, 
repayment period and maturity as well as individual and group loans. Product pricing was 
standardized and fixed for all loan products at 27%. The company had a loose targeting of customers. 




5.3.6. Social Performance Management  
 
What capacity did this reveal for SPM at the outset of the pilot? SPM for Bai Tushum was very ad 
hoc. Staff incentive systems were not geared towards employment goals for clients. Very few client 
level assessments were conducted and staff in general did not have experience in doing social 
performance assessment. Client level monitoring was not systematic and data collected by loan 
officers was under-utilized and un-audited. As part of its participation in the ILO project, Bai Tushum 
changed its mission to highlight its potential role in creating jobs for clients’ enterprises. For the next 
years, the CEO had a variety of plans, including the launch of an SME department, incorporation of 
social performance indicators into a new management information system, and implementation of a 
client loyalty campaign (CEO BT, Oct 2009). 
 
How did the SPM of Bai Tushum compare to that of the other Kyrgyz MFOs? None of the Kyrgyz 
MFO managers explicitly referred to decent work as part of their PBM, but several managers reported 
to pursue employment creation (3 MFOs), entrepreneurship (2), welfare building (1) and vulnerability 
(1). The microfinance agencies claimed to pursue social objectives of employment creation (5 MFOs) 
and business expansion for the clients (6 MFOs).   
 
Only Finca Kyrgyzstan conducted a social performance assessment on employment outcomes. They  
found that “each client creates approximately 0,7 jobs. This means 107.000 self-employed [clients] 
plus 70% is almost 180,000 jobs created” (Finance Manager, Finca Kyrgyzstan Oct 2009). The 
manager’s definition of job creation was much broader than that of Bai Tushum and included self-
employment of the client as well as wage workers and family and daily labour in the enterprises.26  He 
had not read the report, and had not shared it with staff, or other internal and external stakeholders. He 
admitted, “the people at Finca International are more concerned with social, maybe they will have a 
social performance department there, here we are more concerned with operations” (Finance Manager, 
Finca Kyrgyzstan Oct 2009). The Finca assessment did not result in organisational action. This led me 
to question to what extent social performance in Bai Tushum was part of the internal operations, or 
was it done for external reporting?  
 
The CEO’s of Kompanion and Frontiers identified job creation in terms of the number of workers in 
enterprises of clients; they did not distinguish between unpaid family and paid wage labour. They 
                                                 
26 -“If a person receives a loan from us that is employment creation. [And] Family employment can be seen as a 




were sceptical about the potential of microfinance to contribute to job creation.27 As mentioned by the 
CEO of Kompanion (July 2011), “I don’t think microfinance really creates employment… It helps an 
entrepreneur to be stable. Many poor would like to have a job”...“Being an entrepreneur is very 
difficult.”  These different and conflicting perspectives raised another important question, how could it 
be explained that several MFOs in the same market context believe microfinance generate jobs while 
others do not?   
 
Table 16 provides one explanation; it shows that similar to Bai Tushum, SPM practices of other 
Kyrgyz MFOs were also in an initial stage. None of the microfinance companies conducted a social 
audit or rating or geared staff incentive systems towards client level goals. All MFOs tracked basic 
social performance indicators in their management information systems such as the percentage female 
and rural clients, income and assets and sectoral work activity of the client, but few of them tracked 
employment indicators.  Although MFOs had marketing or business development departments, they 
did not have staff that could devote their fulltime attention to client level assessments. SPM practices 
remained limited to customer satisfaction surveys and product development. It was questionable to 
what degree Kyrgyz MFOs and Bai Tushum in particular, were reaching their development objective 
of employment creation. I will leave this finding for now and turn to the description of IMON 
International.   
 



















Bai Tushum No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Finca 
Kyrgyzstan 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Kompanion No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Frontiers No No No No No Yes Yes 
1stMCC No No No No No Yes No 
ABN No No No No Yes Yes No 








                                                 
27 -“There is a proportion of microfinance agencies that create jobs, but this is mainly seasonal 
jobs. …Microfinance does not create jobs, but improves the life opportunities for people that are self-
employed..” - CEO Frontiers, July 2011. 
- “Microfinance does contribute to employment in Kyrgyzstan but it is difficult to say how much. Mostly it does 








In the midst of the Tajik civil war, the National Association of Business Women Tajikistan (NABWT) 
was founded as a non-commercial organisation, in 1995. The member based organisation aimed to 
expand economic rights and opportunities of women in the labour market, promoting women’s access 
to resources, education, and develop their market skills. It implemented advocacy projects, and 
lobbied for the rights and interests of women entrepreneurs.28 In 1999, the NABWT launched a 
microcredit program in Tajikistan, together with support of Mercy Corps, aiming to reduce poverty, 
create new jobs and support micro entrepreneurs. ‘IMON’ which translates as ‘Faith’ in Tajik, evolved 
out of this program in 2005 (NABWT 2005). In 2008, it transformed into the microcredit credit 
company. The company received an ‘A-‘ in 2007 and ‘A’ in 2009 from Microfinanza, implying a 
strong financial performance with a stable outlook.29  
 
From 2005 to 2008, the growth in the number of borrowers of IMON was much stronger than the 
growth in the number of women trained by the NABWT, this because lending operations were 
financially sustainable (See Figure 9 a+b). Although in ten years the NABWT trained approximately 
5000 women (NABWT 2005), scaling up programs was challenging because they depended on scare 
grant funding from donors. In 2009, the NABWT was small in comparison with IMON, having only 
two regular staff and 380 members. Many of its staff had started working for IMON. The association 
continued offering entrepreneurship training, but separately from IMON and for only a very small 
portion of the IMON borrowers.  
 
In parallel, with rapid growth in terms of the number of borrowers served and portfolio expansion, 
female targeting reduced substantially from 100% in 2003 to 38% women borrowers in 2010 (see 
Figure 9 c). This reduction was observed for nearly all Tajik MFOs. This declining trend indicated 
something was happening to microfinance’s outreach to women (see more Section 7.3).    
 
                                                 
28 http://www.nabwt.tj/ accessed Nov 2011.   
29 www.mixmarket.org accessed Feb 2012 
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Figure 9 Growth of IMON 
 

















c) Percentage of Female Borrowers 
 




5.4.2. Mission and Vision 
 
IMON’s mission was to promote economic development and quality of life (see Table 13). The MFO 
had a diverse set of client level objectives such as women’s empowerment and gender, 
entrepreneurship and employment creation.  As described in the business plan, the company aimed to 
be a “profitable, socially oriented, and transparent institution … with strong focus on corporate values, 
ethics, gender and customer care” (Microfinanza 2010:12).   
 
It initially aimed to grow the loan portfolio by 35% per annum from 2009 to 2012 (Oikocredit 2011: 
Ept 13), but because of the global financial crises the growth target for 2009 was lowered to zero 













































2012:12&21). IMON aimed to strengthen existing branches and sub-offices, transform into a micro-
deposit company offering savings services, and implement payment terminals such as ATMs. The 
strategy aimed to balance financial performance with implicit social goals relating to gender and 
female targeting (Microfinanza 2010:12).   
 
The CEO viewed, “Tajik women would be empowered if they can participate in the decision making, 
whether it is in the family, community, workplace. Empowerment comes with access to resources, 
financial property and material resources. [It concerns] both husband and wife since we are talking 
about gender empowerment.” It meant “women participation at the “boss level” (CEO, Oct 2011).  
However, at the same time, she felt that “in the last ten years, women’s entrepreneurship has suffered 
from larger male-managed enterprises dominating Tajik sectors. The government has given little 
attention to the position of women in the household.” (CEO, Sep 2009). Women’s entrepreneurship 
decreased and entrepreneurship had become a male dominated activity. The dropping percentage 
female borrowers in the portfolio illustrated this (see Figure 9c). Although gender and association 
formed a priority, these were only “addressed by the NABWT, the roots of IMON” (SM16ab, Oct 
2009). The reduction of women borrowers in the portfolio and the limited capacity of the NABWT 
formed two of the reasons to participate in the ILO pilot (see more in Section 7.3). 
 
5.4.3. External relationships and Ownership  
 
In 2009, the NABWT (45%), Mercy Corps (45%), and MEDA (10%) owned the company’s shares. 
Thus, the business association had a strong ownership in the company (Microfinanza 2010:6). 
Although legally separated, the NABWT was located in the same building as IMON and many of the 
managers of the MFO had worked in the association (Microfinanza 2010:17 and participant 
observation). Nearly all international microfinance investment vehicles were lending to IMON as well 
as international development finance organisations such as the IFC and EBRD.  
 
5.4.4. Operating Environment  
 
Compared to Bai Tushum’s management, IMON paid less attention to the external environment and 
focused more on its internal practices. “Competition with the other MFOs is of lesser concern to 
IMON” (Microfinanza 2009:9). Partly this was because the Tajik market was less competitive (see 
Section 5.2), but it also had to do with the organisational culture in the company, which is described in 
Section 5.3.5.  
 
The microfinance sector in Tajikistan was less competitive and not so much under the radar of 
government officials when compared to Kyrgyzstan. For example, USAID, IFC and ADB had lobbied 
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for a new microfinance law that allowed MFOs to transform into banks, however the government did 
not want to liberalise the banking sector (Microfinanza 2009:7).  
 
IMON lobbied proactively through the NABWT with policy institutions such as the ministry. It also 
maintained relationships with local village heads and local municipalities. The CEO was concerned 
with the public policy institutions in relation to women entrepreneurship. She showed me several 
papers on women’s empowerment in Tajikistan and mentioned, “There is a national strategy about 
women participation and gender equality. However, we [as Tajik persons] are still in the beginning of 
the pyramid of gender education. We are talking not doing. Although the documents look fine on the 
surface… [when digging deeper into the data] it turns out that schooling of girls and women drops, 
and that the overall education levels drops. So we need special programs for women” (CEO IMON 
July 2011).  
 
In 2009, IMON had 10 branches and sub-offices and 33 field offices (see Figure 10 below). The 
company was mainly active in the Southern region of Katlon, the regions surrounding Dushanbe and 
the Northern Ferghana Valley. IMON’s management made the decision to keep the head office in the 
Northern city of Khudjand, rather than the capital of Dushanbe, partly because its loan portfolio was 
concentrated (>60%) in the Northern Ferghana Valley. Staff viewed the Northern regions of 
Istaravchan, Isfara, and the Southern regions of Kyrgantube and Shartuuz as regions with more 
traditional gender norms (Focus group discussion, Sept 2009). The MFO was not active in the Ravsht 
Valley, a remote and mountainous region in East-Tajikistan that has strong traditional Islamic and 
gender norms.  
 
IMON’s targeting did not have an explicit poverty focus. Around 28% of the borrowers lived below 
the national poverty line when compared to 47% for the entire country. Female clients were more 




Figure 10 Geographical Presence of IMON 
 
Source: IMON Annual report 2010.  
 
The company was the largest MFO in term of number of staff and active clients. It had a relatively 
high operational self-sufficiency and profitability with good portfolio quality (see Table 17).   
 
Table 17 Performance Indicators of MFOs  


























IMON 29,0 26,602 358 149% 5% 7% 7.7 40% 36% 
FMFB  20,5 11,546 417 63% 7% -7% 8.8 26% 19% 
Arvand 4,1 7,896 156 139% 3% 3% 3.1 42% N/A 
HUMO 3,3 7,750 159 134% 12% 7% 6.3 37% 30% 
OXUS  5,4 6,581 167 94% 9% -2% 5.7 35% N/A 
FINCA 
Tajikistan 
5,0 23,662 223 99% 4% -2% 10 34% 29% 












5.4.5. Organisational capacity and culture  
 
 
The main motivation for staff to work for IMON was the companies’ support for clients30,  its 
reputation as a leading and transparent organisation 31, and working conditions.32  For example, one 
staff member mentioned, “IMON had a good reputation and is a leading MFO. I was asked to work 
for other MFOs but wanted to stay part of the IMON team” (M12, July 2011). One senior manager 
said, “I liked IMON because of its social projects, it really can help for people” (SM5, July 2011). All 
employees had university degrees, they had a diverse educational background and experience. Staff 
had previously worked for NGOs, government institutions, universities and affiliated organisations 
such as Mercy Corps and the NABWT. Few staff had worked for banks. Employees received 
extensive in-house training, for example, a security guard and former borrower were trained internally 
to become credit officers.  
 
IMON had a strong human resource department with five women working on staff recruitment. Staff 
often referred to the strong selection procedures.33 IMON had 358 employees, making it the second 
largest MFO in the country, as of 2009. Although only 36% of staff were women, 62% of the 
managers were female. The company had a high employee retention of 87%, particularly for 
management (94%). Staff and especially management had worked for a long period in the company 
(Mix Market 2009; Pilot Proposal IMON June 2009).  
                                                 
30 - She started to work for the NABWT and “I liked the mission and saw how they work and I came to their 
hiring process….” - M11, July 2011 
- He had worked 5 Years with Mercy Corps. …”IMON is a people’s organisation”. - SLO13, July 2011 
- “She was a business women that started up her business with a loan from IMON”... “After taking a loan from 
IMON, she educated and advertised IMON loans to others.” – SLO3, July 2011  
- He first worked in Mercy Corps and started out as a security guard. After this he became an expert in 
administration in IMON. “Our organisation tried to work with women”. – SLO5, July 2011 
- “IMON supported people who did not work and help them to protect them socially”. - SLO6, July 2011 
 
31 - “Before this I was working in a public organisation and before that the association of women” … “I knew 
IMON and had information about them and a good cooperation with them.” She worked previously as external 
consultant and now as manager - M9, July 2011 
- Before working for IMON, she was a teacher of physics, mathematics.… “I wanted to work for IMON because 
it was a leader in the microfinance market, and everybody knows IMON.”-  M10, July 2011 
- “What I like in IMON is that people don’t give a bribe, the transparency and the work climate”. - M5, July 
2011.   
-“Before IMON she worked in government institutions,” and NABWT. “IMON is a transparent place”- SLO14, 
July 2011.    
 
32 -“She wanted to improve her knowledge and earn money.” – SLO7, July 2011  
- “He worked before in the agrobank and wanted to start working in IMON as a loan expert because of the 
higher salary advertised.”- SLO4, July 2011 
 
33 After people were selected for the job application, “…We then make a shortlist, and now according to our 
new procedure for each position we have a different testing system…Based on the test we prepare a 
shortlist ….We call the top 50% and will invite them. Loan experts then can analyse their communication 




Compared to Bai Tushum salaries and bonuses of loan officers were much lower. The average salary 
in IMON was 7.7 times GNI per capita of Tajikistan, compared to 6.7 for other Tajik MFOs, as of   
2009 (see Table 17, p109). Staff bonuses were mainly geared towards financial performance 
specifically growth in portfolio, portfolio quality, and the number of borrowers. In addition, customer 
retention was part of the staff incentive system. There were no client-based targets related to gender 
and women’s entrepreneurship (Microfinanza 2010:14).  
 
There were a set of softer staff incentive systems such as scholarships and staff training. Scholarships 
were popular among staff and training and coaching were at the heart of the organisational culture. 
New loan officers conducted a course of four weeks, which included an introduction to the 
institution’s history, mission and ethical values. Training for loan officers were done on a quarterly 
basis and included client protection principles (Microfinanza 2010:14&19). Thus, IMON had a 
balanced mixture of hard and soft incentive systems. 
 
I found offices open and spacious working environments, they had large corridors, meeting rooms and 
places for staff and client training. Offices had sufficient place to relax during break hours. At the 
headquarter team-building activities were conducted including staff retreats, collective lunches and 
playing sports such as table tennis, football and fitness.  
 
Board members had a diverse background of political, social sciences, and economics. For example, 
the CEO and director of NABWT were on the board and were specialists in gender studies. The board 
seemed to have social performance on its agenda. In 2009 “it was decided to do the required social 
reporting. For example, percentage female clients, children less than 18, average loan size, average 
jobs created. The board of directors requests information on the indicators for every quarter” (SM16a, 
IMON Oct 2009). Two out of five board members were female. Most of the current senior managers 
had been with IMON since its inception in 1999 and were former teachers or workers of the NABWT. 
The reason why many of them ended up working for IMON was because they were among the highest 
skilled personnel available in the labour market and there was no established banking sector after the 
Tajik Civil War (Microfinanza 2010:17). As a consequence, many staff were schooled in-house 
becoming loan officers and credit managers. Trainers and managers of the NABWT have higher 
economic education and several worked as tutors in higher learning institutions (NABWT 2005:16). 
Most staff especially in the Northern branches had studied at one university, which was considered 
among the best educational institutions in the country.  
 
The marketing department was set up in 2005 and contained three staff members. No staff member 
was able to devote fulltime to client level assessments and this activity needed to be combined with 
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marketing and public relations activities. The NABWT and the marketing department had conducted 
several qualitative assessments of women’s entrepreneurship (Makkavmova 2006). IMON also 
cooperated in a study done by GTZ (e.g. Burkle 2010) and conducted the ILO diagnostic survey (see 
Section 3.5). The management information system tracked basic indicators including the percentage of 
female and rural borrowers, work activity of clients per sector, incomes, assets, employment, 
formalisation and business practices. Data was of reasonable quality and could be used for the 
sampling of clients for the ILO pilot assessment. Staff reported basic outreach indicators in a quarterly 
newsletter. It was possible for branch managers and other staff to access social performance data 
(participant observation).   
 
The marketing department conducted regular client satisfaction and exit surveys. Customer retention 
rates were very low (54%), and better for female and urban borrowers. Key reasons mentioned by 
borrowers for leaving the program were migration, business closure, seasonality and moving to a 
competitor. 
  
Table 18 Borrower Retention Rate 
 
Source: Pilot proposal IMON (23-06-2009: 6) 
* Net customer retention rate = (Number of active clients at the beginning of the period + number of new clients 
during the period – the number of active clients at the end of the period.) / Number of active clients at the 
beginning of the period.  A resting period of 6 months is taken.  
 
 
The company offered six loan products with flexible product features including loan amount, period, 
pricing. It offered group and individual loans. IMON engaged in product development such as leasing. 
While tracking indicators on client outreach, the organization had a somewhat loose targeting of 
customers. Particularly there were no special products for women or with the objective to support 
women’s empowerment and gender.   
 
5.4.6. Social Performance Management    
 
What does this reveal for the capacity to do SPM at the outset of the pilot? SPM for IMON was in a 
starting phase. Staff incentive systems were not geared towards women’s entrepreneurship and 
empowerment. The MFO did monitor several client level indicators and conducted client level 
assessments on women’s entrepreneurship and customer satisfaction. The board showed attention to 
social performance. Several managers and staff had worked for development programs and learning 
institutions. The company had a number of plans to improve its SPM as part of an overall action plan 
 2008 
All clients 54% 
Female clients  78% 




that included its participation in the ILO project, implementation of the client protection principles and 
conducting a social rating (SM16 Oct 2009).  
 
So how does the SPM of IMON compare to other Tajik MFOs? None of the 6 MFOs had social 
mission statements that explicitly referred to decent work aspects, but several resonated to aspects 
such as business and entrepreneurship (three MFOs), broader economic development (four MFOs) 
and reduced vulnerability (two MFOs). Five MFOs had a social objective of employment creation and 
four MFOs intended to improve women’s empowerment.      
 
With regard to this last goal, IMON’s CEO identified empowerment in terms of control over 
household decision-making and access to resources. This performance standard was similar to that 
mentioned by the MFO managers of ARVAND and HUMO.34 HUMO launched a start-up loan with 
training, with the support of GIZ. Although it aimed to promote women’s entrepreneurship, 
management decided to target both men and women because they experienced a lack of demand (CEO 
HUMO Oct 2009).  
 
Indeed as was shown in Figure 9c, (p106) there was a reduction in female targeting for Tajik MFOs.  
I asked senior managers what could explain the decline. Shared perspectives on external factors 
included an overall decrease in women’s entrepreneurship observed as part of changing cultural and 
religious norms.35 This included “local culture and mentality” (CEO Finca Tajikistan July 2011). 
Another manager argued the dependency of women on remittances reduced their need to be self-
employed (see also Section 5.2.1, p92).36  
                                                 
34 - “If a women’s decision does not depend on somebody else decision, she is more empowered. [Although] 
women do make most of the work, men make the decision to take the loan or not.” – CEO, Arvand, July 2011  
- “Women’s empowerment is when a woman can go out of the home, when she can study and get an education; 
when she can feed her family and bring money to the home and spent it on her needs; when a woman is not 
dependent on her husband and of men ; when she has a strong business.” -  Investment Officer, HUMO, July 
2011 
- “We see a contrasting situation women who are not even allowed to touch money, but also women who do not 
share money with their husbands” – CEO, Finca Tajikistan, July 2011 
 
35 - Tajik microfinance is moving towards the rural areas and this is more conservative. In the cities there is 
more trade activity often conducted by women. For example, the percentage of women clients dropped for the 
livestock loan.” -CEO Arvand July 2011- 
 - “The family is analysed as a borrower rather than the client.” –CEO Arvand Oct 2009  
- Within the traditional perspectives of men “women are often not employed and women culturally cannot be 
used for social networking because the man do not always accept this” - CEO, 1stMFB July 2011. 
- “it may also be a function of the social regression experienced after the collapse of the former Sovjet Union 
including labour migration, deterioration of social protection , and reduction in education” - CEO, 1stMFB July 
2011. 
- “Women do not engage in business, this is mostly men.”- SM16a IMON Oct 2009.  
 
36 - “IMON has witnessed higher dropout rates for female clients that receive remittances. It may be caused by 
the fact that they have less need for capital.- SM16a IMON Oct 2009.  
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Internal factors mentioned by MFO-managers included that products were not geared towards 
women’s demand. The high proportion of male loan officers made it more difficult to serve women in 
a Tajik gender context.37 Finally, several women did not meet loan requirements because they did not 
own collateral or did not register their business.38  
 
This raised an interesting question, were products and services of microfinance companies sufficiently 
customized towards women entrepreneurship? Table 19 shows SPM initiatives of Tajik MFOs were 
also in their initial stage. None of the MFOs had conducted a social audit or rating or geared staff 
incentive systems towards client level goals. All microfinance agencies tracked basic social 
performance indicators in their management systems such as percentage female and rural clients, 
income and assets, and work activity by sector. However, few of them (IMON, Arvand, and HUMO) 
tracked employment and entrepreneurship indicators. Most MFOs carried out customer satisfaction 
surveys and product development, but none of them had a full-time staff member working on social 
performance. 
 





















IMON No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
1stMFB Bank No Yes  No No Yes Yes* Yes 
Arvand Micro-
invest 
No No No No  Yes  Yes Yes 
HUMO No No No No No No Yes 
Finca Tajikistan No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 






                                                 
37 - “None of the products are geared towards women.” – CEO Avand Oct 2011 -   
- “Perhaps it is the structuring of the credit department. If I look at who work for us it is mainly men. … we only 
have four products, that do not meet the needs of women.” - CEO Finca Tajikistan Oct 2011 
- “Two years ago we had conducted a gender assessment. The more I thought about it some of the findings are a 
function of geography. Female loan officers are not in the Rasht Valley. Better target gender numbers can be 
obtained in Khudjand and Dushanbe.” - CEO, 1stMFB Oct 2011.  
- “We do not have any women’s empowerment activities.” - Oxus CEO Tajikistan Oct 2011 
 
38 - “the loan is managed by the women, but legally signed by the men. “ - CEO HUMO Oct 2009  
- “Women cannot get easily a valid passport and ID card, which form a requirement for the loan.“- CEO HUMO 
Oct 2009  
- “The collateral belongs to the men.” [And] “family mentality related in Muslim culture in which the men 
decides” – SM16a IMON Oct 2009  
- Men are “more likely to pay taxes, have a passport and ID card. When men have this available the loan is more 
likely to be taken in name of the husband. “….- CEO Arvand, Oct 2009  
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5.5. Comparing the Case Studies in 2009   
 
At the outset of the pilot, the two case study MFOs were in their initial stage of implementing SPM 
initiatives. They featured several characteristics of social enterprises (see Section 2.6). Both 
microfinance companies claimed to pursue double bottom line management with an employment 
related goal at the client level. Bai Tushum was aiming for job creation particularly in the higher 
market segment. IMON was pursuing women’s entrepreneurship because this was historically and 
culturally important for people in the organisation. Both companies were monitoring explicit strategic 
objectives for financial sustainability and growth, but they lacked clear social objectives. Both 
organisations were market leaders showing good financial performance and portfolio quality. They 
each had ambitious growth targets and lowered their expectations during the global financial crisis 
(see Section 5.3.2  and 5.4.2). They each were part of a wider market that was young and dynamic 
(see Section 5.2.2).  
 
However , the main differences between the two organisations seemed to be in their organizational 
culture, human resource capacity and their attitude towards the external environment. Following the 
work of Cameron (2008) and Cameron, Quin et al (2005) on organizational culture (see Section 2.2, 
p27) Bai Tushum in my perspective had an outward looking organisational culture in the sense that 
the competitive and political environment were highly relevant for its PBM. IMON had an inward 
looking culture in the sense that internal learning and human resource systems were very important 
(see Sections 5.3.4 and 5.4.4).  
 
The differences between the two companies may be partly explained by the wider operating 
environment in which the MFOs were embedded. For example, the Kyrgyz microfinance market was 
more competitive and political compared to the Tajik microfinance market. Nevertheless, this was also 
to a large degree explained by organisational culture itself, specifically how management perceived 
and valued the external environment.39 
 
I would perceive Bai Tushum more as a banking culture with senior managers and board having 
substantial experience in finance. The human resource department recruited experienced staff from the 
wider financial sector. The company offered relatively high salaries with good bonuses. Staff in the 
company was motivated by career development and working conditions including remuneration. In 
stark contrast, IMON had a board and management team with a diverse background varying from 
public institutions such as universities, NGOs, banks and in particular the NABWT. The board 
                                                 
39 To support this statement further, it is relevant to recognize not all Kyrgyz MFOs were outward looking, or 
not all Tajik MFOs were inward looking. For example, the Kyrgyz company Kompanion was inward looking, 
despite being active in the more competitive Kyrgyz environment. In line with Cameron’s (2008) work on 
organisational culture there can be different organisational institutions within the same market context. 
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showed attention to social performance of the company. IMON recruited top graduate students and 
staff from various organisations, offering a combination of soft and hard incentive packages with 
lower bonuses than Bai Tushum but strong internal learning programs. Staff in IMON were motivated 
by the support the company gave to clients and its reputation as a transparent and leading organisation 
in Tajikistan (see Section 5.3.5 and 5.4.5). Therefore, Bai Tushum seemed to have a more competitive 
banking culture, while IMON was characterised by a culture of integration with focus on human 
development.  
 
Both organisations were offering a small set of credit products with some flexible conditions. They 
had a marketing department engaging in customer satisfaction surveys and product development. 
However, IMON had more experience with client level assessments than Bai Tushum; as evidenced 
by the quality of customer satisfaction assessments and social performance data in the management 
information systems (Section 5.3.5, p101 and 5.4.5, p111).  
 
How did the capacity to do SPM compare to other MFOs in the Central Asian microfinance markets? 
Social objectives and performance standards varied across microfinance agencies. Some defined 
employment generation loosely as increasing self-employment for clients. Others defined it more 
strongly as improving the number of wage workers in enterprises. Senior managers of the Tajik MFOs 
were describing women’s empowerment normatively, but also recognized a declining trend of 
women’s entrepreneurship. Few microfinance agencies tracked formalised indicators and metrics to 
accompany their social objectives. Financial performance and growth targets dominated staff 
incentive systems. The MFOs did not conduct social audits and only one company had completed a 
social rating. I found the more “systematic” aspect of SPM to be product development, marketing and 




Chapter VI. Bai Tushum Pilot 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Having discussed the MFOs and their capacity to do social performance management at the outset of 
the pilot, I will now describe the pilot of Bai Tushum. I will do this following the questions posed in 
Chapter IV, (see Figure 4 p72). Section 6.2 explains the pilot design and its broader aims in relation to 
performance management of the MFO. What determined the willingness to take up the opportunity 
provided by the ILO? Section 6.3 describes the assessment strategy at the outset of the project as well 
as how the organisation actually managed pilot implementation and assessment. Section 6.4 reports 
key performance outcomes relevant for the organisation. Section 6.5 presents the main organisational 
learning in relation to the empirical results. Section 6.6 makes concluding remarks about the capacity 
of the MFO to do SPM at the end of the pilot.   
 
6.2. Description of the Pilot 
 
In January 2009, Bai Tushum’s project team submitted several ideas for a pilot experiment including 
launching an SME lending department, customer loyalty campaign, financial education project, 
collective bargaining project for farmers, and monitoring of indicators to detect job creation. Several 
of these ideas related to the existing plans of management described in Section 5.3 (p103). Initially, 
Bai Tushum wanted to implement all five ideas, but the ILO requested the project team to be selective 
and the plan for an SME department was presented in the summer of 2009 (pilot proposal, June 2009, 
April 2009; presentation of the CEO in Geneva in February 2009) 
 
This plan was chosen partly because the diagnostic survey conducted in 2008 confirmed that the 
microenterprises supported by Bai Tushum were relatively large and formalised and employing a 
relatively high number of wage workers (see Section 3.5, Table 6, p63).40  But it was also based on an 
the existing plan of the company to offer more SME lending services to clients. Small and medium 
enterprise finance was viewed to be an important niche market for the company (see Section 5.3, p 97-
98), but product delivery and pricing was similar for most of the loans (see p102).  
 
                                                 
40 78% of the clients of Bai Tushum were self-employed. Most of them (89%) had one or more workers in their 
enterprise. The average number of workers per self-employed client was 2.4, much higher compared to other 
MFOs. The majority of the workers were family workers (87%). Only 12% of the workers were wage workers.  
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The pilot entailed a re-organisation of the credit process and delivery system within the company by 
establishing a separate department for SME- and micro-lending. The product modifications included a 
change in loan pricing, lowering of the documentation requirements and a lengthening of the loan 
period. In addition, senior staff members would deliver the new SME loans (Pilot summary Oct 2009). 
The main expectation was that the new delivery mechanism of SME lending could generate 
employment for microfinance clients, job creation for their workers and improved customer 
satisfaction. In this context, microloans were defined as loans below US$ 5000, while SME loans 
were higher than US$5000 (Pilot summary Oct 2009; Pilot proposal July 2009:1&5).  
 
To ‘causally’ link intended changes to outcomes, several staff in the organisation used an implicit 
assumption, namely that (easier access to) larger loans would create more jobs and better serve the 
SME segment. “As a result of all innovations offered by our company we expect creation or 
maintenance of jobs by clients through simplification of access to financing. In turn creation of jobs is 
closely connected with the development of small and medium-sized business in the country” (Pilot 
proposal 23-04-2009). The CEO mentioned in support that in the past, “Bai Tushum estimated that for 
every $250 US in loans one job position was created” (CEO, Feb 2009). As was described in Section 
5.3.2 (p97), there was a historical belief that individual loans contributed to the renewed mission of 
job creation (CEO Oct 2009). This ‘shared perspective’, that larger individual loans invested in the 
SME sector would have more growth potential for job creation was triangulated during several 
interviews and focus groups discussions throughout the pilot period.41 Several managers and other 
staff seemed to believe the company had a positive social performance of job creation through its 
lending activities.  
 
An underlying agenda of Bai Tushum was to incorporate employment related indicators into the 
management information system (Pilot proposal 2009:1&5&9; CEO Oct 2009, see also Section 5.3.5, 
p102). “After completion of the survey this program will give us possibility to review constantly jobs 
creation impact” (Pilot Proposal June 2009). The expectation of the pilot for the CEO was to “firstly 
to improve the company itself. “ Second, “To make clients also wake up, [because some of them have] 
employees working without security and social support. The project could be used to educate the 
clients.” Third, “in a competitive environment the institutional image becomes important” (CEO, Oct 
2009).  
                                                 
41 - The intended causal effect is that; “faster disbursal procedures which are more suitable for the clients, lead 
to more disbursement of loans, leading to more jobs created by micro-enterprises”. – CEO, Feb 2011 
- "An investment of 300 US$ dollar they say create one job. " - M11, Aug 2011  
- There is a strong belief in the training group that large loan amounts create more jobs. For example, one 
attendant mentioned, “that loans above 50,000 KGS create the more permanent job”. Another person that “the 
sum of the loan is higher, the more jobs are created”. - Participant observations June 2011 during training on 
data analysis  
- It was believed that the SME sector had more growth potential because “through the division specific attention 
will be given to clients with growth potential” (Pilot proposal, June 2009). 
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In 2009, the willingness to formalise SPM seemed mainly external to the company. The CEO 
mentioned, “We started social performance because the political dimension in Kyrgyzstan requires 
information on it.” …“The political environment in Kyrgyzstan requests the collection of information 
on job creation.  Currently there are political attacks from parliamentarians, who are asking whether 
microfinance is being conducted in the right and correct way” (CEO BT, Oct 2009). As described in 
Section 5.3.4 (p100), the company was concerned about the potential pressure from regulation. 
Furthermore, “Social performance is good for the institutional image.” Bai Tushum is a “commercial 
organisation with a social mission, but in practice we do very little and focus mostly on financial 
performance such as portfolio at risk…..Social Performance should be taken very seriously” (CEO Bai 
Tushum Oct 2009). Thus, the ILO project allowed Bai Tushum to demonstrate job creation to external 
stakeholders such as politicians and to improve its institutional image.   
 
The project team developed the pilot with a strong business mindset since there was a need for Bai 
Tushum to improve competitiveness and restructure business operations. “Today the competition is 
getting tougher, and micro financing markets attract not only micro-financing organisations, but also 
[the] banks of Kyrgyzstan” (Pilot proposal 2009:5-6). The project team wrote to the ILO that 
“unambiguously we can claim that [after pilot implementation] the operational expenses will be 
reduced, especially in serving SME clients, and this will allow us to reduce the interest rate” 
(Proposal, July 2009:4). The pilot may “expand opportunities for the client and for the company” 
(Project proposal, April 2009:2). The business perspective influenced the pilot assessment. The 
project team preferred to implement the pilot with a great deal of flexibility and selectivity. For 
example, the team wanted to launch the SME loans in the stronger branches, for new contracts and 
only if clients and staff agreed to the new delivery channels (Pilot proposal July 2009:7; Discussions 
with the project team in Sep 2009). The focus on external competition and regulatory environment 
signalled further to me that the company had an outward looking organisational culture (see Sections 
5.3.4, p102 and 5.5).    
 
A project team was set up to implement the pilot. It consisted of middle and senior managers from the 
departments of marketing and credit operations. To ensure commitment from other staff, the project 
team planned to provide regular training (Pilot proposal July 2009:10). The average cost per interview 
was estimated to be around US$ 15. Taking into account travel and preparation, the overall time per 
interview was estimated to be about one hour. The total project financing was budgeted at 
US$ 267,230. Bai Tushum covered 60% of the costs, particularly the implementation of the SME 
department. The ILO sponsored the remaining 40%, specifically the costs for doing the social 
performance assessment. For the MFO itself the budget was relatively small because it was only 0,6% 




The ILO project was the company’s largest initiative in SPM, but the MFO wanted to engage also in 
other activities such as a social rating, social audit and customer loyalty campaign (see Section 5.3.6, 
103). As discussed in Section 5.3, over the same period the company also wanted to attract new 




6.3. Implementation of Pilot Assessment   
 
I will now describe the assessment strategy at the outset (6.3.1), followed by what was actually 
implemented (6.3.2) and assessed (6.3.3). The Section focuses on the process of data collection as 
experienced by people in the organisation. I placed methodological details of statistics and regressions 
in the appendix.42 
 
6.3.1. The initial Assessment Strategy in 2009  
 
Although the ILO wanted to do an impact assessment through the assignment of control branches in 
the evaluation, Bai Tushum’s project team preferred to do a simpler before-after-analysis without a 
control group. Management wanted to maintain flexibility to modify or adapt the pilot. Having this 
option was important for the MFO because it affected the core business of credit delivery. 
Furthermore, management wanted to be able to scale-up or stop the pilot, in case there were strong 
changes in the external environment. For example in case it experienced increased market competition 
or costs of capital (discussion on methodology report, submitted to Bai Tushum, Aug 2009). The ILO 
staff member and myself argued that without comparison group it would be difficult to test whether 
the same outcomes would have happened if the pilot had not been implemented. The ILO staff 
insisted on using a control group because they had to justify the methodology to their sponsor and 
keep it aligned with the other MFOs that participated in the project (see Section 3.4.2, p58). At a 
meeting in September 2009 with the ILO staff member, the project team and myself, we agreed to 
keep a set of control branches. However, there was a tension between the views of the ILO and the 
MFO on whether to do a single experimental design or allow for a more responsive experimentation.  
 
At the outset of the pilot implementation, the MFO was not just interested in knowing whether the 
pilot worked, but also how and for whom it worked. The key questions were; “What percentage of 
micro enterprise clients are growth oriented? Did microfinance contribute to job creation, and if so, 
how? What is the quality of the jobs created? ...What are the reasons [that] the business has not hired 
                                                 
42 Several Tables and Graphs in section 6.3 and 6.4. and Appendix I formed the basis for a report (ILO 2013a, forthcoming).    
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more employees” (Proposal June 2009)?  I will now discuss the implementation process and then 
come back to these points.  
 
Sample Size and Dates of Data Collection   
 
As part of Bai Tushum’s broader agenda of incorporating social performance indicators into the 
management systems (see page 118), it was important for the project team to have a sample that could 
represent the entire portfolio of the company. In agreement with the project team, we used a stratified 
sample of 1440 active borrowers, by selecting 40 clients randomly for each sub office. Only clients 
with individual and production loans were included in the sample because they may have more 
potential to create jobs. This sample covered most of Bai Tushum’s portfolio outstanding (77%) and 
active clients (45%). The plan was to undertake five surveys with the baseline survey to be conducted 
in November 2009, and follow-up surveys every six months.  
 
Key Social Performance Indicators and Survey    
 
The initial survey contained over 25 indicators related to the client’s household, work activity, income 
and assets, workers in the enterprises of clients, and customer satisfaction. “Job creation” was defined 
according to the ILO standards as changes in the number of wageworkers. Testing of the survey 
revealed clients did not always distinguish between daily labour and wage employment. Family 
members who were “helping out” in the enterprise were not always considered workers. Thus clients 
were asked “How many people work for you in your business?” and “In addition, how many people 
help out in your business?” After identifying the total number of workers in the enterprise, a table was 
completed with basic characteristics for each worker including a classification for wage, family or 
daily worker and apprentices. By asking several questions, the responses could be triangulated.  
 
Customer satisfaction was measured through open and closed questions assessing the willingness to 




6.3.2. Management of the Pilot Implementation 
 
Having discussed how we intended to do the pilot assessment, I now describe how the pilot was 
actually implemented. After a relatively successful baseline survey, the pilot experienced considerable 
delays with several components being carried out at different periods and under different conditions 




The biggest challenge in launching the pilot assessment according to the project team was the Kyrgyz 
political crisis (Report June 2011; Jordan workshop, June 2012). The “difficult political and economic 
situation in Kyrgyzstan (events in April, 2010, June 2010)”, led to a reduction in demand and reduced 
loan portfolio growth from 21% in 2009 to 8% in 2010. Management felt there was a need to be 
responsive to the competitive environment (Report April 2011). The political crises in June 2010, 
discussed earlier (Section 5.2, p91) affected the sustainability of clients as well as the MFO (see more 
in Section 6.3). Several clients, especially in the South of Kyrgyzstan, were affected directly because 
their assets were stolen or destroyed, while others were affected more indirectly “through a decrease 
of the economic activity in the region and slack of trade in the markets “ (Email correspondence Bai 
Tushum 26-06-2010). Staff observed contraction of the trade and transport related to closure of the 
borders in 2010.43 There was increased volatility in price-levels and reduction in demand for goods.44  
Income and assets were reported to decline for some borrowers, and one staff member cited an 
increase in migration.45 The crisis generated a great degree of uncertainty in the short term for both 
social and financial performance.46 It delayed and strongly influenced the pilot implementation.  
 
There were also internal challenges in carrying out the pilot; while the project team was intended to 
work as a close group, in practice it seemed to consist of two sub-groups namely the marketing 
department involved with the social performance assessment and the credit department involved with 
the implementation of the pilot. At the start of the project, before the crises, I found the project team 
did not meet up frequently and the two groups did not always communicate effectively. The marketing 
                                                 
43 - “trading was stopped” -  SLO2c Jan 2011 
-“ There was a border closure so a lot of import and export stopped to China. Kazak tourists usually visit Naryn“ 
[but did not do so this year] - SLO6, Jan 2011 
- “Most of the traders suffered after the closing of the borders. This may not have been a problem for agriculture.  
For transport, it was a problem.” Also prices went up. - SLO7, Jan 2011 
- “Traders suffered much. In November the situation has been stabilized. Income decreased much. Also assets 
were affected.” - SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
44 - The political crises led to an “increase of prices for foodstuffs, a decrease of activity in trade sector, the 
difficult situation in Osh, a reduction of demand, a restructuring of loans, difficult economic and political 
situation” (Bai Tushum report April 2011). 
-“Crises influenced the prices. Potato prices decreased much. For all of the clients there was the selling price of 
animals.” - SLO8, Jan 2011 
- “It was very difficult the crisis has affected clients severely.” - SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
45 “A lot of clients lost their business.”... “Some migrated and worked in Kazakstan, Russia.” - SLO5b, Jan 
2011 
 
46 - “It should be noted that in connection with recent political and tragic events in Osh and Jalalabad regions a 
large number of customers are now in a difficult situation which does not allow many to pay off debts. 
Definitely the situation in a country strongly influenced the efficiency and profitability of clients businesses, 
and hence on their assets and has a result on [the creation of] jobs.” - Email project team, June 2010  
- Some clients are “afraid of the loan” given the current unrests in Kyrgyzstan, they are not sure if they can 




manager had written the pilot proposal, but with little involvement of other team members.47 Over the 
period June 2009 to Oct 2009, I had several meetings with team members, but few of them were with 
a complete team. Staff would often run in and out of meetings. Because of staff turnover, the project 
team changed its leader three times over the period 2009 to 2011. It led to additional 
miscommunication.48 The sub-groups seemed unaware of each other’s activities. For example, when 
the marketing manager went on leave of absence in June 2010, the new project team leader was not 
informed that exit clients needed to be interviewed. Likewise, the marketing department was unaware 
of what exact changes in the credit delivery system were implemented (Participant observation 
interview M10b, Jan 2011; Participant observation email May 2011). 
 
The limited time to participate in the project team was one of the key reasons that the project team 
became increasingly ineffective. For senior and middle management, attracting investors, 
transforming into a bank and maintaining portfolio quality and growth were priorities, and these went 
at the expense of time spent on the pilot (see Section 5.3). These tensions were exacerbated by the 
political crises when the management of the company was under pressure to sustain financial 
performance.   
 
During interviews in February 2010 and Jan 2011, I found that staff could not explain to me clearly 
what the pilot was about. Each staff member had a somewhat different response often unrelated to the 
new SME delivery system.49  The institutionalization of the pilot seemed very weak, the staff didn’t 
seem aware of the basic content of the pilot. So what had happened?  
                                                 
47 The Marketing manager designed the decent work innovation proposal mostly by herself. The CEO and the 
operational manager also looked at the proposal. The Pilot test team did not meet up frequently to discuss it - 
M1, May 2009.  
- “When the innovation proposal was presented I didn’t understand the feasibility” [of the pilot] "As I wasn’t the 
person who makes the decision I didn't address this to management". "Job creation [as a goal] is ok, but through 
what channels [is it achieved]”. “Not by making changes through the credit process. Perhaps through other 
processes.” – M10c, Aug 2011   
-"We don’t create the decisions, but we provide information to the management team."- M11b Aug 2011 
 
48 - “when the manager was absent, the project was transmitted to the new team leader. …[But], the new team 
leader did not know anything. He asked me for updates …but I did not know." – M10c Aug 2011 
- The manager informed the new project leader that exit-clients did not need to be interviewed. However, I had 
never mentioned this. In principle all exit clients needed to be interviewed or at minimum a random sample. – 
participant observation made during discussion with project team leader Jan 2011.  
- The new staff member was not briefed properly. For example, the staff member didn’t know about the 
methodology of the study and what the sample represents. I spent quite some time explaining the methodology – 
Participant observation, M11, Aug 2011.   
 
49 - The pilot  “Needs to develop the business, the client turns to the microfinance as a more convenient way to 
get money." The staff member has a limited view on the innovation; the PR manager had to then explain what 
the pilot was. - SLO5b, Jan 2011. 
- When “Microfinance is being disbursed and the population creates jobs. “ - SLO6, Jan 2011 
- "People take loans on doing business and field husbandry and they live on this money."  - SLO7, Jan 2011 
After further probing it was clear he did not know what the pilot was - Participant observation.  




A series of challenges were taking place. In Jan 2011, I met up with the project team and it turned out 
the pilot was implemented in all branches, including those that were supposed to function as a control 
group. The team felt it had to treat the control group because of the political crises and the resulting 
reduction in loan demand and increased cost of funds (Interim report April 2011; Report Jan 2011; 
Marketing Coordinator Aug 2011).50 Second, changes to the delivery mechanism at client level were 
generally small. Although several changes took place at organisational level including hiring of new 
credit managers and underwriters, and division of staff into a micro and SME department, few 
changes were made to product features (presentation Jan 2011, team leader). Since the baseline, 50% 
of the clients in the sample received a new loan and 36% received a lower interest rate (see Figure 11). 
The innovation entailed a small increase in the average loan amount (US$ 203) and a small decrease 
in interest rates (31% to 29%). Changes such as lengthening loan period, delivery of loans by senior 
staff, and reduction in documentation requirements were made for a very small percentage of the 
sample. The CEO agreed there was “not too much innovation in this sense” [at client level] (CEO Feb 
2011).  
 
Figure 11 Product Modifications for New Loans Given after Baseline Survey 
 
  Source ILO 2013a, forthcoming 
 
With small modifications in the delivery of loans to clients as well as the absence of a control group it 
was difficult to relate the innovation to social performance outcomes. The ILO Social Finance 
Programme then decided to cancel the fourth and fifth follow-up survey, because it was impossible to 
measure the impact of the pilot. Faced with the changes in pilot implementation, we mediated how to 
modify the assessment.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
50 “I think it was not a good decision to divide control and treatment branches. The environment in Kyrgyzstan 
is always changing. At the time of the baseline survey, we could divide the branches, but after the revolution 
prices increases, the demand was very low, and our company should try to realize [its] plans. The company had 
to treat the control group because of the changing environment.” – M11, Aug 2011  
- She admitted in many of these cases both groups were treated because BT had different priorities, specifically 
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6.3.3. Management of the Social Performance Assessment   
 
In agreement with the ILO, we decided to do a simpler social performance assessment using the data 
already collected. I prepared a general report for the second follow-up survey and asked Bai Tushum’s 
management what other questions they were interested in exploring? In November 2011, the project 
team described it wanted to assess the following questions:  
“- Whether we can compare the growth of job creation between the micro and SME 
- Which industries and what regions more rapidly create jobs? 
- Exit clients - how many jobs were created?   
- Seasonal job creation - was there any change during the study?... 
- Is there some effect from the pilot, especially in job creation and employment and its dynamics by 
SME and microfinance clients” (Excerpt email Nov 2011 of the project team’s feedback on second 
follow-up survey report).  
 
In addition, I realized that testing the implicit assumption held by Bai Tushum staff that larger loans 
created more jobs was important, because it formed a building block for the performance management 
of the MFO (see Section 6.2, p118). I explored basic correlations, to see whether the extra loan 
amount contributed to changes in the number of wage workers in clients’ enterprises. Results do not 
show causal relationships as for this some sort of control group would be required. Due to cancellation 
of the fourth and fifth survey, I will use only data for a 12-month period. During this period, the 





Because of the political crises, the ILO, Bai Tushum and I, decided to exclude four sub-offices in 
South Kyrgyzstan from the sample because it was dangerous for staff to conduct interviews in these 
areas due to violence. Cancelling the interviews reduced the total sample size from 1440 to 1283 
clients (see Table 20). For the first follow-up survey, there was a high dropout rate because of the 
political crises, but also because of internal factors relating to data management. The project team 

















Interviews complete 1283 992 1226 
Total sample 1283 1283 1283 
% Response rate 100% 77% 96% 




After submission of baseline data I found discrepancies in employment measurements for 18% of the 
sample (Baseline Data check 15-03-2010). After I communicated the errors, the marketing  
department decided to do extra trainings with staff on interview techniques for new survey rounds.  
Although most errors were corrected, sometimes it was impossible to go back to the clients and 
recollect the information. However, data quality for the indicator improved for the first follow-up 
survey as only 1% of the sample contained errors. Several staff mentioned it was difficult for clients to 
estimate net income and assets.51 It was also difficult for clients to estimate their working time 
because they did not always separate their time spent on household activities from that of their work 
activities.52 Indeed, I found several errors in these data when checking it.  
 
Staff found the questions in the survey clear and comprehensible.53 However, it was difficult to 
translate some of the definitions used in the questions into a language understandable for clients.54 As 
one manager highlighted, the "questionnaire have specific terms. When loan officers ask clients they 
                                                 
51 - “People are afraid to provide information on net income for taxes”. [Also] "it was difficult for rural clients 
to calculate net income". - SLO9, Jan 2011.  
- “Net income is not a good indicator for agriculture, as… clients sometimes take assets into the net income. 
Assets are clearer indicators for impact, specifically welfare status. “ – M10b,M10c, Jan 2011  
- "Assets … [and] Net profits are sometimes created in the minds of people." - M11a, Aug 2011 
 
52 - “One problem in data collection is that household work is also seen as part of the normal work hours.” - 
M10b,M10c, project team leader, Jan 2011  
- “For working time, clients answer the whole day or 24 hours” - , because they did not separate their work lives 
from their household lives – SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
53 - The "Questions were easily understandable."- SLO7, Jan 2011 
- “All respondents answered willingly, some wanted not to answer questions honestly.” -  SLO6, Jan 2011 
- “If you ask them clearly then clients also understand.” [The] “first set of interviews is difficult, but after that it 
becomes more easy.” SLO8, Jan 2011 
-“Clients are eager to answer the questions. I tried to make the interview a flowing conversation.”  - SLO 9, Jan 
2011 
-However, one mentioned; “I cannot be sure if all clients told the truth.”… “The people from the rural areas are 
more honest” - SLO2b, Feb 2010 
 
54 -“One client did not understand the questions.” - SLO2b Feb 2010 
 - “The questionnaire is difficult.”…”Some questions do not work and we need a better translation for the 




have to give definitions and apply the terms as this is restricted data collection.” (M10c, Aug 2011). 
This meant having to deviate from the explicit survey language and provide additional clarifications to 
clients. Another challenge was that there is a “time limit for clients”, especially “in workplaces clients 
are often busy” (SLO2b, Jan 2011).55  
 
 
Experiences and Learning by Staff  
 
Conducting interviews was considered by the senior managers to be part of the “regular work” of loan 
officers. However, this view was not shared by the staff (Participant observation diagnostic tool May 
2009). They found it challenging to make time available to do data collection and multi-task this with 
their regular job. “I worked four extra weekend days for two weeks” … “I had no other choice than to 
do the interviews, [but] they were difficult to manage with the current tasks” (SLO5a, Feb 2010). 
Especially in November there was a strong demand for loans and interviews were often conducted 
outside of regular working time making surveys unpopular among staff (Discussions with Marketing 
department Jan 2011).56   
 
During the feedback rounds with interviewers, it became clear staff didn’t appreciate having to do 
interviews during extra hours, while not receiving any additional payment. So it was decided to 
implement a bonus system for loan officers financed through the ILO budget. The first bonus was 
however lower than expected.57 The complaint was fed back by loan officers to management and the 
bonus was increased to a satisfactory level.58 
 
                                                 
55 - "The questionnaire can be shorter." SLO7, Jan 2011 
 
56 - “ I Worked in over-time on interviews,” - SLO3, May 2009 
- “ Not sufficient time.” The second follow-up survey was conducted in the weekends. For the first follow-up  
survey there was sufficient time. - SLO 2c, Jan 2011 
- “For the first Follow-up survey, I had the opportunity to interview during the workday. For the second follow-
up survey I had to visit in the weekends. “ - SLO7, Jan 2011 
-“Clients in the rural areas were visited in the weekend.” - SLO9, Jan 2011 
-“From November to December there is sufficient time but there is a high pressure to fulfill the disbursements 
[target]. She worked 2 weekends”.- SLO5b, Jan 2011 
- “Normal, no problem. For Baseline survey… this was a substantial caseload….he interviewed almost 100 
clients in the weekends. However, in the summer he managed to conduct the interviews during the normal 
working day.” - SLO8, Jan 2011 
- "For loan officers it was also difficult. It was a trouble for them to find the client. They complained to us. They 
worked often in the weekends. " – M10c, Aug 2011 
 
57 - “The surveys are also a stimulus to get a bonus, but “What offended him was that the bonus was less than 
expected”. Due to taxes and social funds the bonus was 38% lower.  SLO2b, Feb 2010 
-She felt she “did not receive enough bonus. The bonus was less than expected. “ - SLO5a, Feb 2010 
 
58 -“Yes, the bonus is sufficient now.” - SLO 2c, Jan 2011 




All interviewers found it a useful for their work to conduct the surveys, but they also said it had not 
changed their way of working substantially. I asked what aspects they liked about doing the 
interviews. For several staff it was an important opportunity to interact with the clients in their 
workplaces and houses. One mentioned she had “Interviewed rural clients and found this useful 
because she normally works with urban clients, [making it possible] “to be maximally close to the 
clients”. [And] “see their real business environment” (SLO 4, May 2009).59 Others used interviews to 
monitor the borrowers’ deb capacity and risks60, cross check information on customers61, and rethink 
products offered to them.62 Many were interested in the welfare and work activities of clients 
including the jobs created by their enterprises.63 For example, one loan officer mentioned "I now pay 
special attention to social portraits of clients. How many children work, how many workers.  …"I was 
surprised that many clients worked abroad in Russia and Kazakhstan". (SLO2a, Feb 2010). Another 
mentioned that it was "useful to see the structure of the businesses, the exit clients, the income and 
assets and the sum of loans as I work for the credit committee." (SLO7, Jan 2011). As monitoring of 
clients was identified as a weakness in the company (see 5.3.5, p 102), being able to interact with 
clients after loan disbursement was considered a valuable and useful experience by staff.  
 
                                                 
59 - "I get acquainted with clients of other loan officers." – SLO5b, Feb 2010 
- “talking to different clients”, meant using “different approaches”. He had to behave in different ways to 
interpreted different clients. - SLO8, Jan 2011 
- “To be able to visit the clients in rural areas" – SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
60 - "He could use the interviews to visit the clients who had difficulties repaying the loan." - SLO2a, Feb 2010 
- "The fact that it allows to monitor and analyses my clients and assessment of the risk.” - SLO5a, Jan 2011 
- [He checks] “if the client can repay a loan, when he analyzes every six months”.  – SLO 6, Jan 2011 
- It is "Normal, part of monitoring of clients"- SLO7, Jan 2011 
 
61 - To "crosscheck analysis of assets and incomes." - SLO7 Jan 2011 
- He “made some analysis for himself. As credit manager it was his responsibility to look at what loans are 
disbursed and he also looked at assets and incomes of clients. He was crosschecking the information” - SLO8, 
Jan 2011 
- “when clients took loans they told some information on assets, that did not fit [match] with the information of 
the loan officers.” – SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
62 -  “I uses the information while assessing the real situation to see if to disburse or not.” … As member of the 
credit committee, he could use the information “when the client comes for another loan.” – SLO 6, Jan 2011  
- “ I invited exit clients and told them about the decrease of interest rates"…. [and checked] "Did we disburse 
enough to this client… For example we found out that several clients had enough income to take up more loans." 
- SLO7, Jan 2011 
- “They provide information to decrease the interest rates and lengthen the terms of the loan." – SLO9, Jan 2011 
 
63 - "It is useful to get to know welfare condition of clients, and whether clients will return to Bai Tushum for a 
follow up loan" She was surprised to find some "very rich clients that earned more than 1 Million US$”… 
"Interesting aspect is that more clients hire workers to produce domestically"… “Most of the clients worked for 
15 hours per day." - SLO 5b, Feb 2010 
- He observed “What the work of the client is” and “What is their incomes”…. -SLO8, Jan 2011 
- She liked the " engagement with the main workers of clients"  - SLO5a, Jan 2011 




Another form of learning is that loan officers were trained in assessing client satisfaction and job 
creation. This was not only a result of the ILO project, but also an internal recognition that SPM was a 
gap in the training program (CEO Oct 2009, see p101, Section 5.3.5). When I conducted the training 
for interviewers in September 2009, I found many staff were not aware of the mission statement of the 
company and there were discussions in the group about what constitutes a “good job”.64 In 2011, 
during the staff interviews, I observed staff to have a more common understanding of what the 
company meant with job creation and they were more familiar with the mission statement.65  
 
Staff in the marketing department felt the project created “new experiences and skills, especially on 
social performance and what companies should do in order to manage it.” She liked that, “all loan 
officers understood trends in social performance management and liked to be part of the project.” And 
that she observed “what incomes and assets clients have and what results they achieved” (M10c, Aug 
2011). Another manager mentioned, "the project is close to our mission, it allows us to see changes in 
income, assets and job creation." [Second]" we now know about the methodology of how we 
implemented the project. And we know how to to do social performance analysis and organize other 
surveys. For example the client exit study." It was a "good experience to help organize a professional 
survey" (M11a, Aug 2011).   
 
However, at the same time they mentioned they had little time to learn, “There are only two persons 
and we have a lot of other stuff to do. It is difficult to spend time“… “We managed of course but not 
in-depth” (M10c, Aug 2011). At operational level, the marketing department was responsible for 
public relations, marketing and social performance assessments. It included a set of activities as 
diverse as being responsible for the branding, organizing festivals, conducting the social rating, 
attending conferences, conducting client exit surveys and accompanying the pilot project.  
Despite suffering from a multi-task problem, both managers never asked the CEO for additional  
human resources. At the same time, the CEO was convinced that “SPM for one person is too much” 
(CEO BT July 2011). After feeding back this information two staff members were added within three 
months. The company changed the marketing department into a business development department. 
                                                 
64 E.g. “A worker that receives money " - SLO2b Feb 2010 
 
65 First "Jobs are the main part of our lives", they should have, “Good salary and safety in working conditions.” 
– SLO2c, Jan 2011 
- "A job is when somebody who works for somebody and gives money in terms of some agreement."- SLO5, Jan 
2011 
- “It means when the client comes to BT and takes a loan for improving incomes, assets and does not have own 
resources. He needs to hire outside workers. The person should not be from within the household member and 
[employment] for longer period.” – SLO 6, Jan 2011 
- "a worker with a salary payment" – SLO7, Jan 2011 
- "Somebody who is paid a salary for some service… and works for a longer period or permanent " – SLO 8, Jan 
2011   
- "If it will be paid work, it is job creation, and if there is a contract." - SLO 9,Jan 2011 
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The new head of the department was placed on the executive committee (Bai Tushum 2011, Annual 
report).  
 
6.4. Empirical Findings 
 
Having described the implementation of the pilot, I will now turn to the empirical findings of the 
assessment as presented to Bai Tushum in four reports (baseline, first and second follow-up survey 
and final report). I focus on indicators for job creation and customer satisfaction, because these were 
found most important by staff. Other indicators such as net income, assets and working time are not 
shown because data quality was perceived weak and the MFO did not act on these findings.   
 
Customer Satisfaction  
 
As of November 2009, the key positive aspects of Bai Tushum’s lending services according to clients 
were the repayment schedule, application time of the loan, and customer service (see Table 21a-c). 
The main weaknesses were high interest rates, and that no discounts were given to loyal customers. In 
the Aravan sub-office customers complained about the lack of nearby cashier-points to make 
payments. Although management considered faster and simpler disbursement procedures and higher 
loan amounts as reasons to implement the pilot, the clients were actually satisfied about these product 
features (see 6.2, p118). Also after the implementation of the new delivery system customer 
satisfaction did not improve for clients that received the loans via the new loan delivery system. 
 
Table 21 Customer Satisfaction in Nov 2009    
 
a) Three Key Strengths of Bai Tushum   
 % of total 
clients 
Repayment schedule,  48% 
Loan application time  43% 
Customer Service, (Staff competence , ethics)  38% 
Total Observations 1440 
 
b) Three Key Weaknesses of Bai Tushum   
 % of total 
clients 
Interest rates too high 56% 
Loan period  7% 
Difficulty to make a payment / long queue at the desk  6% 
Value added Taxes on interest rates 6% 






c) Satisfaction per Product Feature   
 Very Good Normal Bad Very Bad Total 
Loan Period 23% 67% 10% 0% 100% 
Loan Amount 19% 68% 12% 1% 100% 
Customer Services 39% 59% 2% 0% 100% 
Interest Rates 4% 32% 52% 12% 100% 
Loan application time  30% 61% 7% 2% 100% 
1400 observations 
 
A high number of 28% of the clients (359) exited the program over the 12-month period. Earlier 
satisfaction surveys showed most clients exited because they did not need a loan anymore or were in 
default (see, Section 5.3.5, p102). However this assessment found additional reasons for customer exit 
such as dissatisfaction about interest rates, clients borrowing from competitors, and poor economic 
conditions and business failure (see Figure 12). The percentage of clients willing to take new loans 
reduced from 78% in Nov 2009 to 55% in Nov 2010. Only 21% of the exit clients wanted to take a 
new loan compared to 67% for active borrowers. 
   
Figure 12 Customer Exit and Retention  
 































As shown in Figure 13, an increasing percentage of clients started to employ workers, namely from 
92% in Nov 2009 to almost 100% in Nov 2010. However, less than half of them employed wage 
workers and there was a reduction over time from 43% to 28%. Also most of the clients’ enterprises 
were small, with a few employing more than five wage workers (5% in Nov 2009 and 3% in Nov 
2010). Thus, it was questionable to what degree the company was actually targeting SMEs as opposed 
to micro-enterprises. The company defined ‘SME’ as companies receiving loans above US$ 5000, 
which comprised 14% of the sample (see p118). Alternative classifications based on national 
legislation also showed few SME borrowers in the sample.    
 
Figure 13 Size of Enterprise  
 
a) % Clients with Workers and Wage workers      b) % SME Clients various classifications 































86% 83% 99% 
SME 14% 17% 2% 
Total 
Sample 
100% 100% 100% 
* SME based on turnover (sales of assets) above KGS 150,000  
for production and agriculture and  KGS 230,000 for trade  
and services.  
** SME are companies with more than 7 wage workers  
for production and services and more than 15 wage workers for 
 trade and services. 
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Figure 14 shows a reduction in the average number of workers per client from 4.7 to 3.6 over the 12-
month period. The decline differed per type of employment; while there was a reduction in wage and 
daily workers, the number of family workers remained stable.   
 
Figure 14 Average Number of Workers  
 
a) Total Number of Workers   b) Workers by Type 
 
  
Figure 15 shows the decline in the number of wageworkers was less strong for clients receiving new 
loans when compared to those who did not. Also there was a stronger decrease in employment for 
exiting clients when compared to clients who remained active borrowers. Changes in number of wage 
workers employed were more stable for SMEs than compared to microenterprises (see Figure 15c and 
d). For agriculture, trade and services there were declines in job creation. However, for production 
activities there was a strong increase.  
 
Figure 15 Average Number of Wage Workers  
 
















































 c) SME Classified by Loan Amount                    d) SME classified by Asset Turnover 
 
















Figure 16 explores a simple correlation plot between changes in loan amount and job creation, it does 
not control for other variables that may be influential in determining job creation. There is a small 
weakly significant correlation (+0.08, significant at 10% confidence level, see appendix I). A simple 
OLS regression estimated that every additional KGS 100,000 (US$ 2,298) of extra loan sum created 
only 0.09 job positions. Thus there was hardly any loan size effect and it was much less than what Bai 
Tushum had estimated in the past (US$250 for every additional job, see p118). After controlling for 
several variables such as branch type and clients' characteristics, the effect became insignificant. Other 
variables seemed more influential in determining job creation such as the type of sector (production 
activities) and region. Clients exiting the program experienced a reduction in job creation. (See the 
Appendix for the full model). 
 
Range Loan Amount 
in KGS 
Average Nr of Wage 










































Figure 16  Correlation Loan Amount and Job Creation   
 
 
6.5. Organizational Learning in Relation to the Results 
 
Before investigating how the MFO acted on the empirical findings, we first need to establish how 
proactively the outcome reports were disseminated. Reports were sent to the project team members, 
but not all members had read them. Outcomes were presented on two occasions to the management 
team and at the regular staff trainings. However, during interviews, most staff could not mention any 
key findings from the presentation. For example, one loan officer mentioned “The economic analysis 
was not shared by the marketing department” (SLO7, Jan 2011).66 Although several staff mentioned 
to be interested to hear about the results, they did not have access to the reports.67 The marketing 
department had spent no time on disseminating outcomes to the field staff, partly because they were 
busy with other responsibilities (see p129).  
 
During my interviews, I found that two branches set up informal working groups that reflected on 
experiences gained when conducting the surveys. The groups talked about customer satisfaction and 
client characteristics, including the potential of clients to create jobs. The marketing department had 
no awareness of these working groups. So while possibly interesting survey results didn’t go 
downstream from senior management to loan officers, other potentially interesting knowledge 
                                                 
66 - “I cannot remember” the results. SLO9, Jan 2011 
- He did not see the baseline survey report, SLO2c,  Jan 2011 
-"I should see the results to refresh my memory” And “I had read the reports and forgot. The baseline survey 
was presented for the management team and send to the branches.” Staff is now send some information in a 
quarterly newsletter - M10c Aug-11 
- What results of the project have surprised you so far? “Can’t Answer”.- M11a, Aug 2011 
 
67  - The information was not shared with her. She would be “Interested in getting some information on positive 
changes. Changes made in the lives of clients and businesses.” -SLO5b,  Jan 2011 
- He did not receive the report and baseline survey information. I asked him what questions are you interested 


















-1000 -750 -500 -250 0 250 500 750
Increase in loan amount in 1000nds of KGS
First Differences Nov 2009 - Nov 2010
Job Creation and Loan Amount (+0.08)
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including lessons learned by loan officers also didn’t travel upstream in the organization (see also 
p128 on lessons learned by loan officers).  
 
Outcome reports were shared with external stakeholders specifically investors and the social rating 
agency (Credit manager 11b Jan 2011; M-Cril 2009).68 Politicians did not receive the report, despite 
being seen as an important target group at the start of the project.  
 
The assessment led to several lessons learned in the area of customer satisfaction. Even though at the 
outset management felt the loan processing time to be slow, feedback from clients showed this was 
one of the stronger aspects of Bai Tushum’s loan delivery. In one specific area, a new office was 
opened, because customers complained about the access to finance (see p130). The marketing 
department found it could improve loan delivery through simpler means than what was originally 
designed in the pilot proposal.  
 
Second, the finding that customers complained about interest rates (p130, Table 21), led management 
to lower interest rates for new loans by 2% on average. “Marketing discounts on interest rates were 
given to retained customers”… “However, the campaign stopped in September 2010 because of the 
increased costs of funding, [in relation to the Kyrgyz political crises]” (M10b, Jan 2011; M11b, Jan 
2011). Thus, the customer loyalty campaign was not a lasting organizational change.  
 
At a presentation that I gave in August 2011, senior managers were surprised that customer 
satisfaction decreased over time and that exit clients were not inclined to take up new loans (see 
Figure 12). The variety of reasons for client exit made management interested to explore more data 
and we decided to do a training on data analysis for customer satisfaction and employment 
measurement. The project team realized “in the past management had never compared performance 
outcomes between active and exit clients” (Report, Nov 2011). Second, the company launched a large-
scale client satisfaction survey covering over 2000 clients, in 2011. An external agency administered 
the survey because management did not want to burden staff. The surveys allowed the company to 
have a better view on customer satisfaction (Bai Tushum, annual report Dec 2011). However, despite 
increased insight in the quality of services to improve customer satisfaction, not many concrete actions 
were undertaken. 
 
As discussed in Section 6.2, staff shared the assumption that larger loans created more jobs. However, 
my analysis suggested there was no relationship between loan size and job creation. Instead, the 
                                                 
68 - The project team leader highlighted “investors are send the report and M-Crill also used it.” – Discussion 
between myself and project team leader, Jan 2011 
- The “wage work information was used”... “We used it when we complete the questionnaire for investors and 
when investors are doing the due diligence, speak about the results with other investors.”- M11a, Aug 2011 
-"External parties are shared the information.” - M10c, Aug 2011 
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surveys found a reduction in wage employment generated by clients’ enterprises and hardly any 
correlation between changes in loan size and job creation. When presenting results to the management 
team, I asked what could have caused the reduction in wage employment (see Figure 14, p133). The 
result caused commotion and there was a strong reaction particularly from the CEO (Aug 2011) “in 
any other year if we would conduct the survey we would have positive job creation, but in this year of 
crises we have negative growth”… “A lot of clients migrated and this was the likely reason for the 
decline in jobs” (CEO July 2011). Other managers mentioned other factors could be responsible such 
as the reduction in trade, closure of borders and increased inflation. The first reaction was to explain 
the results as being caused by external factors rather than internal processes related to Bai Tushum’s 
activities and services (notes workshop, July 2011).  
 
Likewise when we prepared Figure 15 f, (p133), together with staff at training in data analysis, it took 
considerable time for the group to agree there was no apparent relationship between loan amount and 
job creation. After accepting the evidence other assumptions surfaced, some staff said job creation 
depended on sector, region, seasonality, gender. During the training each of these assumptions were 
tested.  
 
Several months later, the CEO mentioned it would be good to identify and target job-promoting 
companies such as SMEs and production activities (CEO Oct-2011; Bai Tushum 2011:22-24), see 
Figure 15e, (p133). In addition, the social rating and the ILO pilot revealed, “the social mission is fine, 
but the monitoring system is not well established.”… “There is no monitoring after the loan 
disbursement.” (CEO July 2011). This included incorporating employment indicators into the 
monitoring and loan screening systems (M11b July 2011; CEO July 2011, see Section 6.2).  
 
Perhaps the strongest form of learning was that the company became more modest about its capacity 
to create jobs. It was a reality check that “organizational changes are not easily correlated with [client 
level] outcomes” (Discussion workshop in Jordan, CEO, M11, Board member, June 2012).  
 
Having to deal with the new reality, a new problem arose. The MFO now had no positive evidence to 
demonstrate job creation to the public policy makers (see Section 6.2, p119). Rather than saying in the 
annual report that most clients didn’t create any jobs in this year, Bai Tushum opportunistically came 
up with a new estimate that “each USD 700 provide self-employment for the clients” (Bai Tushum 
2011:24). I will leave it up to the reader to judge whether this is conscious ‘mission marketing’ or 
lowering of standards in line with new reality checks, but it is clear the company as a social enterprise 




Implementing social performance initiatives had their costs and benefits. The CEO (July 2011) 
considered the main benefits of social performance management to be, first improvement of “quality 
of services we can provide to our clients”, [second] “it creates motivation for staff performance”, 
[Third], “customer satisfaction”.  The main costs related to human resources and the costs of data 
collection, specifically “The surveying time [particularly that] loan officers also need to dedicate their 
time.” [And the] “data audit, as without this we cannot have the right picture” CEO (July 2011). 
Indeed one key learning from the process was that more human resource capacity was required to 
implement the pilot assessment (see p129).   
 
As described at the outset management of the company expected the project to be a sustainable 
intervention (see Section 6.2, p119). However, in hindsight I would even say the pilot was never 
allowed to fail financially. Management decided to upscale the pilot after the baseline survey and 
before the first report was drafted. The company continued the pilot long after the ILO’s funding ran 
out (Feedback Chairman of the Board, Marketing Manager; June 2012, Jordan conference). The 
company adapted the pilot further by incorporating a microloan, SME and Corporate department 
offering more services at the front line (Feedback CEO, Chairman of the Board, Marketing Manager; 
June 2012, Jordan conference), but these changes were not based on the results of the assessment. It is 
likely the pilot would have been implemented even without the ILO project, but the assessment 
offered some value for the company to experiment with employment and other client level indicators.   
    
Over the period 2009 to 2012, the MFO remained financially strong; it achieved reasonable return on 
assets, operational self-sufficiency and portfolio at risk, despite experiencing a political crisis (see 
Figure 17). The growth in the loan portfolio continued in 2011 and as of December 2012, the 
company was reasonably on track with its ambitious growth planning (see 5.3.2., p97). New investors 
came on board in September 2011 and the company transformed into a bank allowing it to mobilize 
deposits. Over the period 2009 to 2012, managing the political crises, attracting investors, 
transforming into a deposit taking institution and maintaining portfolio quality and growth were key 
strategic priorities. The figure illustrates the loan portfolio grew much faster than the number of 
borrowers implying an increase in average loan size. Indeed, there was a strong increase in average 
loan size from 1,553 US$ in 2011 to 2,380 US$ in 2012, but whether this had created new jobs 









Figure 17 Growth of Bai Tushum  
 






















Number of borrowers 27,526 28,162 +636 
Gross loan portfolio Mln 
US$ 
38.1 63** +24.9 
Return on Assets 5.1% 0.8% -4.3% 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
130% 105% -25% 
Operational expenses/ 
assets  
7.3% 9.1% +1.6% 
Portfolio at Risk 30  2.7% 1.8% -0.9% 
  * Source Mix Market accessed 8-02-2013 and 11-08-2013.   
 
 
6.6. Concluding Remarks on Capacity for SPM  
 
Despite that several initiatives were undertaken, the capacity to do SPM remained limited and had not 
improved much from 2009 to June 2012. The lack of capacity to conduct client level assessment, 
particularly evidenced by the multi-task problem that staff experienced in combining their regular 
work activities with the pilot activities (see p122, p127), and limited time of staff for reflection 
(p129), led for an organization that had difficulties pursuing double bottom line management.  
 
When the assessment challenged the idea of mission achievement, it seemed management considered 
this a temporary setback. It continued operations under the assumption that next year results would be 
more positive under better external circumstances. However, there were limited organisational 
systems in place to ensure such job creation could be detected in the future, making the MFO in my 
view vulnerable to mission drift. The assessment revealed that job creation was based on an 

































When I asked the CEO at the end of the data collection (June 2011) what the reasons were to engage 
in SPM, she mentioned: “First for ourselves”…“ how to benefit the client and the company”, ….“to 
improve services and client satisfaction as part of corporate social responsibility. And to support 
today’s government and officials” (CEO Bai Tushum, June 2011) In addition, “We want to do social 
performance, not just because it’s fashion, but to improve services and systemize it” (CEO Bai 
Tushum, Oct 2011). Thus over time the external driver to support political agencies and improve 
institutional image remained, but a more internally driven agenda in the area of customer satisfaction 




Chapter VII. IMON Pilot  
 
7.1. Introduction   
 
This chapter will describe the pilot of IMON International and in doing so follows the same structure 
as the previous Chapter. Section 7.2 explains the pilot design and its broader aims in relation to SPM. 
Section 7.3 discusses the pilot implementation and management. Section 7.4 reports the key 
performance outcomes relevant for the organisation. Section 7.5 presents the main organisational 
learning in relation to empirical results. Section 7.6 makes concluding remarks about the capacity of 
the MFO to do SPM at the end of the pilot.   
 
7.2. Description of the Pilot  
 
The main findings of the diagnostic survey as described by IMON’s project team, were that the 
majority of clients lacked entrepreneurial skills, suffered from bad working conditions, had informal 
work activities and no membership in associations (Pilot proposal February 2011). Particularly, IMON 
found it a reality check that very few clients were aware of the NABWT (National Association for 
Business Women in Tajikistan).69 IMON presented ideas relating to entrepreneurship, formalization 
and working conditions, namely “Increasing of the level of education and training of [of women]… 
[moving] clients from informal sector into formal one and ensuring support from the side of the 
government; [and] creating of favorable conditions of work and new jobs” (Pilot proposal, 2009 Feb).   
The ILO requested IMON to be selective and the project team came up with the idea of piloting a 
start-up loan and entrepreneurship training for women.  
 
This idea was not new to the organisation. In 2007, the MFO had tested such a product with support 
from GTZ. This project showed there was a strong demand for start-up loans, but the pilot was 
considered unsuccessful because the training was very technical and many women did not start their 
business. “I think really after finishing the training the women were frightened, the materials were 
very technical and it was not interesting for women because they didn’t understand anything from the 
training” (M1b, July 2011). Out of 80 women attending the training sessions, only 20% took a loan 
from IMON (Discussions with the project team Nov 2008, Aug and Oct 2009). Key challenges were 
how make the product attractive for women. And second, how to integrate non-financial services into 
the lending program.   
                                                 
69 For example, only 2% of the clients were members of an association. And 64% of the clients even claimed 
there is no association in Tajikistan.  
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The pilot then became launching a women’s entrepreneurship training - the ILO GET AHEAD 
module - followed by start-up capital, with the aim to improve women’s empowerment and 
entrepreneurship. The training package would be offered in partnership with the NABWT. In October 
2009, an ILO consultant provided a training of trainers for 17 staff of the NABWT and IMON. The 
GET AHEAD module was chosen because of its strong gender component (Pilot proposal 23-06-
2009: 4). The module encourages joint learning for women based on real life experiences. It is a 
participatory training which involves basic marketing, bookkeeping and business planning (Bauer et al 
2008:1-2). Training materials were adjusted with IMON and NABWT staff to the context of Tajik 
microfinance. For example, the training duration was shortened from 5 days to 4 days because IMON 
staff expected women may not attend a full working week. The module included a set of mandatory 
and voluntary sessions that could be further adapted by the trainer to the needs of a group. As 
discussed among the project team, the ILO and myself, the training was aiming to improve the 
entrepreneurial skill, confidence and practices of women, and not necessarily only to start a 
completely new work activity (Participant observation, focus group discussion 2009; training of 
interviewers; methodology report Sep 2009). 
 
A counselling meeting took place to select women who would be eligible and interested in both the 
loan and training. After completion of the training sessions, women could submit a business plan and 
would be offered start-up capital. This entailed an individual loan up to US$ 7000 with similar 
conditions and eligibility criteria as other IMON loans, except that women would not need to have a 
business. Table 22 summarizes the terms and conditions of the loan.    
 
Table 22 Start-up Loan Product  
Methodology Individual 
Currency TJK and Indexed to US$ 
Min Interest Rate 28-32% (For Indexed Loans) 
Max Interest Rate 38-42% (For loans in TJS) 
Fees 0-1.5% 
Min amount 100 US$ 
Max loan amount US$ 7000  
Collateral Guarantee, movable property, real estate, jewellery 
* Adapted from Microfinanza (2010, July). 
 
IMON had wider social objectives for the pilot to mitigate social mission drift by improving their 
understanding of women’s demand for financial and non-financial services, female targeting, and by 
supporting women’s business activities (Innovation proposal 2009:2; Pilot summary Sep 2009; Focus 
group discussion Sep 2009). This was viewed to be part of an overall trend in Tajikistan of declining 
women’s entrepreneurship in the country (CEO, July 2009), see p107-108. As shown in Section 5.4 
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(Figure 9, p106) there was a sharp reduction in female borrowers over time for IMON as well as other 
Tajik MFOs. “In 2008 IMON was transformed into the commercial structure as a microlending 
organization. Offering financial services was the priority. Our organization goes only, how to say, in 
commercial directions and our social direction was lost. We saw a reduction in the women clients…. 
During this period we saw that the number of women in our portfolio dropping. And we wanted to 
find out new ideas and new areas of attracting new women clients (M1c, July 2011). As such “gender 
formed a big priority” (SM16a, July 2009), the project formed a response to a shared view that the 
company was drifting from its mission.  
 
Another reason to implement the pilot was to revive the link between IMON and the NABWT. As 
described in Section 5.4, (p105-105) compared to IMON, the NABWT had become a relatively small 
organization and by 2009, it had only 380 members. The aim was to strengthen the capacity of the 
business association and to “encourage [IMON] clients to become NABWT members” (Pilot proposal 
2009 June: 1).   
 
The main motivation to capacitate the NABWT seemed to be the historical importance of women´s 
business association for the management in IMON. As described in Section 5.4.5 (p110), most of the 
senior managers in the company started their career in the association. It was also a shareholder and 
co-founder of the MFO (Microfinanza 2010:17, see p107). Staff felt connected with the association, 
being described by one of them as “the roots of IMON” (SM 16a, Oct 2009). As mentioned by a 
manager of NABWT (SM15, Aug 2011), “ [IMON] Staff should be aware of the association as it is 
part of the history of the organization.…. It is important for staff to know the story of the association.” 
This does not mean that external stakeholders didn’t matter, after all the NABWT’ mission was to 
lobby with political institutions (see p105). But the dominant driver to increase cooperation between 
the two organisations seemed to come from internal rather than external factors. It also supported the 
idea that IMON had an inward looking organisational culture (see Section 5.4.4, p107 to Section 5.5, 
p115).   
 
For IMON the expectation for financial performance was less ambitious when compared to Bai 
Tushum. “This innovation is not financially profitable for IMON, but has a more social nature. 
Through this innovation we expect to improve the economic situation of our clients and increase their 
enterprise and gender literacy…, IMON considers that probably after two years of successful 
implementation of the innovation, the operations under this new package should reach financial 
stability” (Pilot proposal, June 2009: 12-13).  
 
The project team consisted of staff from several departments including the marketing manager, the 
head of NABWT, the regional manager and deputy CEO (IMON pilot proposal June 2009:7&14-15). 
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Costs of surveying based were estimated to be US$20 per woman. The cost of the was estimated at 
US$39 per participant. For participants the training was free of charge. The team estimated the total 
project financing at US$ 173,976. The ILO financed 40% of the costs and sponsored the social 
performance assessment and 36 entrepreneurship trainings. IMON contributed 60% of the funds, 
which included managing a start-up loan fund of US$ 100,000, and financing 11 training sessions. For 
the company the budget was relatively small, consisting of 0,5% of the annual revenue. IMON’s 
management seemed committed to the project as it invested financial and human resources and the 
start-up loan itself was viewed to be a relatively risky intervention for the organisation.   
 
At the outset in 2009, the ILO project was the largest initiative in social performance management, but 
the company also wanted to adopt client protection principles and conduct a social audit and rating 
(SM16a, Oct 2009, see p112). Furthermore, in terms of financial objectives, the MFO wanted to 
transform into a microcredit deposit agency and maintain portfolio quality and growth targets (see 
p112, Section 5.4.2). 
 
7.3. Implementation of Pilot Assessment   
 
Having described the pilot design, I will now describe the assessment strategy at the outset, (7.3.1) 
followed by a description of what was actually implemented (7.3.2) and assessed (7.3.3).70  
 
7.3.1. The Initial Assessment Strategy in 2009  
 
 
The assessment aimed to identify women’s demand for loans and non-financial services. What factors 
were important for women to apply for start-up capital and implement their business idea. Second, we 
aimed to assess the effects of the training on women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship. We 
expected that the training sessions would have a stronger impact for those participants receiving 
training and loans, when compared to those who only received the training (pilot summary 2009).  
 
For the ILO and myself the question of impact was relevant in order to understand whether the 
product had its desired social effects. The ILO needed to keep the methodology in line with the other 
MFOs and had to justify it to their donor agency. The degree to which impact measurement was 
relevant for IMON is described later in this chapter, but similar to Bai Tushum we had to deal with 
several practical limitations and tensions between impact assessment methodology and pilot 
implementation.    
                                                 
70 Several Tables and Graphs in section 7.3 and 7.4. and Appendix II formed the basis for a report (ILO 2013b, 




The first constraint was that given the human resource capacity of IMON it was not practically 
feasible to implement the marketing campaign, training and interviews within several weeks. The 
project team expected that in a period of six months up to 512 women could be trained across the 
country of which up to 300 could take the loan (IMON sampling note 2011; pilot proposal 2009). 
Rolling out the product meant deviating from an ideal impact design where measurement is done at 
similar points in time (e.g. every six months). The project team insisted on gradually implementing the 
pilot.   
 
In ideal impact measurement, which the ILO and myself initially preferred, we would randomly select 
half of the training applicants into a treatment group and the other half into a control group to 
minimize selection bias. However, this raised some practical problems for IMON, first the company 
would need to find a sufficient number of women interested in the product in order to reach the 
required sample size of 745 to 1145 people. At this stage in the research, we didn’t know exactly how 
many women would be interested in the product and the project team highlighted it had limited human 
resources to conduct interviews.  
 
Second, we had discussions about how ethical it was to randomize women into start-up loan products. 
As I explained to the project manager one view holds that when there is more demand than placement 
for the pilot, it is highly ethical, as every person that applies for the product has an equal chance of 
receiving it. Another view stresses it is unethical to offer participants a product and then (de-) select 
them by lottery.71 This perspective highlights that development practice does not take place in a 
laboratory setting. For IMON’s project manager it was important to support women who were highly 
interested in setting up a business. Also the start-up loan was perceived to be a risky product for both 
the clients as well as the MFO. So IMON’s project manager did not want to randomize control and 
treatment group because it was considered impractical and unethical, and both myself and the ILO 
representative agreed to this (notes from a meeting 11-09-2009, Bishkek conference). To drop the 
control group was not an option for the ILO. So, given these constraints, the ILO, the project team and 
me, opted for the more practical solution of matching the comparison group to existing first time 
borrowers. In the absence of randomized controlled sampling, the impact estimates would be subject 
to a selection bias. 
   
Sample Size and Dates of Data Collection 
 
For every client that received training – the treatment group – an existing female borrower was 
matched into a comparison group using the management information system.  All women in the 
                                                 
71 To my knowledge the only RCT for start-up businesses is Mel et al (2009), but they research cash transfers 
not loans and this is less risky for end-beneficiaries.   
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comparison group had entered the program in January 2009 and were new first time borrowers. We 
intended to match clients on branch, age category, marital status and highest level of education.72 Up 
to 512 women would be in the treatment group, of which the project team expected that around 59% 
would take a loan. Up to 400 existing female borrowers who were already self-employed could be 
selected as a comparison group. We aimed to conduct a baseline survey before the training and three 
follow-up surveys to be conducted every six months.   
 
Key Social Performance Indicators and Survey  
 
The survey contained over 23 indicators related to the client’s household, business and work activities, 
association, entrepreneurial skills and customer satisfaction. Key performance indicators interesting 
for the project team related to the demand and barriers to business start-up, women’s entrepreneurship 
and empowerment, and the business case of the pilot. We adapted a list of survey questions from a 
variety of literature on entrepreneurship and empowerment (Johnson 2003:265; Nelson et al 2004; 
Banerjee 2009; Karlan and Valdivia 2006; 2009) as well as the ILO tools such as the diagnostic 
survey (see Section 3.5). Staff reduced the draft survey to a core set of questions and we tested it in 
the field upon several occasions.   
 
We had considerable discussion about how to measure “entrepreneurship” and we agreed to use 
several metrics. It was relatively easy to track whether women started their business ideas, but it was 
more complex to detect whether women improved their “entrepreneurial skills”. In an attempt to 
measure this, we decided to use self-assessment tools in combination with looking at several business 
practices. I will come back to some of these indicators later when discussing issues of data quality. 
 
We agreed that one definition of empowerment is “the process of women to boost their confidence, 
improve control over decision making and bargaining power and perceptions of possibilities in the 
household” (adapted from Mayoux 2000: 17). Women who were married were asked, ‘who decides 
about the use of a certain expense in the household?’ (Adapted from Johnson 2003: 265). For analysis, 
I designed three indexes relating to control in the household decision-making over small expenses (i.e. 
food, clothes, school fees and health expenses), large expenses (i.e. the purchase of a car, real estate 
and large business expenses) and financial services and earnings (i.e. loans, savings, earnings and 
                                                 
72 These indicators were chosen as matching variables as they were easily measurable and likely correlated with 
empowerment and entrepreneurship outcomes. (See for example for further reading, Heckman et al. 1997; 
Djankov et al. 2008).  
In trying to reduce selection bias further, we asked women in the comparison group; whether they would have 
liked to participate in entrepreneurship training when they started their business. We only selected women who 





working time).73 We had discussions with the project team on whether it was better to select only 
female interviewers as this may reduce the response bias for women empowerment outcomes.74 Based 
on recommendations of the CEO (2009) we selected both male and female senior staff with good 
communicative skills. Staff conducted the interviews in the first language of the interviewees, either 
Tajik, Uzbek or Russian. Female staff (74%) conducted the majority of interviews. Women were 
interviewed alone and not in the presence of their spouse in 97% of the cases. I attempted to control 
for differences in interview setting in the final estimations if needed.   
 
To measure the business case for the start-up loan we looked at the actual cost of training, the 
percentage of participants taking the loan, and customer exit and satisfaction.  
 
7.3.2. Management of the Pilot Implementation  
 
Having described the initial assessment strategy, I now turn to the pilot implementation. The project 
team divided the tasks, the marketing department coordinated data collection, the credit management 
department disbursed start-up loans and the NABWT offered entrepreneurship trainings. The team 
changed its leader three times, from the Southern Branch Manager (2009), to the marketing manager 
(2010) and the business development manager (2011), but team leaders seemed to transfer their tasks 
properly. Management kept oversight of the process of implementation as part of an overall action 
plan for incorporating social performance management into the operations of the MFO.  
   
In January 2011, objectives with regard to female targeting were incorporated into staff incentive 
systems, in relation to the feedback from the social rating report. First, “the number of female clients 
should not be less than 50% by the end of next year. Second, in 2011 every branch has to disburse no 
less than 100 start-up loans." (M1b, Jan 2011). Bonuses were given “for disbursement of rural, 
women, agriculture and small loans” (SM 16b, credit manager, July 2011). Staff interviewed seemed 
aware of the targets because they were part of their bonus systems.75  
                                                 
73 Based on exploratory factor analysis, a women’s empowerment index was computed on the basis of questions 
11 to 20. The variables were recoded into 0-10 scale and missing values were taken out.  
Index 1: Earnings and Financial Services use (Q17+Q18+Q19+Q20)/Maximum score 
Index 2: Small expenses (Q11,12,13)/Maximum score 
Index 3: Large expenses (Q14+Q15)/Maximum score 
A score of 0 would indicate the husband has sole responsibility; 20 the husband major and wife minor 
responsibility; 60 if equal responsibility; 80 if wife major and husband minor; 100 if Wife sole responsibility. 
 
74 For example studies have shown that matching gender can lead to a substantial reduction of human bias 
(Karlan and Zinman 2007). 
 
75 - “The social audit and rating translated into an action plan.”… “Staff bonuses are now based on social 
criteria… First for number of start-up loans. Second, loan given to women. Third loans below a certain amount 
of money. …- ”IMON included start-up loan disbursement into their bonus system" [to ensure rolling out the 




In August 2010, the human resource department implemented a gender policy for staff that included 
“special focus to women’s empowerment and a high percentage of female staff” (M1b, Jan 2011). 
“The goal is to have 50% of the staff to be female” (SM11, July 2011). The policy meant, “If 
screening shows women and men are [equally] suitable then we will try to hire women“(SM11, July 
2011). The HR Manager also reflected on gendered barriers in loan delivery systems: “Sometimes 
[clients] say the job of loan experts is not one for women, but then they understand that we work a lot 
with women [loan experts]” (SM11, July 2011). Nonetheless, when conducting the training for 
interviewers in October 2009, I observed strong gender norms of staff members.  
 
The project team implemented a qualitative reporting system for trainers to feed back results of the 
entrepreneurship training. “After every training we provide a report to the Business Development 
Manager and first deputy of the general director, who is also director of NABWT.” …”They look for 
the effectiveness of the training. [For example it shows], “How many of the women took the actual 
loan?.... “We explain the organisation of the training. We explain the participants what ideas they had 
and came up….. At the end of the training did she change here opinion? Does she have new ideas? 
What could be improved and be done better?” (M10, July 2011). Other feedback systems introduced 
for staff included incorporating social performance in the training program, special awards for 
branches, distributing an IMON newsletter and test knowledge of staff on social performance (SM 
16b, July 201176; SM17b, July 2011). Thus, a mixture of hard and soft staff incentive systems was 
implemented.  
 
Staff had a good awareness of the pilot and implemented it according to the initial plan (Participant 
observation, Aug 2011). Each branch was marketing the product for two weeks using television, radio, 
newspapers and advertisement channels. They organized counselling meetings to see whether women 
were eligible for a start-up loan. The screening process would be similar to a normal loan except that 
women did not need to submit a business plan. After forming a group of 12, the training could start at 
the branches or head quarter. The training took four consecutive days. After completion of the training 
women may decide to start-up their business and apply for the loan.  The actual loan pick-up rate for 
the treatment group was 57%, (slightly lower than the expected rate of 59%). Although the project 
                                                                                                                                                        
- “In August 2010 social strategic plan was made and the percentage of female clients is part of this plan.” - 
SM11, July 2011 
- For employees of branches there is a social bonus and there are indicators for making new workplaces.“ When 
twelve participants take a start-up loan then employees can get the bonus. This is why everybody is interested in 
this. - M10, July 2011.  
 
76  - “We include social performance in the training program” – (Credit Manager, SM16b, July 2011) 
- Every six months we test branch and staff knowledge through on-line assessment. [We] “put in social impact 




team expected to train up to 512 in six months, the company managed to train 486 women in nine 
months.  
 
The three months delay in implementation had consequences for the assessment as the data collection 
needed to be finished in December 2011. Because of this, the ILO, IMON and I, decided to reduce the 
number of follow-up surveys from three to two (email April 2010). Instead of conducting an extra 
client level survey, the project team asked to use the remainder of the budget to finance 36 additional 
trainings. The ILO agreed to this because it contributed to the continuation of the pilot (email 
correspondences, April-June 2010).  
 
Trainers were positive about the training module; they found it participatory and non- technical as 
well as sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the needs of the group. One trainer mentioned “The 
modules are very interesting … it is in easy language. It is a good philosophy. First it is games, then it 
is fun and participatory. It was very interesting for [the women]. They all participated in these games, 
they all laughed and gave information about gender” (M10, July 2011).77 Several trainers reported 
participants liked the training.78  Some of them experienced positive effects for clients relating to the 
training.79 For example, one manager said, “Many of the women were explaining that they can 
exchange their opinions and experiences”…. “Our training was very useful, because many [women] 
before never got out of their houses, they didn’t do another work, just the housework.” (M10, July 
2011) Other staff said they themselves learned from offering the trainings to clients. 80 For example, 
one trainer mentioned, “I learned a lot from case studies, just how women start a business. How they 
become an entrepreneur and how they work under difficult economic situations.”… “It helps you to 
understand the competences of the experienced entrepreneurs.” (SM11, July 2011).  
                                                 
77 - “I really like the material that was implemented by the ILO. The training is more sensitive and practical for 
village women…. “The training process is more game playing, more understandable for women in rural 
Tajikistan. It was not technical.” - M1c, July 2011 
- Good training objective, and it is interactive which is good. [I liked the] “Role playing game. Good, simple 
information for rural areas.”... ”Easy understandable for clients and easy for trainers.” – SLO 13, July 2011 
 
- For example one staff member liked that “ we have a large selection of exercises but then it is up to us to make 
a selection.” - SM11, July 2011. 
78  - “I speak with the women after the training and many say thank you, I didn’t know how to do planning and 
analyses”. [Second, trainings are successful when]  we see that all participants stay for the training, -SM11, July 
2011. 
- “Most of the clients liked the training.” - SLO3, July 2011 
 
79 - “After training it is explained that women and men have equal rights. They can work, they can study, ..they 
had questions and received answers.” … “After training women understand how to sell and put prices on 
products. They understand how to calculate expenses…and what is the net profit.”… - M10, July 2011 
- The women learn from other women, and share experiences. ..[For example, in one exercise] one person will 
mention the problem and another person will provide an answer.”    - SM11, July 2011. 
 
80 - “I had a chance to talk with the people. It was good for me.”…[And it was] “Good for the women clients to 





On the other hand, there were barriers in launching the product. First, several participants complained 
about the duration of the training because it was difficult for them to attend four consecutive days.81 
Staff wanted to shorten the training to make it more attractive for women to participate. One senior 
loan officer argued this would reduce the effects of the training because there is less time for 
participants to prepare a business plan (SLO13, July 2011). As mentioned by a senior manager, “We 
have to analyse if we can shorten it and do mainly the basis of the training. Maybe for a shorter period 
and then after that have somebody [follow up and] analyse the proposals“ (SM11, July 2011). Second, 
in some regions there was a low frequency of trainings because of insufficient demand or lack of 
available trainers.82 Low training frequency resulted in a waiting period and in turn delayed the loan 
application time.83  
 
Third, there seemed barriers related to gender norms in Tajikistan; “The mentality is that it is difficult 
for women to start their own work and some of the members said it is difficult to pay back (M9, July 
2011). Another staff member highlighted “women work at home…  [because of] the Islamic influence 
and influences from the husband and the father” (SLO 7, July 2011). Sometimes the mindset in 
Tajikistan was that “start-up business is not the women’s job” (M1c, June 2012). Moreover, women 
often needed permission from their husband to join the training. 84 Several staff recommended it 
                                                 
81 -  “Participants and me did not like the period and duration of training. Because I work here and I can’t be off 
my main work for so long. We want to make it shorter.” - M10, July 2011 
- “The clients did not like that it is a four day training. They would say I have a business and can we make a 
four-day training.” – SM11, July 2011 
- “Sometimes it was difficult to organize a group.”…. [Second] “Because all women are housewife they have to 
take care of the children. This caused problems when their children were sick and had to go to hospitals. Some 
women would always be late, or feel uncomfortable during the training because they worried about their 
children.” - M14, July 2011 
- “A training of 3-4 days is very long for women.” ….“Instead of four days, provide a two day training. 
[Because] Women are very busy and should be in the home to take care of the children.” … - SLO 6, July 2011 
- She would recommend to: “To reduce the nr of days to 2 days or reduce the nr of hours per day.” We can use 
more trainers.” –SLO7, July 2011 
- “We could do the training for 2 days if the loan officers would follow up with the individual plans.”- M9, July 
2011  
 
82 - “To train more trainers would be more effective. Some regions have no or only one trainer.”- M10, July 
2011  
 
83 - “The disbursement takes too long.” -SLO 5, July 2011.   
- “Groups selection of 4-5 women would be easier”....For most of the clients it takes too much time to provide 
the loans…. “Most of the women who apply for training go to another organization.” – SLO 3 July 2011.  
 
84 - “Both wife and husband are curious about the product and training participation…The husband would be 
checking if the wife participated.” - M14, July 2011 
- As pointed out by a trainer “women prefer to have their husbands to come to the training. [However at the 
same time] “many women don’t like to sit down and talk about gender in the presence of their husbands.” - 




would be good to include the husband in the training or to develop a product for men.85 In the 
Istaravchan branch that was successful in disbursing start-up loans, staff deliberately promoted the 
product to both the husband and the wife as a way “to encourage the women“(M14, July 2011).  
 
A related challenge was that women lacked proper documentation requirements for the loan. Several 
women, especially in the Southern branches had expired passports that sometimes dated from the 
Soviet Union. “They don’t apply for a new passport because they fear fines from the government and 
tax inspectors for not having a good registration” (SLO 6, July 2011).86 It appeared to be part of a 
wider issue that formalisation itself was gendered. One manager said women cannot go to the 
government institutions without their husbands’ support. “Women cannot work without the men’s 
protection.’’ … “because in our government in some higher places especially work only men.” (M8, 
July 2011). One key challenge in product implementation was how to involve the local municipality in 
the launch of the product (M1, June 2012). I will come back to these points in the Section 7.5.  
  
7.3.3. Management of the Social Performance Assessment   
 
Having described the challenges in pilot assessment implementation, I will now describe the actual 
assessment starting with the sampling, data quality and experience of the process of implementation.  
 
Sampling and Matching 
 
At baseline survey treatment and comparison groups were somewhat similar [i.e. not statistically 
different] for several indicators, namely empowerment, nationality, educational level of woman and 
spouse, region, type of income sources, husband and spouse working, spouse migration, level of 
awareness of the NABWT, and several business practices.  
 
However, as shown in Table 23, there were also strong statistical differences between the two groups. 
For example, the treatment group included wage employed and unemployed women, while the 
comparison group mainly consisted of self-employed female clients. A higher portion of registered 
                                                 
85 - “Why can we sometimes not take also the men into the group”. - SLO 5, July 2011 
- “Many  men are interested in the start-up loan.”  - SLO 6, July 2011. 
- “Many men also like to have a start-up loan and ask us why we don’t offer a start-up loan for men…. Maybe 
we will prepare a start-up loan for men.”- SM11, July 2011 
 
86 “to have an easier documentation procedure.”… - SLO6, July 2011  
- “If women don’t have a passport they cannot get the loan.” - M9, July 2011  
 - “Several women had only copies of their Soviet passport, not a new passport.” The costs to get a new passport 
from the municipality is only 15 US$, but the problem is that they fear punishment from the government or tax 
inspectors for not having a good registration. – SLO6, July 2011. 
- “Most of the women want to start right now.” [But] “many lack documentation, photos, do not pay taxes, and 
need to pay to rent a place. Women are scared because of these conditions and it increases the cost to participate. 
Also most clients work part-time, yet a full time business is a requirement of IMON” – SLO 3, July 2011.   
152 
 
businesses and years of entrepreneurship experience in the comparison group further evidenced it. In 
some regions it was not possible to complete the matching on age because there weren’t enough 
young women in IMON’s customer base. The comparison group was more rural, slightly younger and 
less often married.  
 
For analysis, I compared women who received training and were offered a loan (TG) with a 
comparison group (CG) of female borrowers that did not receive entrepreneurship training. We will 
then make a distinction between TG1, who received only training but did not access the loan, and 
TG2, who received the training and accessed the loan. It is expected that the TG2 is more comparable 
to the CG because women in both groups have entrepreneurship activities. I will show the changes in 
performance indicators over time.  
 
Further econometric analysis was conducted using a difference-in-difference model with control 
variables (see Appendix). I do not claim that the DiD estimators generated causal effects because there 
may have been other (unobserved) factors instead of the training that caused differences in the 
outcomes of the two groups. For example, the comparison and treatment groups may have 
experienced different trends that could not be fully controlled for.   
 
Table 23 Differences Between TG and CG at Baseline Survey 
 TG TG1 TG2 CG 
Description New female IMON 
clients that want to 




training & loan  
1st time female borrowers that have a 
business and received a loan after Jan 
2009 
 
% Self-employment 54% 50% 58% 99% 
Average Age 36 35 36 37 years 
Average years of 
business  experience 
 
4,7 4,2 4,9 6,7 years 
% Married  65% 59% 70% 76% 
% Rural 54% 50% 57% 41% 




The biggest challenge in interviewing according to the marketing manager was that it was difficult to 
find interviewees. Especially it was problematic to interview the groups of women who did not start a 
business, or who exited the IMON loan program (M1, June 2012).87  Indeed, dropout was not random, 
                                                 
87 - “client exit, migration was a big challenge when we organized the interview process. Especially it takes 
much big time to search the clients.” - M1c, July 2011. 
- “Find it difficult to find clients.” - M12, July 2011.  




for example, it was much higher for TG1 (50% compliance rate), compared to TG2 (85% compliance 
rate). As shown in Table 24, this explains why at the second follow-up survey drop out is higher for 
the treatment group (70%) than the comparison group (75%). Given the dropouts, I estimated 
performance outcomes both on the full sample of completed interviews (904 at base line and 652 at 
second follow-up survey) and for the survivor sample (652 at baseline and 652 at second follow-up 
survey). Often this influenced the magnitude of impacts but not their direction.    
 
For the second follow-up survey, interviews for the TG were completed two months later than 
interviews for the CG. Controlling for the month in which the interview was conducted changed the 
magnitude of the impact estimates, but not its (positive or negative) direction.  
   
Table 24 Compliance of Interviews  




 N N N% N N%  
Baseline 904 486 100% 418 100% Oct 2009-April 2010 
Follow-up Survey I 791 423 87% 368 88% May-Dec 2010 
Follow-up Survey II 652 340 70% 312 75% Jan 2011-Oct 2011 
 
 
Data Quality  
 
Most staff found the questions in the survey clear and understandable88, nonetheless several mentioned 
it took a lot patience for both themselves and the clients to complete the interviews. As one loan 
officer highlighted, “most of the clients are not educated and I had to explain a lot” (SLO4, July 
2011). Another said, “Maybe some clients can’t answer, or don’t understand it, but they say “yes” or 
“no”.”….  “We needed a lot of patience and understanding to explain” (SLO7, July 2011). In addition, 
several clients did not always have time to do the interviews and did not like to answer the same 
questions every six months.89 This meant staff had to deviate from the survey language. 
 
Not all questions in the survey worked well. Surprisingly, at baseline survey women in the training 
group self-reported stronger entrepreneurial skills than the comparison group even though they had 
less business experience. Staff highlighted training participants may have showed a too optimistic 
                                                 
88 - “the interview was good  and it was relaxed. Women answered to all of the questions. No problems with the 
questions.”  - SLO6, July 2011. 
-  “The survey starts with simple questions.” - SLO13, July 2011. 
- “Small questionnaire, but it has very good information.” - SLO5, July 2011   
 
89 - Clients "don’t like the same question every 6 months". - SLO3, July 2011  
- Sometimes “women feel this questions is repeated.” [Second], women “don’t like it because of time.” - M8b, 
July 2011. 
- ‘It takes for the clients half an hour of their time. Before we conducted focus group discussions, which is more 




picture because they did not want to appear weak entrepreneurs.90 Also some questions were difficult 
to answer for training participants who did not own a business.91 It was also difficult for interviewees 
to estimate net income.92 Indeed, at baseline, 21% of the sample did not report their net income and 
the question was not taken up in the final analysis. Therefore, despite testing the survey, several 
performance indicators could not be tracked over time and others needed to be dropped from the 
assessment.  
 
At the outset, we decided that men could interview women (see Section 7.3.1, p147), however in 
August 2011 the majority of interviewers reflected that it is better for data quality to have female 
interviewers.93 Sometimes the husband needed to be informed because they were suspicious of the 
interviews.94 In a small number of cases, there were incidents when husbands were weary of their 
wives being interviewed by another man.  
                                                 
90 - “Entrepreneurial skills questions (Questions 30 and 33) for the treatment group was not clearly understood.” 
…. “And may not be a correct response”…. other interviewers also mentioned it is difficult to assess 
entrepreneurial skills. The problem may be , “women want to look more great that they are. Don’t want to share 
the weaknesses at any time.” - M1b, Jan 2011  
 
91 - The question on business planning women don’t understand if they do not have an enterprise.” - SLO3, July 
2011  
- “For example on business planning was difficult to understand because women never thought about it.” - 
SLO13, July 2011 
 
92 - “Sometimes it is difficult to answer net income, women know it is better or worse than last month. But they 
don’t know how to calculate.” - M12, July 2011 
- “Net income can be hard to estimate.” - SLO4, July 2011 
 
93 - “For us men it was very hard to conduct interviews with the women. When I call some women do not feel 
comfortable. We always tried to conduct such interviews with women, if not we searched into ways how to 
make the interview comfortable… But in some parts we did the interviews by men because the gender situation 
in these regions is very bad. So it was also one challenge in interviewing was the questions of gender.” - M1c, 
July 2011 
- “Sometimes the Marketing Manager asked us to call to women. In Tajikistan it is not the tradition for women 
to talk to other men. From that time, we decided that for the research it is better if it is women and women.” - 
SM11, July 2011 
-  It was also difficult for men to interview women. [The norm is] “I am the man, I have the rule, when a woman 
interviews a woman it is easier. Because most woman are ashamed for men.” – SLO4, July 2011 
-  “There was one case where he wanted to do an interview, but the husband was drunk. He conducted the 
interview on a different day.”  - SLO13, July 2011  
 
94 - “We had such situation that we called to the husband and it was quite hard to organise the interviews with 
the women that [just] got married”…”Some even said that if you come to my house my husband will beat me. 
And in this situation we just marked the questionnaire that the woman doesn’t agree with the interview.”… “I 
came across this 6-8 times because the group of women that were getting married was quite high in our TG.” - 
M1c, July 2011. 
- When I go to a client house, the neighborhood is curious and the interviewee felt bad” - SLO3, July 2011. 
 - “Most of the time the husband is angry or disagrees. The husband won’t let [women] take the loan. The 
husband would do it only if he could benefit, but most of the time he said we can’t do a loan.” - SLO4, July 
2011 
- “During the interviews the husband thinks that were are looking if women are pursing loans after training.” -





Experiences and Learning by Staff 
 
Staff felt they were given sufficient time to administer the surveys and conduct trainings.95 In one 
branch staff had to work on weekends.96 Interviewers were satisfied with the bonus.97 Partly because 
the pilot and interviews were implemented on a rolling basis, staff could combine it with their routine 
activities.  
 
However, the marketing manager mentioned; “I feel that my time when I worked with the project, it 
was not enough. We have many different tasks to do. … I only coordinated the process. I did not have 
the time to go very depth into the project…. I was in the project not 100 percent, but about 60 percent” 
(M1c, July 2011). In particular, for the marketing department it seemed difficult to combine the 
responsibilities of public relations, marketing and managing the assessment.  
 
Staff interviewed (10 out of 10) found it useful to conduct trainings and interviews and many felt it 
had changed their regular way of working. Several appreciated the support given to women to help 
them to set up a business. Others felt doing the trainings and interviews helped their understanding of 
women’s entrepreneurship and customer satisfaction because it generated feedback from the clients. 98 
For example, one loan officer mentioned, “it is useful to understand the needs for training for women. 
                                                 
95 - She was able to do this during the daily work. - SLO3 July 2011 
- He did not work in the weekends, sometimes he needed to work extra hours - SLO4, July 2011 
 
96 - I was " mainly using weekends to work and conduct a lot of the interviews." …" less than 5 times I had to 
work on Saturday." [or she would come earlier to work and use the extra hour of work at the end of the day for 
the interviewing.] - M12, July 2011  
-“Sometimes it was difficult and we had to work extra on Saturdays.”…”Two Times it happened that I worked 
on Saturday until 12:00.” - SLO13, July 2011 
- 3-4 weekends she had to work. - M14, July 2011 
 
97 - “She received the payment. At baseline 5 TJS for TG and 7 TJS for control group. For the second follow-up 
survey she will receive 7 TJS for TG and 7 for CG”. - M12, July 2011 
- “It would be a good encouragement to increase the training fee because given trainings is very energetic work. 
I conduct the trainings from Friday to Sunday.” - SLO13 July 2011 
- “We had so many clients coming in that it affects our salaries positively. - M14, July 2011 
  
98 - “He now knows about the strong, medium and weak clients.” – SLO4, July 2011  
-[It was interesting to see] "The large need for money. The first loan cycle the loan is a problem and for clients 
from second loan cycles the loan is less of a problem. " – SLO5, July 2011 
-She heard “Good Words about services in the organisation.“ – SLO 6, July 2011  
- “some questions, the persons starts to think about and gets interested in the trainings. For example they were 
more interested in the other trainings of NABWT.” … [And later in the interview] “My experience from Mercy 
Corps is that it is important to have trainings and researches. This to provide information for people to receive 
new loans and see how it affects their economic development… This makes me learn a lot of microfinance..” - 
SLO13, July 2011 
-“Several control group clients were also interested to receive trainings.” - M14, July 2011 
- “It’s good to understand ..why clients are going to other organisations. Interviews in general are an opportunity 




They included accounting, taxes and business planning” (SLO7, July 2011). Another said, “we found 
information about the social status of women and their changes… For what are women spending 
money. How do they manage expenses, who manages the expenses. [Also] How they understand the 
loan and what they would like to change in it…. [And to see whether] women can take initiatives into 
their own hands [as entrepreneurs]”. … "It is very good for us because we understand the view of 
women who like to work and who have a business" (M8, July 2011). Some staff found it important 
that female targeting increased their bonuses.99 Another loan officer “liked the training in 
interviewing” (SLO 6, July 2011).  Others used questions and interview techniques from the survey to 
screen new clients.100  One manager found it “nice to meet the clients. “ because her job didn’t require 
much client level interaction (M12, July 2011).  
 
All staff interviewed (10 out of 10) could accurately describe the mission statement of the company. 
Several had a normative perspective on empowerment, they highlighted women should become 
independent, confident and have control over decision-making.101 Others mentioned the practical 
barriers and norms constraining women’s empowerment and entrepreneurship. Particularly women 
lacked access to education and employment opportunities. There were perceptions in Tajikistan that 
                                                 
99 - It is good for our work to. "..."For example we have bonuses for women targeting, so it’s good for us to 
understand also the need for women. Because it is for our work and the results also lead to a bonus. " - M8b, 
July 2011  
- She like  “bonuses are offered “ to her. - M12, July 2011 
 
100 - “He uses some of the questions for the clients. When they come to the office.” [and apply for a new loan]  
SLO4, Rudaki 
- [He liked] the questions on the business planning, women’s empowerment, and income sources for the 
household. …."I also use some questions a lot when working. Sometimes when we introduce ourselves with the 
customers we now observe better their character. The interview questions and techniques are helpful here. "Q6 
we use for daily work, Q10-Q20 who control the household income. Q33 on entrepreneurial skills."- SLO5, July 
2011 
-  “We used some of the questions in the screening process.” [For example,] “additional sources of income of 
family. “ - SLO7, July 2011 
- Clients can get a loan on the basis of the information in the survey. - SLO3, July 2011 
 
101  - “Women empowerment is about the level of decision-making of women and their self-confidence in the 
household.” - M1b, Jan 2011. 
- “Knowledge is power. When a woman is not doing housework, but works for herself, she will be empowered. 
[Many Tajik] women work just for her husband and children and do all work as homework. It is because of that 
that IMON is looking for a start-up of business so they can make their life better and do what they like to do”. - 
M10, July 2011 
- “In Tajikistan the best woman entrepreneur is one which is economically independent. She has no problems in 
understanding with the family and husband. … She plans for the future and she needs to understand basic 
economics, costs and revenue. And of course she would need good communication and system and effective 
route with other systems, partners, competition.” - SM11, July 2011. 
 - Some women are very confident. Some are more attached to the family so the financial decisions are made in 




men and women in practice do not have equal rights.102 Staff had a good awareness of the pilot and 
gender aspects (participant observation, Aug 2011).  
 
Because of positive feedback from staff, the project team decided to continue trainings after the 
baseline survey (email 2010).  “According to the results of conducted trainings we have received a 
good feedback as on the part of clients as well as on the part of trainers and have seen efficiency and 
usefulness of these trainings. At this stage of the project and analysing new demand from new women 
clients, we do not wish to stop on our achievements and we plan to actively to promote “GET Ahead” 
trainings and correspondingly to finance new women clients by ‘Start-up’ loan product. ….“After the 
end of the [ILO] project IMON plans annually to conduct a minimum of 90 trainings” (Project team 
leader e-mail June 2010).103 In other words, the company decided to scale-up the program.  
 
In July 2011, additional staff was hired for the marketing department (from 2 to 4 persons) and the 
NABWT (from 2 to 5 persons). IMON launched a new business development service and recruited a 
manager that coordinated the trainings. Although the initial plan was to conduct training sessions 
through external consultants hired by the NABWT, management decided to institutionalize training 
capacity within IMON. As highlighted by the BDS manager “All trainers are now in-house trainers” 
(M9, July 2011). The company designated an own fund of US$ 35,000 for conducting the trainings 
(M1d, July 2012). Furthermore, with completion of a new head office and the enlargement of other 






                                                 
102  - "There are no employment opportunities for women that want to work.” - SLO3 July 2011 
- Most of the ladies want to work and study, but their husbands don’t let them. "The husband won’t let them take 
the loan. The husband would do it only if he could benefit, but most of the time he said we can’t do a loan. "....  
- SLO4, July 2011 
-  "It is part of our tradition that women are lower than men... In Tajikistan we have few women who are 
educated and know about their rights. In the villages, few women can study. They are in the lower status… 
“women have to take care of the children” is the mentality - SLO6, July 2011 
She thinks that women first should be educated - SLO7, July 2011 
- “if women don´t know about the rights then it is comfortable for some men”- M8b, July 2011 
 
- “Today many young boys work outside of Tajikistan and a large number of women live without their 
husband. ….. When women marry, they start their marriage often with financial problems. This can cause 
divorces and all kind of social problems, because the family-in-law spent so much money on the wedding, they 
start to use wife as a toy…. Empowerment will take time.” - M8b, July 2011 
 
103 - This was also triangulated with the marketing manager who mentioned: “We have continued this project 
without the support and funds of the ILO. So it means for us that IMON sees the good direction of the work in 




7.4. Empirical Findings  
 
I will now turn to results as presented to IMON in three reports, namely baseline, first follow-up 
survey and final report. I focus on the demand for financial and non-financial services, women’s 
entrepreneurship and empowerment and the business case of the pilot, because these were found most 
important for the MFO. More results are published elsewhere (ILO 2013b forthcoming). 
 
Demand of Financial and Non-Financial Services  
 
At the second follow-up survey, the percentage of women in the treatment group receiving a loan was 
57%. The loan pick-up rate varied substantially per branch, for example, Istaravchan, Zafarabad, 
Kanibadam and Tursunzade were relatively successful in disbursing loans compared to other areas. 
Women with a registered business at base line were more likely to take the loan (see Figure 18 below).  
 
Figure 18 Percentage of Loan Pick-up  














At baseline survey, almost all women in the treatment group reported to like the training (99%), 
however at the second follow-up survey only 258 out of 487 women (53% baseline and 62% of the 
repeat sample) reported to implement their business idea. Most of them (93%) did so within three 
months of the training. Business start-up was much higher for those who received the training and 
loan (83%) than those who received only the training (29%).   
  
Women had a wide variety of business ideas before the launch of the training the most common ones 
related to clothing and textiles (26%) or animal and husbandry (25%). Interesting business ideas 
included starting an internet café, wedding salon, coffee bar, private school, catering service, textile 




















Figure 19a shows training needs were stronger for the treatment group than for the comparison group, 
at the baseline survey. The women were interested in training in business planning, marketing, 
accounting and legal support. Figure 19b illustrates barriers to entrepreneurship were access to 
finance, taxes and the level of business knowledge. We found barriers to finance for the treatment 
group reducing over time from 55% at baseline to 11% at the second follow-up survey, (while it 
declined from 29% to 9% for the comparison group). Also, the percentage of women viewing the lack 
of entrepreneurial knowledge and experience as a barrier decreased from 19% to 13% (while it stayed 
somewhat level for the comparison group, from 7% to 6%). As shown in Figure 19c, 158 women 
could not implement their idea. Reasons related to family member influence, the riskiness of the 
business plan, unforeseen expenses and lack of time.  
 
Figure 19 Entrepreneurship Challenges and Barriers  
 
a) Training Services Useful for Development of the Business at Base Line  
 
 


























































Women Entrepreneurship    
 
Figure 20a and b show a strong increase in self-employment and business expansion, but 
predominantly for women who received both training and loan (TG2) and not for women who 
received only training (TG1). Results on entrepreneurial practices for TG2 were mixed (see Figure 20 
c-d), there was an increase in business registration, awareness and usage of products of NABWT, but 
no effect was observed on reinvesting profits. The usage of products of the NABWT for TG2 
increased from 4% at baseline to 22% at the second follow-up survey, compared to a small reduction 
for the comparison group from 9% to 7%.    
 
Figure 20 Women’s Self-employment and Entrepreneurship 
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c) Reinvest Income into the Business (%)            d) Registered Business (%) 
 
       e) Awareness of NABWT (%)  
 
       
 
 
Women Empowerment  
 
The survey asked several questions related to household decision making for small and large 
expenses, earnings and financial service usage. As illustrated in Figure 21, one key result is that 
women had more control over decisions relating to earnings and financial services, a moderate control 
over smaller expenses and very little control over larger expenses.104 In 21% of the cases women did 
not control their loan.  
 
                                                 
104 This resonates with Johnson (2003:293) who found that men tended to take care of large purchases and 
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Figure 21 Control over Household Decision-making for Expenses and Loans  
 
* Based on the full sample of married couples   
 
I computed three indexes for women’s empowerment varying from 0 (wife not in control) to 100 (wife 
in full control), namely control over for small expenses, large expenses, and financial services and 
earnings (see p146). Figure 22 shows that there was no impact of the training on women 
empowerment outcomes for TG2 (training plus loan), but a small negative effect for TG1 (training 
only). Women receiving only the training (TG1) experienced a reduction in control over household 
decision making for small and large expenses. 
 
Regression analysis showed other factors were correlated with empowerment such as whether the 
woman lives or migrates into a rural area (small negative effect), whether the husband works abroad 
(small positive effect) and whether she was living in Northern Tajikistan (positive effect). The 
interview setting mattered, when a male loan officer interviewed a woman, she reported more positive 
empowerment outcomes than when she was interviewed by a female loan officer. This finding feeds 
back that it may be good practice to match the sex of the interviewer with that of the interviewed when 

































Control over larger expenses
(car, real estate)
Control over small expenses
(food, clothes)
Control over savings
Control over the loan
Husband Sole Responsibility
Husband major/ wife minor
Equal contributions




Figure 22 Empowerment Indexes  
 
a) Control over Loan                                   b) Control over Financial services and Earnings  
 




Business Case  
 
In terms of economic benefits of the pilot I found mixed results. Women in TG2 and CG were 
somewhat equally interested to take a new loan after repayment. However, we found borrower exit 
rates for the TG2 to be lower than the comparison group. This is an important finding given high 
customer exit rates of 49% for the comparison group and 44% for TG2 at second follow-up survey.105 
The start-up loan was riskier compared to other loans in terms of the percentage of clients 
experiencing late payments. The training was free of charge for participants and approximately 
US$ 28 marginal costs per borrower.106  
 
                                                 
105 This finding resonates with Karlan and Valdivia (2006, 2011 march).  
106 For IMON there was an average cost per training of US$ 194.  Given an average group of 12 women and a 
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Figure 23 Customer Satisfaction 
 











c) Late Payment> 30 days (%)  
 
    
 
 
7.5. Organizational Learning in Relation to Results 
 
Before describing how the organization acted on the findings of the assessment, I first need to 
establish how proactively results were disseminated in the organisation. Outcome reports were sent to 
the project team members and in particular the marketing manager was highly aware of the main 
findings (participant observation M1b, Jan 2011) Presentations were made for branch and other senior 
managers at the head office.107 Results were presented at a conference in Tajikistan in the presence of 
the ILO, local authorities and ministry of labour.108  “The conference of the ILO was nice, there was a 
                                                 
107 "Yes, we have shared the results with all our staff at the headquarters. I shared with the directors, branch 
managers and top level and medium level management was introduced this report. Before the round table in 
Dushanbe all the staff has discussed the results."- M1c, July 2011 
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good presentation. There were clients who received start-up loans and there was a good sharing of 
experiences of clients” (SM 15 Aug 2011). However, during interviews most staff could not mention 
key findings of the reports. Several field level staff mentioned to be interested to hear about the results 
of the survey, but were not shared reports by senior management.109  
 
The assessment generated several debates and actions with regard to the demand for financial and 
non-financial services. It surprised the project team members to find that the start-up loan training 
“attracted relatively young women” (M1b, Jan 2011; also SM15 July 2011). It was interesting “to see 
the barriers and challenges for women in entrepreneurship.” What surprised the marketing manager 
was that “40% of the women could not estimate their own income levels.” [And that] “Women do not 
have tools for business planning.” Results showed the “type of business which is more popular for 
women.” and this turned out to be useful for revising the marketing strategy (M1b, Jan 2011).  
In terms of women’s empowerment, the result that, “larger purchases are controlled by man …. led to 
the question how to make more effective the marketing of products such as consumption loans”….   
(M1b, Jan 2011). It meant, “nowadays we understand that probably it is not so important to increase 
the number of women in our portfolio, but we have to think about women’s empowerment and women 
impact in increasing our portfolio” (M1c, July 2011). After the baseline report an internal workshop 
was organised that discussed whether "to increase the empowerment of women or to statistically 
increase the number of women in the portfolio. It was a big discussion. We did not come to the 
solution. We will await other reports and will see further. In my opinion, we should improve women’s 
empowerment” (M1c, July 2011).  
 
Furthermore IMON found many constraints to what microfinance can do to “help our clients in their 
struggle with the entrepreneurship and to improve their financial education level” (M1c, July 2011). 
Indeed, many of the barriers mentioned by female clients (lack of knowledge, experience and 
problems with taxes) as well as observed by staff (lack of passports, societal and gender norms), 
required a different support than only microfinance services. IMON was unable to support the training 
needs of women through its core-activities of lending and the company itself had limited capacity and 
                                                 
109 He was not shared the report but hoped to see "The results after the interview. I would like to get more 
information." – SLO5, July 2011 
- One loan expert remembered, she “read about it in the newspaper IMON distributes” – SLO 6 July 2011 
- The branch director shared some of the results of the start-up loan product. “We are surprised in our branch it 
is not working so good, but in other regions the start-up loan packages seems to work. She is interested to know 
the results of the interview. – SLO7, July 2011 
- He was not send the report. Some results were shared in the round table discussions. At this meeting there were 
representatives of the government and the ministry of labor and several clients attended this meeting. “We also 




resources at its disposal. As a result, it was planning to work more in partnership with other agencies 
(CEO, SM17b, July 2011; SM16b, July 2011).110 
 
Data on “client satisfaction was useful. Specifically the fact that scores were quite good for customer 
services and that clients were dissatisfied with the interest rates. … IMON may try to reduce interest 
rates or develop special loans” (M1b, Jan 2011). However, improving customer satisfaction by 
lowering interest rates was in tension with the sustainability of the start-up loan and instead the 
company increased the interest rate by 1% to finance part of the training costs.111 Several staff were 
critical about this increase and highlighted it makes it more difficult to repay the loan.112   
 
Based on staff feedback rather than the results of the reports (see p150), other adaptations were made 
to the product, see Table 25 below. First, husbands or other family members were invited at the last 
day of the training to ensure there was sufficient support in the household to help women in starting 
up the business. Second, round tables and “open doors” were organized with local municipalities and 
clients to introduce them to IMON’s activities.113 Third, scaling up of the pilot itself increased training 
frequency and reduced the loan application period for women. By reducing the training from four to 
three days, it became easier for trainers and participants to attend. It also reduced training costs. There 
was a reduction in collateral requirements by allowing group guarantee schemes intended to make 








                                                 
110 - “We realize that we need to build alliances and with other institutions”. Social performance is important 
here… “As a bank you cannot partner with other institutions that easily.”…“We partnered with NGOs that 
work on agricultural loans and gender. …Specifically we partnered with USAID on agroloans… another local 
NGO helps to send information on market prices informing farmers about the food price.” – SM16, July 2011  
 
111 - However the opposite was realized, in order to ensure “stability of this training project, from the next year 
we plan to put some little fees from clients to cover some costs of the project and thus to make it more stable 
and viable” – email SM16, June 2010 
 
112 - “The Interest rate of the start-up product should be similar to a normal loan to make it more attractive and 
becauses it is too high for women to pay back on time.” - SLO13, July 2011 
The interest rate is high. “The start-up loan charges 28% and the normal loan 27%.” -SLO5, July 2011  
 
113 - “With clients ‘open door’ we invite clients and local authorities and provide the information on some of 
the findings from the social reports.” -CEO, SM17b, July 2011 
- “We have discussions on gender and women’s rights. We take part in a meeting in the office. ….Furthermore 
we speak with the local governments and in schools.” -SLO6, July 2011 
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Table 25 Modifications Made to the Pilot 
Feedback from staff  Modification 
Slow loan application period because of limited 
demand and number of trainers in several regions 
Increase the frequency of trainings by up-scaling the 
pilot.  
Gender norms of government and community 
bodies  
Organize round tables and “open doors” before launch 
of the product to get buy-in from local government.  
The husband wanted to be involved in women 
enterprise training 
The husband can participate at the diploma session of 
the training to get support of the spouse  
Women do not have collateral Reduce collateral requirement 
Women often had old and invalid passports  Support women in getting their passport.  
Dissatisfaction of customers with high interest 
rates and loan period 
Unaddressed, interest rates increased by 1% to pay for 
the training.    
  
Beyond modifying the start-up loan product, the pilot had several spin off initiatives, namely the 
launch of new non-financial services, a project offering women new passports, and an assessment of 
working conditions. These initiatives were implemented through partnerships with other organisations 
and as part of the broader action plan to mitigate mission drift (M1b, Jan 2011). While the 
effectiveness of these partnerships is beyond the scope of this research, I will describe each of the 
projects in order to highlight one crucial point for this thesis. 
 
Firstly, the start-up loan product triggered a need for non-financial services initiatives. “We saw the 
main challenges in the business development and according to this we also created the Business 
Development Department. So nowadays, we think about what the organisation can do against these 
challenges to promote women’s entrepreneurship” (M1c, July 2011). “The [ILO] project was the first 
step towards improving IMON’s non-financial services…. This project was very nice for us in 
attracting the women clients… Also after this [assessment] we have an idea to implement a new 
project financial education to clients.… its original idea came from the ILO program” (M1c, July 
2011). As another manager mentioned “IMON now offers social products, the first was the start-up 
loan” (SM16b, July 2011). The company launched agricultural training services with a local NGO, 
financial literacy modules with Oikocredit, and client consultations with the MFC (M9, July 2011).  
 
Second, as described in Section 7.3, (p151) during the implementation of the pilot, IMON found 
women had invalid passports that sometimes even dated from the former Soviet Union. As a result, 
the company launched the project ‘passportization of women’. “We go to the rural areas and we found 
out 20-30 women that don’t have a passport. We make an agreement, IMON pays the fee of the 
passport and we give them the passports. Two such events were held in Isafara and Kumsanghir, in 
total we had for more than 50 passports. The costs per passport are five US$... We sign a letter to the 
authorities and pay directly to the government. If a woman would go to this authority personally, she 
would have to pay a large penalty” (M1c, July 2011). For IMON the initiative reduced the problem of 




Thirdly, because of the many entrepreneurship challenges faced by women and the experience that 
most of them “didn’t receive any advantage of the membership of the association”, IMON revised the 
strategy of the NABWT. “In the last two years NABWT had many big projects” (M1b, July 2011) and 
“offers more training products” (SM15, July 2011). The business association grew from 380 members 
in 2009 to 2.150 in 2012 (ILO, forthcoming 2013). One assessment that arose out of the revised 
strategy of the women´s business association was the SAFE CITY project with UNIFEM researching 
working conditions of clients. The NABWT “conducted some research of our markets [e.g. 
bazaars] … What can the local government do to make the working conditions for women who work 
in the markets better? It was a big research and as a result they made different changes in working 
conditions in the markets” (M1c, July 2011; NABWT 2010).   
 
Interestingly, the spin-off initiatives mentioned above related to decent work aspects of financial 
education, formalisation and working conditions, and this happened to be the exact same list 
submitted to the ILO in the initial proposal in February 2009, after completion of the diagnostic phase 
(see Section 7.2, p141). These ideas were considered relevant for addressing mission drift of the 
company. It raised a question for me would IMON would have done these projects anyway without 
the ILO support?  
 
Quotes from the CEO illustrated that the ILO support may have speeded up the company plans but 
they were likely to be implemented anyway:  “We would like to have more training on gender as a 
social goal. The financial resources and especially technical assistance is needed. Using only our own 
resources will take too much time.” (CEO SM17b, July 2011). The ILO project formed “the first step 
for us to return to the social business model” and tackle “mission drift” (M1c, July 2011). We “started 
to work on the ILO project to emphasize social performance for IMON as a commercial entity” (CEO, 
SM17b, July 2011). The CEO reported the budget spent on social performance had increased every 
year from 2009 to 2011. Her vision was that “for gender to be implemented you need more than only 
the product, you need several aspects including offices, staff, members. You need to think about the 
motivation of loan officers, special products for women, you need a revolutionary change.” For 
example, “we do not have many specific products for women at the moment in IMON” (CEO July 
2011). She felt substantial work needed to be done before this vision could be implemented. I 
conclude here that the aim of the CEO was to embed gender into the routine operations of the MFO 
rather than simply to improve female targeting.  
 
As reflected by the CEO (July 2011) “before we had a declaration rather than a strategy. Now it 
becomes part of our reports, strategic plan, information system, policy and procedures. There is no 
specific social performance strategic plan, but there is an action plan… There is still a gap in our 
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social goals and we need expertise” (CEO July 2011). So this somewhat illustrates that in 2011, the 
main motivation to engage in SPM remained internal to the organisation.    
 
The CEO considered the main economic benefit of implementing SPM to be strengthening the 
organisational identity of the company and to build partnerships. Also “clients were offered loans, 
trainings, consultancy. All these things also help to deliver financial services" (CEO, July 2011).  
Another manager pointed out the importance of reputation “to attract social investors,” and “increase 
the image among public partners and government authorities.” as well as “improve loyalty of clients 
to the organisation” (SM 16, July 2011). Overall it was felt social performance demanded a lot of 
company resources; particularly  “time”… [of staff]. As well as “financial costs of the management 
information systems” and “cost related to attract consultants” (CEO July 2011), “training and 
marketing” (SM 16b, July 2011). As mentioned by one senior manager, in general SPM “is not 
commercially attractive for IMON.” However, “We understand that without social activities in our 
market we cannot do more. We feel social performance should be part of our business.”… “The social 
activities should be integrated” (SM 16b, July 2011).  
 
As described on page 157 in November 2009, IMON spoke of a pilot. However, in June 2010 the 
decision was made to scale up the pilot even before the results of the assessment were fully reported. 
In July 2011, the pilot was reported to be a regular product and by June 2012 adaptations were made 
to the product in such a way that it had become a sustainable intervention. Up to June 2012, 2,164 
women were trained and 1,245 start-up loans were disbursed.  By the end of 2013 the company aimed 
to train 1200 women and achieve a loan pickup rate of 70%. The number of trainers within IMON 
increased from 13 to 46.  
 
Table 26 Scaling up the Start-up Loan Product 
Year 
Number of training  
participants 
Number of disbursed  
loans 
% Pickup rate 
2009 149 63 42% 
2010 598 365 61% 
2011 901 542 60% 
June-2012 516 315 61% 




The start-up loan had achieved a positive net margin of 3,2% (compared to 6% on other loans) and 
had a low portfolio at risk 1,5% (compared to 5% for other loans). Despite, as was shown by the 
assessment, women’s empowerment was not achieved and for some participants was found to be 




The company itself experienced strong financial performance over the period 2009 to 2012 in terms of 
return on assets, operational self-sufficiency and portfolio at risk (see Table 27). New investors had 
come on board in September 2011. IMON had almost achieved its ambitious growth plans of 35% per 
annum in terms of number of borrowers and gross loan portfolio (see Figure 24), but the percentage 
female clients had not increased.   
 
Figure 24 Growth of IMON  
 












c) Percentage Female Borrowers  
  
 
Table 27 Financial Performance Indicators IMON  
Financial Indicator Dec 2009 Dec 2012 Nominal 
Change 
Number of borrowers 26,602 58,186 +31,584 
Gross loan portfolio Mln 
US$ 
28.9 68,4 +39.5 
Return on Assets 7% 5.9% -1.1% 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 149% 137.5% -11.5% 
Operational expenses/ assets  
 
9.7% 12.7% +3% 
Portfolio at Risk 30  4.6% 4% -0.6% 





















































7.6. Concluding Remarks on Capacity for SPM  
 
Overall, the capacity of the company to engage in SPM improved over the period 2009 to 2012 and 
the main driver to do SPM activities remained internal to the company. This view was supported by 
the social rating report, which gave the highest A+ rating, implying low risks of mission drift for the 
company (Microfinanza 2010). It was also illustrated by the CEO who mentioned, “we found that you 
cannot do [SPM] one time and stop. You have to do it regularly” (CEO, SM17b, July 2011). I 
discussed with the CEO that there is still a lack of human resources to conduct SPM given the other 
challenges mentioned in the previous Section. She mentioned, “at the moment we are hiring 50 new 
people every quarter. It is a challenge for management to transfer this knowledge to new staff. Human 
resources become important here. How should we integrate social performance in our departments? 
The management team is thinking to set up an internal task force that can monitor these aspects on a 
regular basis” (CEO, SM17b, July 2011).  
 
I asked the project team leader whether he still felt there was a mission drift. He responded; “No, 
nowadays we have a wide window with our target clients, we have different type of products to meet 
their requirements, we have defined what differences we want to see in the life of our clients” (M1c, 
July 2011). “Previously it was mission drift in our organisation. We understand after this project that 
we have to come again to our mission. We understand that social responsible business is quite a good 
model to attract new clients. Even the risk management is better for the social business model. 
Nowadays we put attention not only on lending operations we seek to increase the level of education 
for our clients”. … “[The] start-up loan product was the first social product. Nowadays we have more 
products in the social direction” (M1c, July 2011). “For our social performance management system 
this project helps to define the future direction, we want to social and operationally effective.” (M1c, 
July 2011). Even though the pilot assessment showed limited improvements at client level particularly 
in terms of women’s empowerment, staff in the company felt the risk of mission drift had reduced as 




Chapter VIII. Analysis and Conclusion  
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
Having described the two case studies, I now analyse the social enterprise models in terms of the 
feasibility of social performance assessment (Section 8.2) double bottom line management (Section 
8.3) and changes in performance management in relation to the ILO project (Section 8.4). In line with 
Figure 4 (see Section 4.3, p72), I compare the findings from the two case studies for each of the 
research questions. I then discuss what lessons may be learned from them. Section 8.5 reflects on the 
argument as part of first, second, and third person action research (see Section 4.5). As described in 
Chapter I, (p8) this thesis aims to bring back to the literature a better understanding of how MFOs 
incorporate social goals into their PBM with reference to the ILO’s decent work agenda. 
 
 
8.2. Feasibility of Social Performance Assessment in Practice  
 
I will start with a comparative analysis of the two case studies on the feasibility of social performance 
assessment in practice. This addresses the following set of questions; what determined the willingness 
and capacity of the MFOs to carry out the pilot assessment at the outset? What other activities were 
undertaken at the same time? How did the MFOs manage their decent work pilot assessments? What 
did they find in terms of outcomes? Section 8.2.2 will then reflect on the lessons learned in relation to 
the wider literature. Paragraphs that reflect on the findings across the two case studies are shown in 
italic.  
 
8.2.1. Findings  
 
 
1. What determined the willingness and capacity of the MFOs to carry out the decent work 
assessment at the outset of the pilot in 2009 (see Sections 6.2 and 7.2 and 5.3 to 5.5)?  
 
For Bai Tushum the main driver for doing the pilot assessment was external to the organisation, 
namely to demonstrate job creation to external stakeholders specifically politicians, investors and 
donors. Staff implicitly assumed the organisation was achieving its social mission of job creation 
through its lending activities. Several staff believed that easier access to larger loans would create 
more jobs in clients’enterprises. It was also important for the pilot to be profitable and improve the 




For IMON the main driver for doing the pilot assessment was internal to the organizations’ culture 
and values. Staff assumed the company was drifting from its social mission of promoting women’s 
entrepreneurship and empowerment. The project team wanted to use the pilot as a way to increase 
capacity of its founder the NABWT and improve its linkage with IMON’s lending activities. IMON’s 
project team did not expect the pilot to become financially sustainable. Although they hoped the pilot 
outcomes could be useful in their relations with public policy institutions, this did not seem to be the 
dominant driver (see Section 7.2, p193).  
   
Although both organisations used the ILO project as a way to drive a SPM agenda: for Bai Tushum 
the driver was more external to the organisation, while for IMON it was more internal. Both MFOs 
wanted to remain financially sustainable, although for IMON the pilot itself did not need to contribute 
to this.   
 
As addressed in Section 5.5 (p115), at the outset of the pilot both MFOs considered themselves to be 
social enterprises that pursued double bottom line management with an employment related goal at 
the client level. However, I found strong differences in terms of organizational culture, human 
resource capacity, motivation, business thinking and their attitude towards the external environment.  
 
2. What other initiatives were undertaken by the MFOs in PBM over the period 2009 to 2012 
(see Sections 6.2 and 7.2)?  
 
Bai Tushum launched several initiatives in SPM including the ILO pilot, a client loyalty program, a 
social rating and audit. Other strategic priorities were to remain financially sustainable by maintaining 
portfolio quality and growth, attracting new investors and transforming into a deposit taking 
institution (see Section 6.2, p120).    
 
IMON launched an action plan in SPM that included the ILO pilot, implementation of client 
protection principles, a social rating and audit. Other strategic priorities were transforming into a 
deposit taking institution and maintaining portfolio quality and growth (see Section 7.2, p144).   
 
Although the ILO pilot assessments were the largest projects in the area of SPM, the initiative had to 
compete with other interventions. In terms of the overall business activities and history of the 







3. How did the MFOs manage their decent work pilot assessment (see Sections 6.3 and 7.3)?  
 
For Bai Tushum, more than a desire to measure impact, the pilot formed an opportunity to experiment 
with social performance indicators and demonstrate job creation to external stakeholders. Although 
the ILO and I wanted to demonstrate ‘whether the pilot worked’, Bai Tushum’s project team was 
interested to explore ‘what enterprises were the job promoters’, and ‘why’ some were more successful 
than others. Rather than an impact assessment design with a comparison group, as advocated by the 
ILO and myself, this inclined Bai Tushum’s project team to a more adaptable and flexible 
methodology. During the implementation phase, the project team wanted to maintain the option to 
modify the pilot in case there were strong changes in the market or political environment (see Section 
6.3.1, p120). When the Kyrgyz political crises broke out, the MFO incorporated the control branches 
into the pilot, making it impossible to measure impact. The ILO decided to shorten the number of 
surveys and we continued with a less rigorous assessment based on the available data (see Section 6.3, 
p124).  
 
For IMON, the assessment had the objective of gaining understanding of the overall mission drift 
assumed by staff in the company. The project team wanted to understand women’s demand for 
financial and non-financial services, in addition to measuring the pilot’s effect. It aimed to improve 
targeting of women and support them in starting up new businesses. Demonstrating to others “whether 
the pilot worked” mattered less for them. They rejected a randomized controlled trial because this was 
considered impractical and unethical. Instead, we rolled out the pilot over a longer period to ensure 
there was sufficient human resource capacity to offer the trainings (see Section, p145). Given the 
practical constraints, we again implemented a less rigorous, but more practical methodology of 
matching the comparison group (see p145).  
 
The MFOs were interested not just to know “whether” the pilot worked, but also “why”, “for whom” 
and “how” it could work better. Although at the outset the question of impact seemed interesting for 
both MFOs, it was not the only question. Both MFOs, but particularly IMON, were interested in 
knowing what results meant for other practices and activities in the company. There were also 
tensions between conducting rigorous impact assessment and maintaining flexibility in pilot 
implementation, and the actual assessment deviated from the planned strategy.  
 
Bai Tushum staff found it was a challenge to collect good quality data, for example, for net income 
and working time. Data quality for several indicators such as job creation improved over time after 
communicating data errors with staff and conducting additional training for them. Moreover, the 
Kyrgyz political crises hampered data collection. Customer satisfaction and job creation triggered a 
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larger response, these indicators being both of better quality and more relevant for the company (see 
Section 6.3.3, p125). 
 
IMON staff also experienced somewhat similar challenges during the data collection. Several 
performance indicators such as entrepreneurial skills and confidence turned out to be of weak quality. 
Quantitative and qualitative results hinted that empowerment outcomes depended on interview setting 
including the gender of the interviewer. It was hard to find certain groups of clients for the follow-up 
surveys, indicating dropouts were not randomly distributed across the sample. IMON acted on data 
relating to women’s empowerment, entrepreneurship, and customer satisfaction because these were 
considered the most relevant indicators (see Section 7.3.3, p152).  
 
The MFOs experienced challenges in collecting good quality data. Data errors were not random and 
reduced over time. There was a gradual learning on data quality and prioritization of performance 
metrics. 
 
Bai Tushum’ staff had to multi-task pilot implementation with their regular tasks at various levels in 
the organisation. The project team did not function as a unit. Senior managers had limited time to 
participate in the working groups and focused on other priorities including managing the political 
crisis, portfolio growth, and the company’s transformation into a bank. These activities went at the 
expense of the time managers could designate to the pilot assessment. The marketing department 
coordinated a diverse set of tasks covering public relations, marketing, product development and 
social performance assessment. Management tried to motivate loan officers to administer the surveys 
by offering bonuses, but the field staff faced real difficulties in combining the survey activities with 
time spent on their regular daily work. The multi-task problems were exacerbated by the political 
crisis because staff came under pressure to sustain financial performance and portfolio quality (see 
Section 6.3.2, p121).  
 
IMON’s project team worked better as a unit. As part of a wider action plan, management 
implemented a balanced set of hard and soft incentive schemes. This included setting performance 
targets for disbursement of start-up loans and outreach to female borrowers. It further entailed the 
implementation of a gender policy for staff, training staff in offering the entrepreneurship module and 
setting up a qualitative reporting system to feed back the effectiveness of the start-up loan product 
(p148; p157). The marketing department combined a diverse set of tasks spanning public relations, 
marketing and social performance assessment, but seemed to manage this by dividing tasks and hiring 
additional people. Field staff felt they had sufficient time and remuneration for administering the 




While both MFOs had limited human resource capacity, IMON integrated the pilot more effectively 
with its core-business. Other challenges in implementing the surveys related to staff motivation, 
training and incentive systems. 
 
4. What did they find out as empirical outcomes (see Sections 6.4 and 7.4)? 
 
For Bai Tushum we found no significant correlation between changes in loan size and job creation in 
clients’ enterprises over the 12-month period. Other factors such as the level of income, type of work 
activity and client exit seemed to influence job creation. The pilot experiment informed the company 
of reasons for customer satisfaction and exit (see Section 6.4). 
 
A limitation of the results is that the survey period covered only twelve months, during which the 
Kyrgyz economy suffered from the political crisis. Moreover, in the absence of a control group, the 
results could not causally link the new delivery system to the job creation outcomes (see p125).  
 
IMON found that women faced many barriers to entrepreneurship. We found an increase in self-
employment, business start-up and expansion, but mainly for women receiving the start-up loan and 
training. The assessment found mixed changes in women’s business practices, including some 
increase in business registration and usage of services of NABWT, but no effect on reinvestment of 
income into the business. We found no effects on empowerment for women receiving both loans and 
training, but observed a small negative effect for women receiving only the training. In terms of the 
business case, the start-up loan was more risky for IMON, but it improved client retention (see Section 
7.4).  
 
A limitation of the results is that the matching methodology could not rule out selection bias, because 
the comparison and the treatment group were not statistically similar on all indicators at baseline 
survey and may subsequently have experienced different trends (see p151).  
 
Both organisations did an assessment that informed them about changes in client outcomes, but that 
could not attribute impacts to the pilot. In general, changes in client level outcomes were minimal for 
both assessments.      
      
 
8.2.2. Reflection on Findings  
 
I will reflect on two related issues, namely the practical feasibility of doing social performance 




Feasibility of Social Performance Assessment 
 
While some of the challenges in implementing the assessment were technical such as setting up a 
survey and designing performance metrics, many others related to organizational processes including 
managing staff motivation, staff incentive systems, training, feedback of data audits and dealing with 
multi-task problems. The surveying activities had to become embedded into the companies’ routine 
operations (see particularly Sections 5.3.5 and 5.4.5 and 6.3.3 and 7.3.3). Or drawing from a set of 
NIE and organisational learning literature (Kim 1993; Denzau and North 1994; Argyris and Schon 
1996; Senge 2006), data collection processes depended on wider organisational systems and could not 
work in isolation from them. 
 
The two case studies illustrated how the survey implementation itself depended on the existing routine 
processes in the companies, and how this in turn influenced data quality. In terms of the feasibility of 
doing impact measurement with MFOs more generally this is an important qualitative finding, since 
these routine processes are unlikely to be the same between MFOs or over time. For example, I 
observed a reduction in first-time reporting errors from baseline to end surveys. Also the IMON study 
suggests it is important to control for differences in interview setting and interviewers’ characteristics 
because they resulted in different empowerment outcomes (see p162 and p154). This is a finding 
similar to Karlan and Zinman (2007). Likewise, dropouts were not randomly distributed across the 
sample. An impact assessment methodology would assume to some degree that these organisational 
processes could be controlled for or are randomly distributed across treatment and control group 
samples. While reduction of selection bias is used as a justification for doing RCTs (Karlan, and 
Goldberg 2007c; Duflo et al 2007), the two case studies indicate several biases as a result of implicit 
organisational processes relating to data quality that also lead to estimation errors. An open question 
for further research is what bias is more influential on final assessment outcomes “selection bias” 
(Duflo et al 2007:5), or what may be labelled as “organisational bias”.   
 
Interestingly, representatives of other MFOs that participated in the ILO project reported similar 
challenges while implementing the pilot assessment (see Table 4, p58) (Feedback of MFO at 
workshops in Jordan June 2012 and Luxembourg Nov 2012). Among the technical challenges were 
handling of panel data, the size of the questionnaire and staff understanding of the research method. 
However, most challenges related to the human resource capacity. These included the capacity of the 
project team leader, staff turnover, incentive schemes, need for staff training and limited time for the 
staff to conduct interviews. Several challenges related to implicit knowledge transfer, specifically the 
sensitization of the decent work pilots among the staff, the clients and the public authorities. Other 
challenges included communication with the external consultants, managing external shocks and 
difficulties in finding drop out clients (participant observations in Jordan June 2012, see also ILO 
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2012). An open question is whether these organisational processes receive sufficient attention in 
impact assessment literature.    
 
Desirability to do Impact Assessment 
 
A second lesson learned is that during the design phase of the assessment, myself and the ILO, were 
confronted with the need to balance our aspiration to do a rigorous impact assessment with the 
preference, capacity, and practical constraints of the MFOs. We wanted to do a randomized controlled 
trial to try to measure impact and inform management decision-making for MFOs. However, project 
teams did not want to select their treatment and control groups randomly for ethical and practical 
reasons. In hindsight, they had a desire to do more “business-wise” piloting. The case study of Bai 
Tushum shows the use of control groups might not be feasible for an MFO when experimenting in a 
complex environment with the core business of lending. The company could not “freeze” its “control 
and treatment” groups over a period of two years (see p120, p124).  
 
At the outset of the project, I overestimated the capacity of Bai Tushum to do an impact assessment 
through large sample surveying. Under such circumstances, I think that the design of the assessment 
should have been made simpler without the use of a control group. Particularly, I think it would have 
been better to opt for a more gradual roll out of interviews, similar to IMON, allowing the assessment 
to become part of daily routine operations of the MFO. While data collection at fixed points in time 
leads to better impact estimates, it increased the workload for staff during the survey months because 
they had to do many interviews within a relatively short time span.  
 
Having said that, the case studies resonate with Dick (1993:32) and contradict the theoretical idea that 
impact assessment methodology can be regarded a standardized single experiment in which no  
learning and process changes are allowed to take place over the assessment period (see Section 4.2, 
p68). From the MFO’s perspective innovation takes place through multiple experimentation with 
flexible and more organic piloting as advocated by Dick (1993:32), rather than through single causal 
experiments as advocated by supporters of RCTs (Shadish, Cook et al 2002; Karlan, and Goldberg 
2007c; Duflo et al 2007).  
 
Nonetheless, impact studies using RCTs have become increasingly popular among donor agencies.114 
The main justification for these relatively expensive studies is that RCTs deal effectively with 
selection bias, making them highly rigorous in answering the question ‘was the program effective’ 
(e.g. Ashraf and Karlan 2005; Karlan and Valdivia 2006;2009; Karlan and Goldberg 2007; Duflo et al. 
                                                 
114 For example, as off 2013, the Poverty Action Lab conducted over 135 projects in 34 countries in 
microfinance and banking alone. 
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2007; Banerjee et al 2009, May, see p41). However, the case studies indicate this is far from the only 
question for the MFOs. This raises a serious issue for SPM described in Section 2.6 (p40); if the 
question of impact is not the only important question for MFOs, then why would impact assessments 
hold priority over qualitative and mixed methodologies (e.g. Barnes et al 2001; Nelson et al 2004; 
Imp-Act 2004; Dunn 2008,p40) that try to answer the other set of questions in ways that were 
desirable from the perspective of the MFOs.115    
 
Karlan and Goldberg (2007:8) stress further that the high internal validity of impact assessment may 
lead to replications of pilots by other MFOs. However, the two case studies indicated the capacity to 
implement pilot assessments also depends on factors internal to the MFOs such as availability of 
human resources, communication in the project team, staff motivation and incentive schemes. 
Drawing from various NIE and OD literature these internal factors include organisational routines 
(Huczynski and Buchanan 2007:128-129; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Frey and Jegen 2000) and culture 
(Nooteboom 2000; Cameron 2008, see p17). They make it highly unlikely that implementing the same 
pilot into another MFOs will yield similar impact outcomes elsewhere even within a somewhat similar 
environment. For example, if the Tajik MFO Arvand had implemented the start-up loan program, it is 
questionable whether it would yielded similar outcomes because Arvand has a different organizational 
culture, motivational schemes, staff feedback systems etc. RCTs may be more suitable for pilots that 
can be implemented independently from internal organisational factors. For example, it may be easier 
to measure the impact of handing out financial literacy pamphlets than financial literacy training.   
 
Moving back to the two case studies, this raises the question why the ILO insisted an impact 
assessment approach. As discussed in Section 3.4 (p58) one reason was to have some degree of 
comparability in methodology across the studies. The ILO wanted to avoid doing 16 completely 
heterogeneous studies and therefore chose for an overall methodological design, but allowing scope 
for variation in it. In my view, this was a good argument, but I also supported the option to be flexible: 
by not doing an RCT in the case of IMON, for example. Another reason was that it was necessary to 
feed back results to a wider audience. This included public policy institutions and donor agencies who 
demanded rigorous impact assessment methodologies. This is an area of constructive tension between 
                                                 
115 There is recognition on PAL’s website that other assessments are better in answering multiple hypothesis, 
although they argue this should be done in combination with an RCT. “ At very basic level, randomized 
evaluation can answer the question: was the program effective? But if thoughtfully designed and implemented, it 
can also answer the questions, how effective was it? Were there unintended side-effects? Who benefited most? 
Who was harmed? Why did it work or not work? What lessons can be applied to other contexts, or if the 
program was scaled up? How cost effective was the program? How does it compare to other programs designed 
to accomplish similar goals? To answer these (just as interesting, if not more interesting) questions, the impact 
evaluation should be part of a larger package of evaluations and exercises” [that includes need assessment, 
program theory assessment, process evaluation, impact evaluation, cost effectiveness analysis and other 




the ILO’s agenda and the MFOs agendas. One important question is then how the assessment was 
used by the MFOs as a basis for action, which I will describe in the next Section.   
 
 
8.3. Feasibility of Double Bottom Line Management for MFOs in Practice 
 
How feasible was it in practice for the MFOs to combine social and financial performance 
management? I will first review how the MFOs acted on the empirical results of the pilot assessment 
in terms of new activities and knowledge, and what this revealed for the capacity to do SPM. Section 
8.3.2 will then reflect on what this reveals about the sustainability of SPM and what tensions were 





5. How did the MFOs act on the empirical findings to improve development practice (see 
Sections 6.5 and 7.5)?    
 
For Bai Tushum, factors other than loan size were found to influence job creation in clients’ 
enterprises. The management team considered the results to be a “temporary mission failure” rather 
than a “mission drift”. They believed that job creation outcomes would improve after the political 
crisis. Perhaps the strongest form of learning was that senior management became more modest about 
Bai Tushum’s capacity to create jobs. In addition, the MFO incorporated some of the job creation 
questions into its information system. The pilot also improved the company’s understanding of the 
quality of customer satisfaction and led to a new survey (see p136).  
 
Staff seemed to learn mostly from the direct experience of doing the assessment, rather than from the 
outcome reports. Field staff reported that doing the interviews was a useful experience, but it did not 
change their regular way of working. They viewed the assessment as an opportunity to interact with 
clients. Loan officers used it as a way to monitor the debt capacity of the borrower and rethink the 
products offered to them (see p128). Although field staff learned some possibly valuable lessons for 
the organization, they often did not transfer this knowledge to senior management. Likewise, even 
though field staff were interested in the outcomes, this information was not shared by the project team. 
Staff in turn provided limited feedback on the multi-task problem to the management team. When I 
informed the CEO, additional staff was hired. Management learned that they lacked human resource 




For IMON, the assessment reports generated additional understanding into barriers to women’s 
entrepreneurship and the need for financial and non-financial services. Understanding more about the  
work activities and business types of women informed the marketing strategy. The reality check that 
21% of the women had little control over their loan led to an internal debate on whether to increase the 
percentage of female borrowers or to promote women’s empowerment (p165).  
 
However, the main form of learning for IMON also seemed to come from doing the pilot and from 
staff experience. Field staff found it useful to do interviews and training and reported it changed their 
regular way of working. Several felt it improved their understanding of women’s entrepreneurship and 
customer satisfaction. Others used the survey questions for screening of new clients (see p155).   
Challenges reported by staff in pilot implementation led to modifications of the start-up loan. Product 
changes included a shortening of the training duration, a reduction in documentation required and the 
involvement of family and local municipalities in product delivery. IMON seemed to have strong staff 
feedback mechanisms through regular qualitative reporting and staff training. In July 2011, 
management decided to do the training in-house leading to investments in human resources, training 
facilities and the start of a business development services department. The pilot led to new initiatives 
relating to financial literacy, formalization and working conditions. Having limited capacity to address 
the various training needs, IMON decided to work in partnership with other development agencies. 
Also the capacity of the NABWT improved as evidenced by an increase in membership and staff (see 
Section 7.5, p166).  
 
For both MFOs, the main learning for staff came from the process of doing the assessment, rather 
than through reading the outcome reports. Evidencing this is that several new activities started before 
the dissemination of the results of the reports. Challenges and experiences of IMON staff were fed 
back to management, prompting modification to the pilot and new activities. For Bai Tushum the 
feedback loops were more limited.  
 
At the outset, the project team of Bai Tushum expected the new credit delivery system to be profitable 
and improve the competitive position of the company. After the baseline survey, the pilot was 
implemented in all branches and effectively scaled up before management knew its social 
performance outcomes. As the pilot concerned a change in the core business of the company, it had to 
become a sustainable intervention. However, we found no correlation between job creation and loan 
volume, indicating little social performance outcomes (see Section 6.5, p138).  
 
In contrast, IMON’s project team did not expect the pilot to become a financially sustainable 
intervention. In June 2010, management decided to scale up the pilot before knowing the social 
performance outcomes of the assessment. In July 2011, the pilot turned into a regular product and as 
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of June 2012, it became a sustainable intervention. However, the outcome report showed the training 
did not improve women’s empowerment (see Section 7.5, p169).   
 
Both organisations scaled-up their pilots, but the decision to do so was made before social 
performance outcomes were formally reported and seemed to be based on experiential learning.  
 
Bai Tushum remained financially sustainable accomplishing its planned portfolio growth over the 
period 2009 to 2012. The CEO considered the main benefits of SPM to be improved staff motivation, 
quality of services and customer satisfaction. The main costs came in terms of human resources (see 
Section 6.5, p138).  
 
IMON remained financially sustainable and achieved its targeted portfolio growth over the period 
2009 to 2012. The CEO considered the main economic benefits of SPM to be strengthening the 
organizational identity, building partnerships and supporting in the delivery of financial services. The 
main costs came in terms of human resources (see Section 7.5, p169).  
 
Both organisations also achieved their financial performance targets. There seemed to be a “business 
case” for the pilot, but not necessarily a “social case”.  
 
6. What capacity does this reveal in the organisations for social performance management (see 
Sections 6.6 and 7.6)?     
 
Despite several initiatives, Bai Tushum’s capacity to do SPM did not improve much from 2009 to 
2012. In my view the organisation was vulnerable to mission drift. The main reason it pursued an 
employment creation goal remained external. One area of social performance that received more 
attention from management was customer satisfaction. However, instead of building more capacity to 
do better assessments, the marketing department decided to outsource the survey (see Section 6.6).    
 
In contrast, the capacity of IMON to engage in SPM did improve over the period 2009 to 2012. Staff 
increased their awareness of barriers to women’s entrepreneurship and undertook actions trying to 
reduce some of them. The project reported to be the first step in a return to the social business model 
and supported further embedding of gender into the operations of the MFO. Managers felt the risk of 
mission drift reduced (see Section 7.6). This view was supported by an external social rating report 
that gave IMON a strong social rating (Microfinanza 2010).   
 
Over the period June 2009 to June 2012, the capacity to do SPM had improved for IMON, but not so 




8.3.2. Reflection on Findings  
 
 
I will now discuss what these findings may reveal about the sustainability of management of social 
goals in the MFOs. I will then analyse what factors contributed to the different outcomes in the 
companies by conducting comparative analysis of tensions in double bottom line management. 
 
7. What does this reveal about the sustainability of SPM (see Sections 6.6 and 7.6)?     
 
A key finding is that both MFOs (gradually) modified their decent work pilots into interventions that 
were sustainable and scaled up, even though the external evaluation reports showed the client 
outcomes were minimal. Both MFOs created a “business case” for the pilot, without demonstrating a 
clear “social case”. 
 
How this happened may be illustrated by drawing from the concept of path dependency (Denzau and 
North 1994:22; North 2005:21; North 1994:364, and Copestake 2007, see Section 2.3, p19). First, the 
pilot itself could be viewed as path dependent, because it involved fixed investments or sunk costs. 
Both MFOs experienced costs and time spent in preparation of the pilot, doing staff training, 
generating staff awareness, pilot implementation etc. For example, for Bai Tushum such investments 
included the costs of dividing the credit department into a microloan and SME department. For 
IMON, fixed costs entailed the costs of setting up the start-up loan portfolio and training. Given these 
investments, some of which had positive organisational payoffs; it was unlikely that the project would 
be fully terminated, even if the desired social goals were not fully achieved.    
 
More importantly, the new SPM initiatives may be viewed as having mutated gradually into the 
prevailing PBM of the company. The pilot itself co-evolved with other processes in the MFO and 
could not be seen in isolation from the overall organisational systems and culture (Boschma et al 
2002:42-47; Denzau and North 1994:20). The pilot assessments ultimately were moulded to fit the 
dominant PBM of the companies, which as discussed in Section 5.5, was oriented towards financial 
goals. For Bai Tushum the pilot was not allowed to lose money from the outset. While for IMON the 
pilot was gradually made sustainable by increasing interest rates and reducing training days. As part of 
their own survival strategy of working in competitive markets, both MFOs prioritized sustainability 
and growth performance. The MFOs seemed constrained in their SPM by their own prior goals of 
maintaining financial sustainability. As such, I would view the double bottom line management for the 
case studies as combining financial and social objectives, but on the condition that financial 
sustainability for the pilots were not compromised in the medium term. I will return to this in Section 




The fact that both MFOs scaled-up their pilots before the outcome reports were known raises the 
question of whether managers based PBM decision-making on formal reporting, or on other factors. I 
will build here on the discussion in Section 8.2.2, (p180), as well as the debate in microfinance to 
what extent impact evaluation is useful for management decision-making (see Section 2.6, p40). 
Although advocates of SPM practices (e.g. Copestake et al. 2005:212) argue that impact assessment as 
an ad hoc activity is unlikely to lead to sustained improvements in development management, Karlan 
and Goldberg (2007) argue impact evaluation does result in better management decision-making. 
RCTs are justified because not knowing impact is “risky for lenders” and may result in scaling up 
ineffective pilots (Karlan and Goldberg 2007:8). Although the idea that impact assessment leads to 
management decision making is correct under the assumption of rational decision-making, it seemed 
challenged in practice by the two case studies. Innovation in the MFOs took place in a more organic 
way and seemed based on a mixture of multiple experimentation, experiential learning as well as ad 
hoc decision-making.  
 
Interestingly, this does not imply the findings agree with Copestake and Simanowitz (2005:212) and 
Copestake et al (2005). Particularly, both case studies emphasize “learning by experiencing” the client 
level assessment rather than learning through more formal outcome reporting. For IMON, doing an 
impact evaluation as an ad hoc activity resulted in several improvements in their capacity to do 
assessments at the client level. It further led to intended and unintended spin-off activities in relation 
to the pilot. This resonates with Denzau and North (1994:366, see p16) as well as Roth (2008:478-
479, p15) who emphasize that the “unintended” effects and discoveries are at least as important for 
performance management as “the intended” ones. That most learning of staff seemed to come from 
doing and experiencing the pilot assessment further illustrates the importance of path dependency in 
PBM (North 2005:21&25& Denzau and North 1994:13).   
 
8. What tensions were observed in financial and social performance management? 
 
I will now identify factors explaining differences in the capacity of the two MFOs to do SPM. 
Drawing from Copestake (2005:175-176 see Section 2.6) and building on the comparative analysis in 
Section 5.5, (p115), I position the MFOs on a set of management tensions relating to mission and 
ownership, operating environment and organisational capacity and culture (See Chapter V). In the 
context of limited information and scarce resources, managers need to make a variety of decisions 
within a multiple set of tensions. I identify these trade-offs based on the empirical findings of the two 
case studies and also by applying literature on management tensions to social enterprise models 
(Copestake 2005:175-176; Denzau and North’s 1994; Frey and Ostherloh 2000; Senge 2006:129-162; 




For analytical purposes, Table 28 on page 189, maps activities of the companies associated with 
pulling resources towards business first strategies in the left column, perspectives that resonate with 
pulling resources towards development first strategies in the right column, and activities associated 
with social enterprise in the middle. Rather than claiming any of these perspectives are superior in 
terms of actual performance outcomes, the idea is to map to what degree the MFOs operated as a 
social enterprise. The Table analyses the wider performance management tensions in the companies, 
not only those that occurred during the implementation of the pilot.  I will describe how the two 
MFOs were situated in these PBM tensions, and whether I observed changes over the period 2009 to 
June 2012.  
 
As described in Sections 8.2 and 8.3, one tension I observed was a multi-task problem for the 
management and field staff. How to balance resources spent on the objectives of financial 
sustainability at the MFO level with social objectives at the client level (see Osterloh and Frey 
2000:540; Frey and Jegen 2000; see p23; Armendariz and Murdoch 2007: ch10:266-267, see p42). 
Both MFOs expressed a strong commitment to remain financially sustainable and grow their portfolio. 
However, the MFOs monitored mainly financial objectives, the social objectives were less formalised 
and depended on implicit assumptions held by staff (see Section 5.5, p115). At the outset, Bai Tushum 
seemed to have a stronger banking culture compared to IMON that focused on human development.  
IMON’s management gave more attention to the social mission, while for Bai Tushum’s management 
it stayed somewhat similar over the period 2009 to 2012.  
 
There was a tension for the MFOs to balance quantitative growth in the loan portfolio with more 
qualitative growth in organisational processes to build development values into performance 
management. 116  This draws from Copestake (2005:175-176) as well as Thomas and Mohan (2007) 
who view development management as a qualitative process that involves building development 
values into organisations and not only focus on quantitative performance. Both MFOs managed to 
accomplish ambitious quantitative growth targets over the three-year period. However, IMON also 
strengthened its process management as part of an overall action plan to mitigate mission drift in the 
company. It included a redesign of staff incentive systems, staff training and product development. 
Bai Tushum managed to accomplish its transformation into a bank. There was a strong internal drive 
of management and other shareholders to become a commercial bank and substantial resources were 
                                                 
116 These tensions were also observed for other MFOs in Central Asia:   
- One realization was that “The company is growing too large. So we have many branches and you can’t do it 
anymore under my control “…  “We opened up branches and suboffices in markets and conducted training for 
credit officers. All of them are from villages and they do not have financial education”- Chairman, ABN Credit 
Union, Oct 2011  
- “We tried to go for a wide range of products and but maybe we did not have the human resources to grow that 
fast. The potential of an institution needs to grow as fast as human resources” this specifically refers to middle 
management. – CEO, Arvand, Oct 2009  
- “ we are funding money like crazy”… “we got to identify what percentage of over-indebtness is there”. - 
Finance Manager, Finca Kyrgyzstan, Oct 2009 
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designated to the transformation. Arguably, some of those resources went at the direct expense of the 
implementation of the ILO pilot. As such, I would say that IMON’s PBM became more aligned with 
the idea of social enterprise, while Bai Tushum’s perspective remained predominantly geared towards 
commercial banking with a corporate social responsibility component. 
 
With regard to the way staff perceived the external environment, there was a tension between having 
an “inward looking” or an “outward looking” PBM. This follows the work of Cameron (2008) and 
Cameron, Quin et al. (2005) on organisational culture (see p27). The MFOs differed substantially on 
this; Bai Tushum had an outward looking organisational culture in that it found the competitive and 
political environment relevant for its own PBM, while IMON was described as an inward looking 
company that focused on integration and internal learning systems (see Section 5.5, p115). The way 
the organisations perceived the external environment did not change much from 2009 to 2012. In 
terms of the political environment, while Bai Tushum did not achieve its primary objective of 
informing politicians of their contribution to job creation, IMON managed to organize round tables 
with the ministry and local municipalities to raise awareness of the start-up loan product. 
 
I observed a set of tensions in human resource management. Similar to Copestake (2005:175-176) 
there was a trade-off between recruitment and experience of staff with a banking background, as 
observed in Bai Tushum, and staff with a development and social sector background, as observed 
more for IMON. However, beyond this, the organisations also seemed to differ in terms of staff 
motivation, incentive schemes and organizational culture (see Section 5.5, p115).  
 
Bai Tushum staff reported to be motivated by building strong career paths and having good working 
conditions and salaries. However, IMON staff was more motivated by the shared goals of the 
company such as support for clients and the company’s reputation as a transparent and a leading 
organisation in Tajikistan.  
 
The differences in staff motivation seemed to relate to differences in incentive schemes. At the outset, 
bonus systems in both companies were mainly geared towards financial performance (see Sections 
5.3.5. and 5.4.5). Bai Tushum’s recruitment system offered strong extrinsic motivational schemes 
through competitive salaries and good bonuses, in combination with rapid internal promotions to new 
job functions. This was done deliberately to hire and retain employees with good banking and 
microfinance experience. IMON had a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation schemes that 
combined reasonable salaries with strong internal learning systems. The latter aimed to integrate staff 
into the organizational culture. During the pilot implementation phase both MFOs implemented a 
mixture of extrinsic (e.g. bonuses for interviewers) and intrinsic motivational schemes (e.g. staff 
training) to do the social performance assessment. However, IMON in particular implemented a more 
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balanced set of extrinsic and intrinsic incentive schemes that aimed to stimulate staff’s attention to 
social performance and went beyond the pilot practices. Following Ostherloh and Frey (2000) and 
Frey and Jegen (2000), it is questionable whether using only extrinsic incentive systems would be 
effective in stimulating social performance objectives because measurement systems are weaker and 
objectives are more implicit and value-laden than financial performance goals. Thus, there appears to 
be a tension in using intrinsic or extrinsic motivation schemes in promoting SPM (see Section 2.3.4, 
p23).  
 
At the outset, as part of the organisational culture, the management of Bai Tushum assumed the 
company was delivering on its social mission of job creation. However, IMON’s management had a 
more open mind-set and accepted the idea that the company might not be delivering on its social 
mission. Equally important, staff discussed openly their ideas on women entrepreneurship and 
empowerment within the organisation. As such, I observed a tension between having an open 
organisational culture, in which it was possible to challenge and dialogue about social performance, 
and a more closed culture, in which shared assumptions on mission achievement were either not tested 
properly or simply taken for granted. In the latter case, challenging shared assumptions may go against 
the status quo or “building block” assumptions of PBM and are therefore seen as undesirable or 
simply not needed. I will return to this last tension as part of the overall argument, which resonates 
with thinking around SMMs (Denzau and North 1994; Senge 2006:129-162; Argyris and Schon 
1996).   
 
Similar to Copestake (2005:166), I observed tensions between standardization and flexibility in 
product design, delivery and targeting. At the outset, both companies had six types of credit products 
with somewhat standardized delivery channels and flexibility for clients to adjust product features (see 
Section 5.5, p116). Bai Tushum started to offer deposit products, over the period 2009 to 2012, and 
this explains why the arrow points to the right. However, as part of the ILO pilot assessment, only 
modest changes were made in credit delivery of the company (see p124). Credit delivery remained 
based on the assumption that larger loans would target the SME segment leading to the creation of 
jobs. IMON started to offer several non-financial services and diversified its credit offer with three 
new loan products (see p167).  
 
For both marketing departments there were tensions between, on the one hand, doing public relations 
and marketing, and on the other hand, spending time on social performance assessment and product 
development (see p175). Both marketing departments were under-staffed and had limited capacity to 
engage in all these tasks. To mitigate this problem, both MFOs set up departments for business 
development services. The MFOs also needed to decide whether to internalize assessments or 
188 
 
outsource them to external consultants or research agencies.117 At the outset of the pilot IMON had 
conducted several assessments together with the NABWT, while Bai Tushum did not conduct many 
social performance assessments. IMON continued to internalize its assessments including a survey on 
financial literacy and working conditions. In contrast, Bai Tushum outsourced its customer 

























                                                 
117 - This tension also occurred for other MFIs in Central Asia, for example the senior manager of First 
Microfinance Bank preferred to institutionalize the client level assessment and mentioned “we prefer not to use 
consultants“… there are “Too many consultants, it becomes an industry in its own right. “, - CEO FMFB, July 
2011).  
- While the senior manager from Finca Kyrgyzstan argued the opposite and emphasized “Loan officers are not 
experts in data collection, it is not their job”…”loan officers may be subjective”  [Staff are busy] "they got other 
important issues". [and] "they may fill out the surveys themselves. ". - Finance Manager, Finca Kyrgyzstan, July 
2011 
118 Other MFOs in the ILO project faced a similar dilemma’s; ESAF and NRSP reported to keep assessments 
in-house as it was considered useful for learning of staff, while PRIDE outsourced the assessment as it was 
considered too time consuming (presentation of  3 MFOs at the European Microfinance Platform in Luxembourg 
in November 2012, 
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Table 28 Performance Management Tensions in IMON and Bai Tushum  
  Management 
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1. Attention to pursuing 
financial sustainability 
and growth of the  
portfolio.  
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quantitative financial 
growth targets 






















   Attention to the social 
mission. (e.g. wider 
impacts at the client 
level).  
 
Attention to control over 
more qualitative internal 
processes that build 
development values  
(Staff capacitation and 
learning, quality of 
monitoring and inventing 








3. The organisation is 
outward looking 
organisation with a 
focus on competitive 
position and the external 










The organisation is 
inward looking with 





































4. Staff (recruited) are 
experienced in 
microfinance and 
banking.   
 
5. Extrinsic motivational 
schemes  (high salaries, 




outside labour market 
with good expertise  
 
6. Strong shared 
assumptions held in the 
organization about social 
performance. 
 
7. Organisation has 
standardized products, 
delivery mechanisms 
and targeting policies 
with the aim to lower 
costs. 
 
8. Spending time on 
marketing and PR.  
 
 
9. Outsource Social 
























































































































Staff (recruited) are 
experienced in 
development and social 
work.   
 
Intrinsic motivational 
schemes,  such as internal 
opportunities, training, 
and staff capacitation, 
hiring recent graduates, 
training of trainers. 
 
 
Dialogue and open 
culture with the 
possibility to challenge 




diversified products with 
flexible delivery 
mechanisms and targeting 
with the aim to tailor to 
the needs of clients. 
 
Spending time on social 
performance assessment 
and product development 
 
Insource social 
performance assessment.  
 
* Note the Table represents an analysis of the PBM of the entire organisation, not just the pilot assessment. 
 
Several tensions that I observed were somewhat similar to those identified during the Imp-Act 
Consortium Action Research (Copestake et al 2005:175-176), namely those relating to mission, 
growth strategy, targeting methods, product development, experience and recruitment of staff (i.e. 
tension 1,2,4,7,8,9 in Table 28). Interestingly, as shown by the arrows, several of them tended to 
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change over the period 2009 to 2012. Managers in the MFO may be able to influence several of these 
aspects in a relatively short time span.  
 
However, I also observed a set of different and perhaps new tensions in the areas of staff motivation 
and organisational culture and in particular the shared assumptions held by staff with regard to the 
external environment and social performance outcomes of the company (i.e. tensions 3,5,6 in Table 
28). Interestingly, as shown by the arrows, several of these tensions did not tend to change over the 
period 2009 to 2012. They relate to more implicit institutional factors that are internal to the 
organisational culture (Huyczinsky and Buchanan 2007:128-129; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Frey and 
Jegen 2000, Nooteboom 2000; Cameron 2008, see p17). Managers may have less direct influence on 
them in the short term, although they may be able to influence these aspects in the long term. These 
implicit organisational institutions may be viewed as more path dependent (Denzau and North 
1994:22; North 2005:21; North 1994:364, and Copestake 2007, see Section 2.3, p19). Nonetheless, 
organisational culture and staff perception and motivation did influence the way the pilot was 
managed and implemented. Furthermore as an external agency the ILO and myself as a consultant, 
had limited influence on them.  
 
Currently the literature on SPM in microfinance is predominantly focused on strategic planning and 
objectives, products and services, management information systems and assessment methodology. To 
my knowledge, there is little literature in microfinance on behavioural systems such as staff 
motivation, motivational schemes and organisational culture. Social rating agencies and auditors such 
as Microfinance, M-Cril and CERISE, barely look at the issue of organisational culture and shared 
staff perceptions as part of their overall assessment. The Social Performance Standards (SPTF 2012) 
that provides SPM process standards for MFOs, also largely ignores implicit organisational cultures 
and motivational factors (see for more discussion 8.5.3). Nonetheless, these factors seemed important 
for the development management of both MFOs. I will come back to this when I return to the overall 
argument on changes in PBM.  
 
 
8.4. Influence of the ILO pilot on changes in Performance 
Management 
 
This Section will further review changes in PBM of the two MFOs in relation to the ILO pilot. It 
draws from the concept of SMMs (Denzau and North 1994) as one way to reflect whether the ILO 
pilot “modified” or “broadened” the dominant SMM of the MFOs [i.e. double loop learning]. Or 
alternatively, whether changes were incremental and temporary following existing patterns of thinking 
that stay “within” the dominant SMM [single loop learning], see Section 4.4.3, (p75) and Section 
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2.3.4, (p23). In doing so, I will focus on the “building block assumptions” and shared institutional 
values and beliefs held by staff towards social performance. Second, the concept of SMMs is useful to 
reflect to what degree the ILO could influence the SMM of the MFOs. 
 
8.4.1. Findings    
 
9. To what extent did performance management practices of MFOs change over the period 
2009 to 2012 (see Sections 6.5-6.6 and 7.5-7.6)?  
 
For Bai Tushum, I did not observe much change in the SMM of the organisation or what may be 
described as “within mental model” learning. At the outset in 2009, several staff shared the 
assumption that the organisation was achieving its social mission of job creation as illustrated by the 
view that larger loans led to more job creation in enterprises of clients. When this assumption was 
challenged by the assessment, the reaction of management was that it was a temporary mission failure. 
Few actions were undertaken in relation to job creation, for example, the MFO did not invest more 
resources to try to achieve better outcomes. Senior management seemed to become more modest about 
the capacity to create jobs through lending services. However, in the annual report the company 
communicated only positive outcomes by lowering the performance standard, indicating it was 
important to demonstrate good results to the outside environment.  
 
While the company had a normative social objective of job creation, in practice I would say, it was 
more commercially oriented and staff implicitly assumed lending operations continued to contribute to 
job creation (see Section 6.5, p137). The company’s SPM seemed constrained by its performance 
management of maintaining financial sustainability and portfolio growth (p138).   
 
In 2009, IMON staff shared the assumption that the organization was drifting from its social mission 
of promoting women’s entrepreneurship and empowerment. I observed a mixture of “within” SMM 
learning and “broadening” of the SMM. I experienced a broadening of the SMM in the sense that staff 
became more aware of gender constraints for women entrepreneurs. There was an improved capacity 
to do gender interventions for both IMON and NABWT. The organisation undertook several actions 
with the aim to reduce mission drift and to become more balanced in its PBM, (see the analysis Table 
28). However, at the same time, I observed “within mental model” learning because the company’s 
SPM initiatives remained constrained by the other objectives of reaching sustainability and growth. 
Despite that, the assessment showed no improvement in women’s empowerment, IMON gradually 
adapted the start-up loan product into a sustainable intervention by downscaling training duration and 





In my perspective, IMON managed to broaden its SMM, while Bai Tushum did not. SPM initiatives 
were constrained by the financial performance objectives such as maintaining sustainability and 
growth, requiring SPM activities to become financially sustainable.   
 
10. To what extent did an external agency as the ILO influence the performance management 
practices of the MFOs (see Sections 6.5 and 7.5)?   
 
I have argued that the Bai Tushum pilot would likely have been implemented even without the ILO 
project because already at the outset the organisation intended to scale-up the pilot. Doing the pilot 
offered some value for the company by allowing it to experiment with employment related indicators 
and demonstrating results to external stakeholders (see Section 6.5, p138).    
 
For IMON, I argued that although the ILO project may have speeded up social performance 
initiatives, it is again likely the company would have moved ahead with non-financial services 
products without the ILO’s support. Nonetheless, as reported by the CEO, the ILO offered relevant 
technical support such as the training module and performance assessment. Managers reported that the 
pilot functioned as a first activity in addressing mission drift, (see Section 7.5, p168).  
 
The ILO may offer technical support to MFOs such as setting up a survey and providing training 
modules. However, as an external agency, it had limited influence on the functioning of both MFOs. 
Particularly, there was little influence on more internal processes in the partner organisations 
including, for example, staff motivation, incentive schemes, staff and client feedback systems, 
organisational culture and multi-task problems.  
 
8.4.2. Reflection on the Findings   
 
I will now turn to the overall argument of the thesis, after which I will reflect on the premises and 
reasoning underpinning it, as well as its implications.     
 
This thesis is on performance management of social enterprise models for MFOs. It assesses to what 
degree this model is feasible in practice in terms of incorporation of social performance assessment, 
double bottom line management and changes in performance management. Among one of the main 
differences between the two case studies was that at the outset for Bai Tushum the driver to do social 
performance assessment was relatively external to the organisation, namely to demonstrate job 
creation to external stakeholders specifically politicians, investors and donors. However, for IMON 
the driver to do the assessment was more internal to the company, namely to reaffirm the 
organisation’s culture and historically embedded values, and to address social mission drift assumed 
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by staff in the company. Both organisations managed to inform themselves about client outcomes and 
received reality checks through doing the assessment. Pilot implementation was strongly constrained 
by the MFOs objective of trying to achieve financial sustainability and growth. PBM in both MFOs 
was strongly driven by financial performance objectives. Both MFOs scaled up their pilots and 
created a “business case” for it, although arguably the reports showed there was a minimal social case.  
For both MFOs learning seemed to come through implicit knowledge through doing the assessment 
and staff experience, rather than from explicit outcome reports. However, while IMON managed to 
enhance its capacity to do social performance management in terms of new activities, Bai Tushum did 
less so. Bai Tushum considered the assessment outcomes to be a temporary reality check, but for 
IMON it created more sustained changes in practices and perspectives of staff within the organisation. 
In my observation, IMON managed to create some “broadening” of its SMM by becoming more 
balanced in its performance management, while for Bai Tushum I observed predominantly within-
mental model learning. The external influence of the ILO on performance management was limited, 
although for IMON reported the ILO support to speed up organisational change.      
 
I argue that social performance management in social enterprises that is based on internal drivers is 
stronger in bringing about sustained organisational change than SPM driven by external drivers.  
External agencies such as the ILO can influence organisational change, but they are constrained by 
internal organisational values and institutions.  
 
The MFO that had an internal driver to start the pilot (IMON) was more open to the idea of mission 
drift, while the case study MFO that was driven by more external factors (BT) was less open to the 
idea of mission drift as it needed to communicate positive performance outcomes to the external 
environment. In turn, the capacity to do social performance management was a function of the 
willingness to introduce social performance assessment into the organisations. For IMON there was a 
real need to build capacity for social performance management as staff in the organisation felt it was 
important to address mission drift. For the MFO with more external drivers (BT) there was no strong 
need to build internal capacity for doing assessment on job creation because they were not doing the 
evaluation for their own operations and activities. Instead, they acted on areas such as customer 
satisfaction because this was important for their PBM.  
 
The reasoning behind the argument resonates and draws from a set of NIE literature that emphasizes  
the importance of “intrinsic motivation” (Ostherloh and Frey 2000), “internal commitment” (Senge 
2006) or “endogenous drivers” (Boettke, Coyne 2008 et al) for creating sustained organisational and 
institutional change (see Section 2.3.4, P25). Although these literatures are at different levels of 
abstraction, they argue that when an organisation’s PBM is driven by internal factors, they will be 
more committed to invest resources, build capacity and ownership (Frey and Osterloh 2000; Senge 
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2006, see p23). They are also more likely to institutionalize practices in ways that stick with local 
actors (Boettke, Coyne 2008 et al). When internally motivated, SMMs of the organisation may also be 
more open to learn from reality checks, and act on results (Denzau and North 1994:8-10; Senge 2006).  
 
The argument further resonates with a set of development management literature described in Section 
2.2,(p14), that points out externally imposed development management is unlikely to prevail, either 
because blue prints are not suitable for local contexts, unable to motivate local agents (Brinkerhof 
2008:989-991), or too technocratic (Hulme 2007b; Sanderson 2001:309; Thomas and Mohan 
2007:12). Likewise, the results of the thesis are sceptical about possible successes for development 
management that is more technocratic in nature (Binnendijk 1999; Meier 2003; ILO 2008a, see p13). 
In contrast, findings also do not resonate with the ideas of Cooke and Dar (2008, see p15) as 
effectively there was very little “social engineering” - the ILO ultimately had limited power over 
internal MFO practices.    
 
8.5. Reflection on the Argument   
 
I will now reflect on the argument as part of first, second and third person action research based on 
Reason and Mc-Ardle (2007) and Reason and Bradbury (2008) (see Section 4.5 p81 ).  
 
8.5.1. First person Action Research  
As part of first person action research, I will reflect on my personal learning, key premises of the 
argument and my choice to use the methodology of SMM.  
 
Personal Learning  
 
The key personal reflection is that myself and the ILO, did not have much influence on the 
functioning of the MFOs partners. In my view, we were simply not powerful enough to incept the idea 
of decent work into the SMMs of the MFOs. For BT, the “reality checks” of the assessment led to 
temporary changes in organisational practices. For IMON the support speeded up the SPM initiatives, 
and while these changes seemed sustainable, the organisation wanted to address its mission drift 
anyway because it was important for staff in the company. In reality, my contribution seemed 
marginal. I designed the survey, conducted data analysis and interacted with staff. However, without 
having much influence on more internal processes such as organisational culture, staff motivation, and 
staff feedback systems there were limited changes in SPM that the ILO staff and I could influence as 




This reality check was initially a painful learning experience for me; it was in tension with my own 
normative perspective since as a practitioner I do want to influence development practices (see 
Section 4.5: p82). An example of external support given by me that was of limited use for the MFO’s 
management decision-making were the outcome reports. Although staff needed timely information 
looking at a variety of questions, the reports mainly tested the effectiveness of the pilot by comparing 
treatment and control groups. We disseminated reports to the MFOs several months after the surveys 
were conducted, because it took a significant amount of time to complete them. On a more positive 
note, I felt positive about the various unintended practices that the MFOs launched without me having 
much influence on it. For Bai Tushum this included improving customer satisfaction surveying and 
for IMON this included several spin off activities in non-financial services, working conditions and 
formalisation.  
 
Bounded Rationality  
  
The argument relies on a set of premises. As described in Section 2.3 (p16), the first set of premises 
surround bounded rationality and fundamental uncertainty that form building block assumptions of the 
concept of mental models. This implies a world where managers in social enterprises try to achieve 
the best possible social and financial outcomes, but there is a significant cost of information,  a great 
degree of uncertainty in reaching performance, intended and unintended outcomes as well as limited 
feedback systems and knowledge transfer among actors. There will always be constructive tensions 
between the normative dimension, and reality, which is path dependent.  
 
Second, the argument rests on a strong analytical distinction between internal and external drivers of 
organisational change, whereas within these extremes it is possible to argue that they represent poles 
along a spectrum. This is similar to Frey and Jegen (2000:5) who highlight difficulties to determine 
exactly which part of motivation is extrinsic and intrinsic. They recognize both forms of motivation 
are needed for organisational performance; however using only extrinsic incentive systems is unlikely 
to yield good performance outcomes. It further overlaps with Cameron (2008) and Cameron and 
Quinn et al. (2005)’s view that many companies are either “inward” or “outward looking” looking, but 
within this tension the level of magnitude may vary. The argument resonates with Boettke et al (2008) 
who accept the idea that organisations may partly adapt some exogenously imposed institutions if they 
are accepted by endogenous institutions. IMON exemplified this by using the ILO project as a way to 
speed up internal action plans for SPM.  
 
Although the distinction between internal and external drivers is a deliberate attempt to simplify a 
complex reality, I argue this is still useful analytically to help understand different types of 
motivation. For example, Bai Tushum staff reported to be motivated by career making, salary and 
working conditions. This in contrast to IMON staff who were motivated by the company’s support to 
clients and feeling part of a transparent and leading organisation (see Section 5.5, 115). The first 
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associates more clearly with monetary motivation, while the second with internal commitment and 
feeling part of a shared identity or culture.  
 
Limitation in Methodology of Identifying SMMs 
 
A limitation of using the concept of SMMs as a methodological framework is that mental models are 
themselves highly implicit. Even with close involvement of the researcher, it is by definition complex 
to understand and to generalise about how actors make decisions (Kim 1993:4). This is because 
implicit knowledge is difficult to transfer from actors to the researcher (Kim 1993:4; Osterloh and 
Frey 2000; Cameron 2008, see p17). Nonetheless, I am reasonably confident that it was not the formal 
reports that led to changes in performance management because “decision-makers” were often 
unaware of results and even made the “decisions” before the outcome reports were drafted. Managers 
in both MFOs decided to scale up their pilots before the social performance outcomes were reported to 
them. This also made logical sense, as managers could not “freeze” product roll out and await final 
results of the report after two years.  
 
Furthermore, what actions were undertaken by the MFOs, were easier to observe than why those 
activities were undertaken.119 In some cases, staff did link the ILO assessment and the follow-up 
activities. In other cases, staff activities took place even before the ILO interventions, so it was clear 
they were not a direct result of the ILO activities. Data on why activities were undertaken could be 
triangulated with information gained from other interviews and sources to check credibility. In other 
cases, following the SMM framework (Denzau and North 1994) the actions may also have been based 
on a mixture of the ILO pilot, other interventions, existing beliefs and experiences and ad-hoc 
decisions.  
  
Trying to identify SMMs in development management was challenging because the concept is highly 
abstract (Denzau and North 2005; Haase et al 2007). As recognized in Section 2.3, (p25), while there 
is some evidence from the field of psychology on how mental models function in practice this 
evidence is in itself limited and researchers use different inductive methods to identify them (Holland 
et al 1996; Richard 2001). It is important to recognize that with limited empirical underpinning, (see 
e.g. Richards 2001:259-260; Denzau and North 1994; North 2005), the idea of SMMs is itself a 
philosophically and socially constructed concept. Anything we see, or fail to see, can be identified by 
researchers as a mental model (ideologies, cause-and-effects models, worldviews, linguistic 
communication, schema’s and analogies), making the concept seemingly vague.  
 
                                                 
119 It was not possible to attribute the ILO pilot assessment to a specific action, but it was possible to observe 
whether the pilot contributed or linked to new actions and ideas. Whether those activities would have been 
implemented even without the ILO pilot assessment was not possible to detect.  
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I started to understand the practical value of “SMMs” better by reading the more practitioner-based 
publications such as Kim (1993) and Argyris and Schon (1996) and Senge (2006), and by challenging 
belief systems as part of personal experiential learning. I believe the concept is still useful as a way for 
researchers to try to understand the social world around them. In addition, the concept is useful for 
explaining development management, particularly as a framework for how development values are 
embedded in the performance management of social enterprises.  
 
Nonetheless, “SMM” is not microfinance related discourse, and in doing the fieldwork, I deliberately 
avoided the use of the term (see chapters 6 and 7). Instead, I was using notions such as ‘organisational 
culture’, or ‘mind-set’, or ‘challenging our assumptions’, which was more user-friendly discourse than 
the term ‘mental model’ or ‘belief system’. Nonetheless, the concept has a value for this thesis 
because it forms one way of explaining different (shared) perspectives of actors that are often implicit.  
 
Furthermore, when I started the literature review I inductively identified three SMMs in microfinance 
based on the existing literature and wider ideological belief systems (see Chapter II). This was done at 
a high level of abstraction, and within this, I tried to inquire more deeply into the SMM of social 
enterprise. However, in opening the black box, I gradually discovered the complexities and diversity 
of SPM practices. Chapter V to Chapter VII illustrated the heterogeneity in double bottom line 
approaches more clearly. It also revealed that both MFOs were quite commercially focused. I do feel 
it is still justified to label Bai Tushum and IMON as “social enterprises” since both MFOs normatively 
pursued financial and social goals (see p57 in Section 3.4 and p115 Section 5.5 ). I will return to this 
point in Section 8.5.3 as part of the reflection on wider literature.   
 
By applying the concept of SMMs as a framework, I was able to link the macro with micro analysis.  
Initially, I found SMMs to be a meta-concept that was difficult to apply to the level of the 
microfinance companies because various literature is at a macro-level looking at ideological belief 
system, worldviews, etc. (see Table 1, p25 in Section 2.3.4). I applied these ‘macro-SMMs’ in 
Chapter II and III to the literature review of microfinance by inductively identifying a development 
first, business first and social enterprise SMMs. Nonetheless as shown by the two case studies, reality 
was more complex. For example, Table 28 (p189), illustrates this by showing a spectrum between 
social and financial performance management tensions.120 I also found a large set of literature on 
‘micro-SMMs’ in the fields of organisational development and action research (Kim 1993: Cameron 
2008; Senge 2006; Argyris and Schon 1996). As described in Section 4.4.3 (p75), I applied this body 
                                                 
120 As described Section 2.3.6 (see p28), the division in three models was itself a deliberate attempt to 
simplify a complex reality. Nonetheless, it was still defendable to classify only three models because it 
illustrated a plurality of views in performance management in microfinance. Several other authors have used  
somewhat similar classifications (Woller et al 1999; Dunford 2000; Mayoux 2000; Rhyne 2001; Robinson 
2001; van Maanen 2004; Seibel et al 2002; Kabeer 2008). 
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of literature in Chapter V to Chapter VII by looking at the norms and perspectives of staff, the 
organisational culture of the microfinance companies and organisational learning.  
 
Limitation of my Action Research Method 
 
In an ideal action research setting, I would use a cycled learning approach adjusting the client-level 
questionnaire after each round of surveying based on the empirical findings and practical realities in 
the data collection. However, under the joint methodology of the ILO, the survey questions were kept 
similar over time to be able to track changes in client outcomes with quantitative data.121 I do feel my 
choice for action research is defendable because of my own inquiry into the broader ILO study (see 
4.2.3). I have used my own qualitative data collection assessing changes in the PBM of the MFOs. 
This data collection was adjusted using a cycled learning approach to improve my understanding as a 
researcher.  
 
Chapter 6 and 7 illustrated how the MFO staff experienced the pilot implementation by using a 
‘double learning loop’ of diagnostic (sec 3.5.), pilot design (Sections 6.2 and 7.3), pilot 
implementation, assessment strategy, data collection, data analysis (Section 6.3 and 7.3), empirical 
findings (Sections 6.4 and 7.4) and follow-up activities (Section 6.5 and 7.5.). While in theory I could 
have described more cycles, for example by explaining loop learning after each separate survey round, 
in practice this would require more fieldwork and complicate the comparative case study analysis.  
 
8.5.2. Second Person Action Research – Lessons for the ILO 
 
What lessons can be learned for the ILO? I will address this by looking at the main objectives set by 
the Social Finance Program at the outset, namely to generate knowledge about decent work outcomes 
and costs, to build capacity in the MFOs for piloting and to promote the decent work agenda within 
the microfinance sector, see Section 3.4 (p56).  
 
Decent Work Outcomes 
 
The pilot assessments generated sufficient knowledge about decent work aspects of job creation and 
women’s empowerment to inform the SMM’s of the MFO with new client level information. 
However, we did not manage to generate rigorous impact assessment results (see also ILO 2012, June: 
9-13).   
  
                                                 
121 One exception here is that the surveys were shortenened after each round of surveying by deleting questions 
that were not subject to change or which generated weak data quality.  
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Leaving aside the methodological limitations of the studies, we found the “averaged” changes in client 
outcomes were minimal for both pilot assessments. For Bai Tushum, the empirical findings resonated 
with Sebstad and Chen (1996) and Hulme and Mosley (1996). They found that few microfinance 
clients owned SMEs with wageworkers and that loan size is weakly correlated with job creation (see 
Section 3.3.2). Given the short time span and lack of control group, the ILO wanted to do further 
piloting in this decent work aspect. The IMON pilot study indicated the entrepreneurship training and 
start-up loan had positive effects on self-employment and business start-up, no effect on women’s 
empowerment, and mixed effects on business practices. Other studies looking at the impact of 
entrepreneurship training (Karlan and Valdivia (2006;2009:15&24-25; Kevane 1996:2-4; Dunford 
2001:9-11) and access to microcredit (Banerjee, Duflo et al 2007; Crepon et al 2011) also show very 
mixed results (see Section 3.3.2, p52). The ILO considered the IMON study sufficient evidence and 
did not plan additional studies.  
 
However, as described earlier (p179), it remains doubtful whether other MFOs would yield similar 
results when implementing start-up loan products or SME loan delivery systems, because they work in 
different contexts and have different organisational processes.122 The external validity of findings 
remains questionable.  
 
Impact assessments have often been applauded by researchers as a way to objectively make inferences 
for public policy making (Karlan and Goldberg 2007; Duflo et al 2007). While both MFOs were 
interested in the business case, it was questionable how useful the public policy case perspective was 
for them. Particularly, the question remains whether MFOs that are externally driven to do SPM are 
interested in sharing negative results of client level assessments with their external environment. The 
case of Bai Tushum is interesting here, as the MFO lowered its decent work standard from job 
creation to self-employment, as a way to communicate positive results to external stakeholders. For 
IMON sharing negative findings was less of a problem as they were more inward looking and did not 
feel pressured by the political environment.  
 
The case studies illustrated staff in the financial companies did not base decisions to scale-up the pilot 
on impact assessment results. An open question for further research is whether politicians would base 
such policy on formal impact assessment reports or whether they would use ideology, experiential 
learning and ad hoc decision making.  
 
 
                                                 
122 For example, the HUMO start-up loan described in section 5.4.6, (p111) was a somewhat similar start-up 
loan on the surface. However it used a different training module, loan product, target group and implementation 
area. Being a smaller finanical company, HUMO invested less human resources into launching the product. The 
MFO was unable to scale-up the program, disbursing only 70 loans and training only 7 trainers, over the period 
2009 to 2012. For example, this is much less than the 1.285 loans disbursed by IMON.  
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Build Institutional Capacity in MFOs 
 
In terms of the ILO’s objective of building human and organisational capacity to do continuous decent 
work piloting, this thesis finds its role as initiator of SPM is limited. This does not imply that the 
Labour Organisation has absolutely no role to play in partnerships; for example, it may offer technical 
assistance among those MFOs that have an internal driver for SPM. The case study of IMON showed 
that external support of the ILO may speed up internal action plans to improve the capacity for SPM. 
This is consistent with Boettke et al (2008), who accept that organisations may partly adapt some 
exogenously imposed institutions if they resonate with endogenous institutions. While the ILO may 
offer technical assistance modules or expertise, given its own budgetary constraints, it is unlikely to 
continuously fund improvements in institutional capacity. One plausible option is to do simpler and 
cheaper assessments and allocate more funds to direct technical support. 
 
Second, if MFO staff learn through multiple experimentations, then perhaps from the outset we should 
have allocated more resources towards doing joint reflection and analysis, rather than “independent” 
outcome reporting. The initial idea was to offer an objective outside view to the MFOs, and also to 
reduce the burden of staff to do data analysis. Doing joint evaluation likely implies simplifying the 
assessment method because it is doubtful that staff would have had capacity to do longitudinal studies. 
It also means management has to allow staff to reflect on the joint analysis. 
 
Third, the ILO should partner with MFOs that are internally committed to SPM. Efforts need to be 
made to screen for organisational commitment and culture. “Buy-in” or motivation of staff and 
management was recognized at the closing workshop by most MFO managers to be one of the main 
challenges in piloting (ILO 2012:15, June conference report). However, “buy-in” is in itself hard to 
detect and a proper screening needs to be done through personal conversation, rather than formal 
applications. A starting point would be to see whether the organisation is internally or externally 
driven to do SPM. For example, MFOs that want to address mission drift on certain decent work 
aspects may be more like-minded to build capacity for piloting, when compared to a financial 
company that wants to build image. And even if internally driven to do SPM, the MFOs may have 




Promote the Decent Work Agenda 
 
In terms of the usefulness for the ILO to promote its decent work agenda through MFOs, we did not 
find the pilots creating strong negative employment outcomes for the clients as suggested by the 
radical “development first” perspectives of Weber (2001), Dichter (2005) and Bateman and Chan 
(2009), see Section 3.3.3, (p53). For example, unlike Weber (2001) who argues that MFOs may 
undermine associations and right to organise, the case study of IMON showed it can also support 
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business association. Likewise both pilot assessments refute anecdotal views of “business first”, that 
MFOs may strongly improve decent work aspects of job creation and empowerment (Robinson 
2001:37; Von Pischke 1991:41, see p54). For example, the Bai Tushum case study exemplified that 
simply offering loans is not enough to create jobs. Within these two extreme perspectives, an overall 
finding was that the pilots had limited influence on job creation and women’s empowerment.  
 
The ILO may play an important normative role for social enterprise MFOs. Drawing from Ghai 
(2002:2), Section 3.2, by being part of the MDGs, decent work may be seen as an easier way to 
communicate to the microfinance sector than traditional labour conventions. Within the Social 
Performance Taskforce, the ILO Social Finance Program may fill a considerable gap and function as 
an alternative to more minimal and Neo-liberal views of how to pursue financial inclusion that 
dominate thinking of CGAP and the World Bank (see p32). For example, while in 2008, the SPTF 
showed little attention to the decent work agenda (SPTF 2008), in 2010 it was incorporated in the 
social performance standards as a guidance for human resource policies of MFOs and for establishing 
basic performance indicators for employment reporting (SPTF 2012). This in a somewhat similar way 
as it has done in the area of corporate social responsibility (e.g. IFC 2006; GRI 2008).  
 
However, it is questionable whether this normative perspective might translate into development 
practice. The rigour and motivation to track clients’ decent work outcomes strongly vary across MFOs 
and depend on their organisational cultures, rather than the influence of the ILO itself. The ILO can 
aim to promote its agenda by collaborating with MFOs that are internally driven to improve decent 
work aspects for clients. However, working in partnership with MFOs that are internally committed 
by no means guarantees positive employment outcomes. After all, both case studies indicated client 
level changes were minimal. The findings merely illustrate that an external agency such as the ILO 
may have limited influence on PBM of MFOs when its agenda does not resonate with that of people 
working in the financial companies. 
 
Other factors also matter. For example, both organisations seemed constrained in promoting 
employment outcomes for clients by the complex environments that they worked in (see for example 
Sections 5.3.4 and 5.4.4).123 Both MFOs were also constrained by internal factors in decent work 
piloting including their own organisational goals of maintaining financial sustainability and growth. 
Being active in a complex environment and having to survive in it left for a limited agency to 
influence employment outcomes of clients (Denzau and North 1994:22; North 2005:21; North 
1994:364, and Copestake 2007, see Section 2.3, p19).  
 
                                                 
123 For Bai Tushum, this was illustrated by the Kyrgyz political crises affecting the implementation of the pilot 
experiment. For IMON this was illustrated by societal gender norms constraining implementation of the start-
up loan program. 
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In terms of development practice, while the historical role of the ILO has been to set normative labour 
standards, perhaps the ILO could function as an auditor of social enterprise practices. Another role 
may be to document and share knowledge about how decent work piloting was carried out in other 
contexts. A last area is that the ILO may offer diagnostics and technical support to social businesses 
that are internally driven to implement such practices, but that lack the expertise to do so.  
 
 
8.5.3. Third person Action Research  
 
As part of third person action research, I will reflect on the argument’s claims to external validity and 
its implications for wider literature.  
 
As described in Section 4.5 (p88), this is a case study analysis that by definition lacks external validity 
in a statistical sense (Shadish et al 2002: 464-468). However, lessons learned particularly on the 
processes of doing the assessments may apply to other contexts, for example to larger MFOs, and 
MFOs working Central Asia. The argument can be further tested in different settings; it may be 
interesting to see whether the pilot implementation and outcomes would be very different if carried 
out in other organisations. Lessons learned from the two case studies can also challenge some of the 
literature of microfinance, social enterprise and development management.  
 
Recently the idea of social enterprise (Yunus 2007; Dunford 2006) has become increasingly popular 
alongside the idea of social entrepreneurship (Dees et al 1998; Borzaga and Defourny 2001; Austin et 
al 2006; Nichols 2006:xiv; Lehner 2012), corporate social responsibility (e.g. GRI 2008) and 
sustainable development (WCED 1988:17). It has also sparked the interest of governments in light of 
an ill-defined Post Washington consensus, and in the context of the MDGs, new development 
management and public private partnerships (see Section 2.6). During the global financial crises from 
2008 to 2013, social enterprises also seemed to become popular in the political context of financial 
austerity measures and budget cuts on development aid because they promote “cost-effective” and 
“efficient” forms of sustainable development through private enterprise.  
 
For example, the European Commission has recently set up a fund of EUR 300 million to promote 
social business thinking particularly for investments in microfinance.124 In 2013, the Dutch 
government was launching a social business fund of EUR 750 million in the context of austerity 
measures. As of December 2012, assets of MIVs invested in MFOs reached a total portfolio of 
                                                 
124 The fund was launched because, it was considered “inefficient to provide development aid through 
governments”, [and that] “in general there is major interest in private sector development in the 
OECD”…“Private sector and low profit funds can solve social problems that cannot be solved by the public 
sector” - Ulrich Grabenwarter from European Investment Fund, Luxembourg European Microfinance Platform, 
Nov 2012).  
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US$ 6,3 Billion, growing at fast rates between 10-25% per annum over the period December 2008 to 
2012. It has also become a profitable industry (Symbiotics 2013). Some of this funding is private, but 
many investments were made through donor and public money, particularly from development finance 
agencies such as the World Bank, IFC, EIF, EBRD, FMO, KFW etc. CGAP (2013:4) considers it “an 
opportunity to leverage private investments into solving development goals (particularly as aid 
budgets are under pressure).”  
 
If the two case studies are relevant examples for the microfinance sector then it generates several 
interesting lessons learned for the feasibility of double bottom line management. As described in 
Section 8.2, data collection (for quantitative) social performance measurements through client level 
assessment seemed less institutionalized compared to financial performance assessment at the level of 
the organisation (see p177). Second, in terms of double bottom line management, both MFOs seemed 
to combine financial and social objectives, but on the condition that financial sustainability for the 
pilots were not compromised in the medium term, in spite of the fact that changes in client outcomes 
were minimal (see p183). Thus, based on the two case studies, social enterprise as preached by Yunus 
(2007), Dunford (2000), Daley Haris (2002; 2009; see Section 2.6.2, p38) is not delivering on its 
normative promise in practice in terms of SPM. Social enterprises may achieve their financial goals 
better than their social goals. Perhaps we should call it “single-and-a-half” rather than “double” 
bottom line management! Within this spectrum, Bai Tushum functioned more like a commercial 
company that espouses corporate socially responsibility (see p139), while IMON was more balanced 
(see p171).     
 
According to Yunus (2007:22) “The social business works as any other type of business “but its 
underlying objective – and the criterion by which it should be evaluated – is to create social benefits 
for those whose lives it touches…. A social business is cause-driven rather than profit driven, with the 
potential to act as a change agent for the world.”  He continues by advocating that the “social 
enterprise does not rely on charity, a social business has to recover its costs by charging a price or a 
fee for its services (Yunus 2007:22). However, while the case studies confirmed sustainable 
organisations may not be highly profit driven, not all social enterprises are cause driven either as 
illustrated by the case study of Bai Tushum. Further, limited systems were in place to evaluate the 
“social benefits for those whose lives it touches”. The two case studies show the limitations of social 
enterprises in pursuing “human capitalism”, and indicate that in practice MFOs may be more 
capitalistic than Yunus (2007:22) claims.   
 
This raises an important question about the role the ILO may play in the social enterprise SMM (see 
Section 3.6, p64); if social enterprise MFOs are in practice closer to achieving their financial goals 
rather than their development goals, the implication may be that MFOs have a limited role to play in 
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promoting decent work aspects for clients. The case study of IMON is interesting as it was given an 
A+ rating in SPM, indicating it is one of the sector’s “best practice” organisations (see p171, Section 
6.6). However, the social performance assessment showed limited effects of the pilot on women’s 
empowerment and revealed gender constraints and barriers to women’s entrepreneurship that were not 
easily handled through microfinance operations. The case study of Bai Tushum enforced the need to 
be cautious in viewing MFOs as effective vehicles for job creation.  
 
Steering SPM Practices and Standards 
 
A question is to what degree social enterprises may effectively be steered by other external 
development agencies such as donors, investors and the Social Performance Taskforce (SPTF). In 
June 2012 at a conference in Jordan, the SPTF endorsed a minimum set of 98 essential process 
standards on SPM for MFOs that pursue double bottom line goals. “Meeting the standards signifies an 
institution has strong social performance management practices” (SPTF 2012:7; 8-10).  
 
However, the case study MFOs had a limited capacity to integrate SPM practices into their operations. 
Instead, SPM processes had to be multi-tasked with other objectives of growth and financial 
sustainability and were moulded by financial objectives. It is questionable whether these two case 
study organisations, which are among the largest MFOs in Central Asia, would be able to implement 
these 98 practices. While impact assessment methodology was criticized in this chapter for ignoring 
internal organizational processes, the Social Performance Taskforce (SPTF) standards more recently 
seem subject to comparable limitations.  
 
They “respond to an industry concern that the sector has lost focus on their clients” and MFOs were 
mainly concerned with financial sustainability (SPTF 2012:8). Although the case study results 
subscribe this is a valid concern, as client outcomes were limited, it is unlikely that the SPTF 
standards themselves as an external institution will contribute to more rigorous performance 
management practices for clients. They themselves form a danger of increasing outside pressure from 
donors and investors on MFOs to comply with the reporting of standardized indicators and “best 
practices”. For example, there has been increased pressure among investors to set social performance 
covenants in lending and equity contracts. The push may also be exemplified by campaigns set up by 
donors such as the Client Protection Principles certification, PPI certification, donor-driven social 
ratings, and awards like “Truelift”, “seal of excellence”, or “S.T.A.R.” Drawing from literature on 
development management, such as Hulme (2007b), Sanderson (2001:309) and Thomas and Mohan 
(2007:12, see Section 2.2, p14), SPM seems at risk of becoming a technocratic system of “ticking of 
boxes” trying to comply with donor and investor driven standards (see Section 2.2). Likewise, 
drawing from Brinkerhof 2008 (989-991, p14) it is questionable whether such blue prints are then 
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suitable for local contexts and able to motivate local agents. Moreover, the standards themselves pay 
little attention to organisational culture and motivation (see p190), because these are implicit 
processes that are not easy to report on. The SPTF standards may be overwhelming for many MFO 
and the resources it may require to “comply” with all 98 best practice standards could even  
undermine their capacity to adopt a more client-centred approach.  
 
This thesis suggests that the donor and investor community will have to downscale their expectations 
for double bottom line management in promoting goals such as job creation, women’s empowerment, 
quality of employment (see Section 3.3.3, p54). With that should also come a reality check that they 
themselves may have limited control over social enterprises. For example, two campaigns that can be 
more realistic about microfinance practices  are the Microcredit Summit Campaign (Daley Harris 
2002; 2009) and the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF 2008:2012, see Section 2.6), which 
embody the belief that double bottom line management is both effective and desirable. An open 
question for further research is whether investors and donors are motivated to downscale their 
objectives, given that they have political and financial stakes in the microfinance sector. Another issue 
to explore further is whether donors and investors practice what they preach in terms of double bottom 
line management.125  
 
Second, following the case study findings social enterprise MFOs willing to pursue double bottom 
line management may need to become more aware of their (limited) capacity and commitment to do 
SPM. This includes reflecting on whether development practices are in line with normative aims. 
Specifically, whether in the context of pursuing double bottom line management, organisations are 
allocating sufficient resources towards a multiple set of goals. One way to do this is by making SPM 
more ’tension seeking’ – by emphasizing more trade-offs between social and financial performance 
goals, rather than focusing on ‘best practices’ or ‘win-win’ situations. There is also scope for more 
reflection from practitioners on their belief systems.126 Chapter II discussed that “social enterprise” 
may be based on a convenient belief that social and financial goals create synergies. As such it is then 
                                                 
125 For example, several MFO managers remarked investors do not even look at SPM in their due diligence.  
-“investors only “looked at the coefficients and the balance sheet. One investor said, “We never read the social 
rating report.”- CEO ABN Oct 2011  
- “Most investors look at the financial aspects. There is a drive towards financial sustainability, which is set in 
by investors. [For example,] One of the investors told me that interest rate is lower than the competition. He then 
asked why don’t you increase your interest rates” - CEO Oxus Tajikistan Oct 2011. This frustrated the CEO.    
- An “external (social) rating is not needed because investors and donors do not base their judgement on 
ratings.”-Finca Kyrgyzstan Oct 2011  
-Another mentioned “SPM could attract investors” - Investment officer, HUMO Oct 2011.  
 
126 This is an area for further research, but some interesting work has been done recently. For 
example, Lehner (2012:1) finds that social entrepreneurs often implicitly assume that philanthropy is 
an inefficient form of development aid, and that companies can steer innovation proactively, and that 
self-help interventions such as microfinance and fair trade are more cost-effective forms of 
development (Lehner 2012). 
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a convenient way of looking at the world for various microfinance actors such as donors including the 
ILO, investors, commercial banks and policy makers. However, the two case studies indicated social 
enterprise MFOs may be subject to path dependence as they are constrained by their own trying 
financial performance or survival within the wider operating environment.     
 
More research is needed in these areas particularly also looking at the linkage between social 
performance assessment and organisational and institutional change in MFOs. The result that loan 
officers and other staff learned from doing the assessment raises an important question on how to 
transfer implicit knowledge on social performance within MFOs. This research used “outcome 
reports.” and “PowerPoint presentations” for the two case studies to disseminate analysis.  An 
interesting area for follow-up research would be to see whether social media could play a more 
prominent role in SPM: the use of video clips of client interviews to generate reflection among 
managers, for example. The research indicates it may be important for staff in MFOs to have regular 
interactions with clients because this can generate useful experiential learning. But it also finds 
significant scope for improvement in knowledge management that translates client feedback into 
routine operations of MFOs.  
 
Prospects of Social enterprise from the Perspective of the SMMs  
 
How are the prospects for the social enterprise SMM viewed from the perspective of the other SMMs 
described in Chapters II and III? When viewed from a business first perspective (Robinson 2001; Von 
Pishke 1991; Von Pishke et al 2008, see Section 2.4) the main risk of balancing social and financial 
goals is that competition will undermine any goal other than profits and growth. Commercial 
microfinance is simply the more cost-effective model. It may be feasible to offer “hundreds” of start-
up and SME loans, but ultimately, both decent work interventions needed to become sustainable in 
order to be accepted by the MFOs. Likewise, the case studies illustrate many technical and practical 
problems arising in doing social performance assessment, including issues of attribution, measurement 
and implementation costs.  
 
When viewed from the development first SMM (see Section 2.5), “social enterprise” is built on the 
impossible yet convenient belief that microfinance generates social and financial performance. Such 
beliefs form easy window-dressing opportunities for opportunistic capitalists who pretend to care 
about human development (Fernando 2006:205-208; Weber 2001). SPM is nothing more than a “PR-
puff” driven by organisational image building (e.g. see Bateman and Chang 2009:23; Dicther 2005). 
Microfinance companies may promote decent work aspects mainly as a form of corporate social 
responsibility to build an image. They may use it to boost staff morale. However, it is doubtful that 
this will be in the best interest of clients. The findings also illustrate that both MFOs generated limited 
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employment outcomes at client level. A wider range of financial and non-financial services (e.g. 
Hulme & Mosely 1996, Wood and Sharif 1997, Nissanke 2002) as well as government support 
(Ditcher 2005; Fernando et al 2007; Bateman and Chang 2009), are needed to reach wider social 
impacts. “Social enterprise” may undermine better ways of doing development since it lures precious 
resources away from more meaningful “development first” interventions such as social protection or 
cash transfers.127  
 
Social enterprise advocates may respond that it is still better to have normative ambitions to achieve a 
double bottom line, even if in practice the two goals are more difficult to manage, measure and 
accomplish. There is a risk that normative social goals will be downplayed, leaving only a financial 
inclusion agenda for business first MFOs. They may also contest the wider relevance of the findings 
of this thesis by arguing that the institutionalisation of social performance requires decades rather than 
years, or that the two case studies are highly context specific exceptions to norms elsewhere. They 
could even question whether the case studies were genuine “social enterprise models”, despite the 
explicit claims of both MFOs to be pursuing twin objectives. 
 
Further Research on Decent Work and Sustainable Development  
 
An even broader question is whether we can achieve the MDG of decent work and simultaneously 
generate economic development. While a full assessment of the feasibility of sustainable development 
is clearly beyond the scope of this research, the two case studies bring forward ideas for further 
research. The case studies indicate managing the goals of sustainable human and financial 
development is complex and challenging. It may be interesting to do similar research on other social 
enterprise activities such as fair trade, cooperative development, health and education. It may also be 
interesting to do extra case studies comparing different types of organisations such as commercial 
banks, social enterprise and NGOs on their PBM and organisational drivers. The case studies indicate 
that in the context of path dependency and co-evolution, the capacity of social businesses in 
promoting sustainable human development may be highly constrained by their own survival in a wider 
environment. More research is welcome identifying constraints and boundaries of double bottom line 





                                                 
127 Whether social enterprises may crowd out development aid and private donations during times of austerity 
measures was beyond the scope of this research, but this forms an interesting area for further research (e.g. see 
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